Com. v. Brooks

Decision Date30 December 2003
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Billy BROOKS, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

George Henry Newman, Philadelphia, for Billy Brooks appellant.

Hugh J. Burns, Philadelphia, Amy Zapp, Harrisburg, for the Com. of PA, appellee.

Before: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and LAMB, JJ

OPINION

Justice NIGRO.

Following a jury trial, Appellant Billy Brooks was found guilty of first-degree murder and possession of an instrument of crime ("PIC"). The jury returned a verdict of death, and on January 23, 1992, the trial court formally imposed the death sentence. Appellant filed post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied. This direct appeal followed, and we now reverse and remand the matter for a new trial.1

On December 26, 1990, Appellant, an inmate at Holmesburg prison, stabbed and killed another inmate, Eric Vaughn, during an argument over a bathrobe. Appellant was subsequently charged with first-degree murder, PIC, and conspiracy. Thomas Turner, Esquire2 was appointed to represent Appellant. Jury selection for Appellant's trial began on January 7, 1992, at which time Appellant informed the trial court that he was so dissatisfied with Mr. Turner's representation that he requested permission to represent himself.3 The trial court allowed Appellant to proceed pro se, with Mr. Turner serving as standby counsel. After Appellant was granted permission to represent himself, he and Mr. Turner essentially took turns presenting Appellant's case to the jury.4 The jury ultimately found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder and PIC, but acquitted him of conspiracy. Following the penalty hearing, the jury concluded that the two aggravating circumstances it found outweighed the one mitigating circumstance it also found, and returned a verdict of death.5 In his appeal to this Court, Appellant raises numerous claims of the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, including a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to meet with him at all prior to his trial.6 As we agree with Appellant that counsel was clearly ineffective in this regard, we reverse.

The law presumes that counsel has rendered effective assistance. See Commonwealth v. Balodis, 747 A.2d 341 (Pa.2000)

. Therefore, to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, Appellant must demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel's course of conduct was without a reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interest; and (3) he was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness, i.e., that there is a reasonable probability that but for the act or omission in question, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. See Commonwealth v. Douglas, 558 Pa. 412, 737 A.2d 1188, 1199 (1999). This Court has made it clear that counsel's failure to prepare for trial is "simply an abdication of the minimum performance required of defense counsel." Commonwealth v. Perry, 537 Pa. 385, 644 A.2d 705, 709 (1994). Moreover, this Court has determined that in a death penalty case, "it is not possible to provide a reasonable justification for [defending a case] without thorough preparation." Id.

Here, during the post-verdict hearings, Mr. Turner testified regarding his failure to meet with Appellant prior to trial as follows:

Q. [Appellant's appellate counsel]: I see. Now, you tried Billy Brooks trial before a jury before Judge Halbert, isn't that true?
A. [Mr. Turner]: That is correct.
Q. And prior to picking the jury, you had never met Mr. Brooks, isn't that true?
A. I had never met him personally, no, face to face, no.
Q. You had spoken to him one time over the telephone, is that correct?
A. No, I probably spoke to him more than one time over the telephone.
Q. Do you have a specific recollection of more than one conversation?
A. I have a specific recollection of one long conversation and I have some of others.
Q. How long was that one conversation?
A. Probably twenty minutes to a half hour.
Q. And you have no specific recollection of any other conversation prior to that?
A. I know I talked to him. But I have no specific recollection, no.

