Com. v. Brewer
| Decision Date | 14 July 1978 |
| Citation | 479 Pa. 558,388 A.2d 1071 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Charles Henry BREWER, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Albert M. Nichols, Dist. Atty., Patrick H. Mahady, Asst. Dist. Atty., Greensburg, for appellee.
Before EAGEN, C. J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ.
This is an appeal from orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County dated September 15, 1976. The case has a unique procedural history.
Charles Henry Brewer was indicted for the murder of his two-year-old stepdaughter, who died on January 19, 1959. On August 31, 1959, Brewer, who was represented by court-appointed counsel, entered a plea of not guilty and trial by jury began on that date. On the third day of trial, after the Commonwealth had presented the testimony of eleven witnesses, Brewer entered a plea of guilty to the charge of murder generally. The guilty plea was accepted on the same day and the jury was discharged. On the following day the court conducted a hearing to determine the degree of guilt. During this hearing, the Commonwealth introduced a pretrial statement by Brewer and the defense introduced testimony of four witnesses in mitigation of Brewer's conduct. The court found Brewer guilty of murder of the first degree and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. Brewer was not advised of his right to appeal and no appeal was taken.
After serving more than eleven years in prison, Brewer, represented by the public defender, filed a petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act, Act of January 25, 1966 P.L. (1965) 1580, § 1 et seq., 19 P.S. § 1180-1 et seq. (Supp.1977-78) setting forth six reasons in support of his claim for relief, including the obstruction of his right to appeal. By order of the PCHA court dated November 2, 1970, Brewer was granted the right to appeal from his plea of guilty and the judgment of sentence nunc pro tunc. The PCHA court did not address Brewer's remaining complaints.
No appeal was filed; instead on November 6, 1970, the public defender filed a motion to withdraw Brewer's guilty plea and to vacate the sentence. A series of reasons were asserted in support of the motion. On February 26, 1971, the public defender filed an amended motion to vacate the sentence alleging that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proof to raise the crime from murder of the second degree to murder of the first degree.
On August 27, 1971, a court en banc dismissed Brewer's motion of February 26, 1971, to vacate sentence ruling there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of murder of the first degree. The court failed to rule on Brewer's motion to withdraw his guilty plea or to decide the issues raised therein. An appeal was not perfected from this order although Brewer directed his attorney to appeal. 1
On March 25, 1976, Brewer filed a second PCHA petition. Following a counseled hearing on that petition the PCHA court concluded it had inadvertently overlooked Brewer's motion of November 6, 1970, to withdraw the guilty plea, so it then proceeded to consider and dispose of that motion. Permission to withdraw the guilty plea was denied. At the same time, the court considered the petitions seeking post conviction relief and entered an order denying such relief. This appeal challenges the orders of September 15, 1976, denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea and denying the request for post conviction relief.
We have concluded the circumstances evidenced by the record dictate that we ignore procedural irregularities and afford Brewer a fair and complete appellate review of the errors he says occurred in the prosecution which resulted in his conviction. Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963).
First, Brewer maintains the trial court should have rejected his guilty plea because during the proceedings to determine the degree of guilt, testimony developed which demonstrated he had a complete defense to the charge of homicide. Cf. Commonwealth v. Roundtree, 440 Pa. 199, 269 A.2d 709 (1970).
The testimony alluded to is that of a Dr. Altman, called by the defense at the hearing conducted to establish the degree of guilt in an effort to mitigate Brewer's criminal responsibility.
On direct examination Dr. Altman testified in part as follows:
I would say he was definitely emotionally immature, he probably has the immaturity of a child in him; he didn't know the difference between right and wrong.
So there's no question what this man has emotional immaturity, so therefore, you have a person who is not psychotic, a person who is a psychopathic personality, a person who is emotionally immature, who don't (sic) know the difference between right and wrong . . .. and I still don't think he does (sic) the difference between right and wrong, and he never will know possibly . . . ."
However, on cross-examination, the doctor qualified his opinion:
Assuming Dr. Altman's testimony established a viable defense of insanity, the situation presented is ruled by Commonwealth v. Slavik, 449 Pa. 424, 297 A.2d 920 (1972). As we held in Slavik, where a plea of guilty is unequivocal and accepted on this basis by the court, its validity is not impugned by testimony subsequently given at a degree-of-guilt hearing.
Next, Brewer maintains that his guilty plea was invalid because it was not intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered. It is argued the record does not demonstrate that he understood the nature of the charges to which he pled guilty and the ramifications of pleading guilty. In other words, the standard for on-the-record guilty plea colloquies enunciated by this Court in Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974), was not met.
The record in this case contains the following colloquy conducted by the trial court before accepting Brewer's plea.
The colloquy, while defective by today's standards, must be evaluated by standards in effect in 1959 when the plea was entered. 2 At that time a defendant who was represented by counsel at a guilty-plea hearing was presumed to have entered a knowing and voluntary plea. The burden of proving otherwise rested on the defendant. Commonwealth v. Alston, 473 Pa. 40, 373 A.2d 741 (1977); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 462 Pa. 571, 342 A.2d 81 (1977); Commonwealth ex rel. Crosby v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 81, 202 A.2d 299 (1964). The standard for determining the validity of a guilty plea entered at that time is that the plea must have been voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made by the defendant, with an understanding of the charges against him, of the constitutional rights being waived, and of the consequences of his plea. Commonwealth v. Alston, supra.
However, in Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Myers, 423 Pa. 1, 222 A.2d 918 (1966), we noted that because the cases had not prescribed a fixed procedure for determining a defendant's understanding of his plea, convictions based on guilty pleas would not be disturbed merely because the court had failed to examine the defendant at the time it accepted his plea. Rather, the defendant's understanding would be treated as a factual issue to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
In the instant case Brewer initially pled not guilty to the charge of murdering his stepdaughter. After three days of trial before a jury, when the Commonwealth had substantially completed its case, he entered a plea of guilty. In view of these circumstances, we can assume that Brewer was aware he was presumed to be innocent of the charges against him and that he had a right to a jury trial.
Testimony at the November 2, 1970 PCHA hearing included that of Brewer personally, who stated he...
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