Com. v. Browdie
| Decision Date | 20 February 1996 |
| Citation | 671 A.2d 668,543 Pa. 337 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Daren S. BROWDIE, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
The issue in this appeal is whether a trial court is required to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter where there is no evidence of record to support such a verdict. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the order of the Superior Court affirming appellant's judgment of sentence.
A summary of the evidence giving rise to appellant's conviction is that Shannon Whitaker and her two month old baby, the victim, moved to Pittsburgh in mid December 1990. Whitaker met appellant in late January 1991 and they soon became romantically involved. Whitaker and appellant moved into an apartment together on April 1, 1991 and they married shortly thereafter. From the beginning, appellant appeared to display fondness for the victim and often fed her, prepared her bottle, bathed her and changed her diapers.
During the period of time appellant and the baby's mother first lived together, the baby was normal, happy, and healthy with no reported ailments or problems. In fact, on April 15, 1991, the baby's pediatrician confirmed the baby's general good health during the baby's regular six month examination. However, on May 17, 1991, during an examination which the mother scheduled because the baby had a cold, the pediatrician noted that the baby had a bruise on her left upper cheek. In response to the pediatrician's question regarding the origin of the bruise, the mother explained that the baby was learning to stand and walk and that the bruise may have been from her falling and striking an object.
Thereafter, ominously, the mother began noticing small bruises on the baby's back, along her hair line, and on her arms. Although the baby's mother thought that the baby may simply be easily bruised and that the bruises resulted from the baby's crawling and attempting to walk, she contacted the pediatrician to be sure the baby did not have a "baby disease." On June 24, 1991, the pediatrician examined the baby and discovered that she had bruises along the vertebrae column of her lower back and a bruise along her right rib cage edge. Suspecting child abuse, the pediatrician informed the mother that under such circumstances he is required to report child abuse to the authorities. However, the mother became quite upset and insisted that the baby was learning to walk and that she was falling quite frequently thereby causing the injuries in question. Since the baby appeared healthy and happy in all other aspects, the pediatrician sent the baby home with her mother without reporting his suspicions to the authorities. Instead, the pediatrician decided to attempt to discover whether or not the baby had a blood disorder. Accordingly, he scheduled an appointment for the baby with a hematologist for July 11, 1991, for further medical procedures.
Prior to the scheduled appointment with the hematologist, on July 7, 1991, an incident occurred where the baby was rendered unconscious. The mother had briefly exited the living room where appellant was giving the baby her bottle and returned only moments later to find that the baby had stopped breathing and had become unconscious. The mother picked up her baby and instructed appellant to call 911. The baby regained consciousness a few minutes later, but the mother insisted on taking the baby to the emergency room at Children's Hospital to be examined. The examination revealed that the baby had an enlarged liver and spleen and had small bruises over her forehead, back and stomach which appeared to be of varying ages. Despite the baby's condition, the emergency personnel permitted the baby's mother and appellant to take the baby home, informing the mother that the baby merely experienced a "breath holding spell."
The mother kept the scheduled appointment with the hematologist on July 11, 1991, and a battery of tests were administered to the baby. The initial examination revealed no blood abnormalities. However, the hematologist noted bruising in unusual places, the possibility of a healing bone fracture or lesion in the left tibia, a large red pinch mark on the baby's side and abnormal liver function. The hematologist sent the baby home with the mother and told the mother that she would be informed of the test results later.
In the days following the "breathing spell" incident, the mother continually observed and cared for the baby and she observed that the baby's health was normal during that period. However, one week later, on July 14, 1991, at approximately noon, mother and baby were in the living room area of their apartment. While the mother spoke on the telephone and the baby played on the floor in front of her, appellant entered the room and decided that it was time for the baby's nap. Appellant picked the baby up, took her into the bedroom and closed the door. Initially, the mother heard the baby crying but shortly thereafter she realized that the baby ceased crying. The mother ended her conversation and went to the bedroom to check on appellant and the baby. When the mother entered the bedroom, she found the baby in the crib convulsing and appellant standing beside the crib staring at the baby. Appellant said that the baby had been convulsing for approximately 20 seconds, yet he apparently made no effort to assist the baby himself or to seek help from the mother who was trained in infant cardio-pulmonary resuscitation. Paramedics who had been summoned to the apartment arrived and administered oxygen to the baby and she immediately came out of what appeared to be a seizure of some sort. The baby was then transported by ambulance to Children's Hospital where an examination revealed that her liver was still enlarged but smaller than the previous week. The baby was once again released from the hospital and the mother was instructed to return to the neurology clinic the following day for a battery of neurologic tests. The mother and baby returned to Children's Hospital the next day and the baby was admitted for four days during which her bruises healed and there were no additional seizure-like episodes. Specialists performed various examinations and no abnormalities were discovered and all the test findings were normal. Hence, the baby was released from the hospital.
After returning home from the hospital the baby appeared to be normal and healthy. However, on July 21, 1991, the mother went into the baby's bedroom and found her dead in her crib. The mother called the paramedics, but the baby showed no vital signs. The baby was gray and her tongue was swollen and protruding from her mouth. There were bruises on her upper body, arms, chest and shoulders. Rigor mortis had set in and the baby appeared to have been dead several hours. The autopsy, which was performed that day revealed that the baby had been dead for less than twelve hours. The external examination revealed fresh bruises on her chest, abdomen, left and right arms, and back, a hemorrhage around the pancreas and adrenal gland, a bruise on the right lower lobe of the lung, a bruise on the posterior side of the thymus gland, and a fracture of the sixth rib on the left side in the back which was a healing fracture which had been refractured. The head examination revealed a subdural hemorrhage. The cause of the victim's death was determined to be the result of a blunt force most likely caused by squeezing.
On August 11, 1991, appellant was arrested and charged with criminal homicide. Appellant described the events leading to the baby's death in a statement to the police. Appellant informed the police that the mother placed the baby in bed and went to bed herself while appellant continued watching television. Appellant explained that he inadvertently awakened the baby and then became frustrated when she would not stop crying. Appellant, worried that the infant's crying would awaken his wife and that she would be upset with him, held the baby tightly for approximately four minutes until she stopped moving. Appellant stated that he then returned the baby to her crib. Appellant explained that he could not sleep well because he knew that in the morning he would have to deal with the baby's death.
At trial, appellant testified that his statement to the police was inaccurate and the product of his fright and confusion. Appellant explained that he loved the baby very much and that he would never do anything to harm her. Appellant further testified that he never hit the baby, that he never punched her, and that he never squeezed the baby violently. In describing the evening preceding the baby's death, appellant claimed that he went into her room at approximately 2:00 a.m. because he heard her crying. Appellant explained that he held the baby for approximately four minutes until she calmed down and then put her back into the crib. Appellant testified that he then went to bed and woke up the next morning at approximately 7:15 a.m. and told his wife that he walked by the baby's room and that she "did not look good." Appellant explained that the mother then went to the baby's room, picked her up from the crib and attempted to revive her but to no avail.
Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of third degree murder. 1 The trial court denied post-trial motions and sentenced appellant to a term of eight (8) to sixteen (16) years imprisonment. The Superior Court affirmed appellant's judgment of sentence. This appeal followed.
Appellant claims that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on what is often referred to as "heat of passion" voluntary manslaughter. The 1972...
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