N.T., 7/16/1996, at 9-10. As this testimony makes clear, Mr. Turner never once met with Appellant in person before his trial on capital charges. In fact, Mr. Turner testified that he could only specifically recall one telephone conversation with Appellant, and that conversation lasted just twenty minutes to one-half hour. It should go without saying that no lawyer, no matter how talented and efficient, can possibly forge a meaningful relationship with his client and obtain adequate information to defend that client against first-degree murder charges in a single thirty-minute telephone conversation. Although a lawyer can always learn certain information from his client over the telephone, we simply would be discounting the gravity of a death penalty case were we to say that a lawyer representing a defendant in such a case has done his job effectively when he has spent only limited time on the telephone with his client. Indeed, the very nature of a capital case, typically quite involved and always subjecting the defendant to the possibility of death, clearly necessitates at least one in-person meeting between a lawyer and his client before trial begins. Without such a meeting, there is little to no hope that the client will develop a fundamental base of communication with his attorney, such that the client will freely share important information and work comfortably with the lawyer in developing a defense plan. Moreover, only a face-to-face meeting allows an attorney to assess the client's demeanor, credibility, and the overall impression he might have on a jury. This is of particular importance in cases in which the client may take the stand in his defense or at the penalty phase in an attempt to establish the existence of particular mitigating circumstances. As Appellant was deprived of the benefits of a face-to-face meeting here, it is clear that Appellant's ineffectiveness claim has arguable merit.7 See Douglas, 737 A.2d at 1199

.

It is equally clear that Mr. Turner had no reasonable basis for failing to meet with Appellant in person prior to trial. During the post-trial hearing, when Mr. Turner attempted to explain why he never went to Holmesburg to speak with Appellant, Mr. Turner conceded that he had not been "looking forward to spending any time alone with Mr. Brooks," apparently because Appellant's previous attorneys had indicated to Mr. Turner that Appellant was "contentious."8 N.T., 7/16/1996, at 21, 27. Moreover, Mr. Turner stated that he thought it would be better to limit in-person contact with Appellant so as to avoid a potential conflict in their relationship. Id. at 27, 737 A.2d 1188. Mr. Turner also rationalized to the court that although he had intended to visit Appellant at Holmesburg a few days before the trial, he did not have time to follow through on his intention, noting: "now, I apologize for being busy, but I am. I have a full schedule." N.T., 1/8/1992, at 28. We agree with Appellant that these explanations do not support a finding that Mr. Turner had a reasonable basis for failing to meet with him. General fear of a potential conflict in the lawyer-client relationship and a busy schedule simply cannot serve as a reasonable basis for failing to have personal contact with a client prior to that client's trial on capital charges. To the contrary, failure to do so is "simply an abdication" of the most basic expectations of defense counsel in a capital case. See Perry, 644 A.2d at 709

.

Finally, it is also clear that Appellant was prejudiced by Mr. Turner's failure to meet with him in person prior to trial. See id. As we have highlighted above, in order to prepare a defense to a charge of murder in the first degree, it is essential that at the very least, counsel meet with his client in person to, inter alia, gather information from the client, evaluate the client's demeanor, and try to establish a working relationship.

Accordingly, we agree with Appellant that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when Mr. Turner failed to meet with him even once before his trial on capital charges. Appellant's judgment of sentence is reversed, and we remand this case to the trial court for a new trial.

Justice CASTILLE files a concurring opinion.

Justice EAKIN files a concurring opinion.

Justice LAMB files a concurring opinion.

Justice CASTILLE concurring.

Although I agree that appellant is entitled to a new trial, I respectfully disagree with the Majority's approach to the dispositive claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as the apparent per se rule it would promulgate for instances where a lawyer fails to meet with his client face-to-face before trial in a capital murder case.9 In my view, the Majority unquestionably errs in finding that appellant has adequately demonstrated that his counsel was ineffective under the performance and prejudice test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987). Indeed, the Majority does not purport to find Strickland/Pierce-type prejudice. The germane and more difficult question is whether appellant is entitled to relief without having to show Strickland/Pierce prejudice. I believe that this inquiry is more properly governed by the U.S. Supreme Courts decision in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), and its progeny. Although I deem the question here to be close, I would grant relief under Cronic.

Appellant raises a dozen claims of counsel ineffectiveness, but the Majority correctly reaches only his first claim. In that claim, appellant argues that his federal and Pennsylvania constitutional rights to the effective assistance of counsel were denied when his court...

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