Com. v. Brown

• Decision Date: 08 July 1977
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Melvin Douglas BROWN, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 1260

375 A.2d 1260

473 Pa. 562

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Melvin Douglas BROWN, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 22, 1975.

Decided July 8, 1977.

Reargument and/or Clarification Denied Aug. 10, 1977.

John J. Dean, Lester G. Nauhaus, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

John J. Hickton, Dist. Atty., Robert L. Eberhardt, Linda L. Kelly, Asst. Dist. Attys., Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before JONES, C. J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS, Justice.

Appellant Melvin Douglas Brown was indicted on charges of murder and voluntary manslaughter arising out of the October 13, 1973 killing of Mary Lee Walters. Appellant's pre-trial application to suppress was denied and the case proceeded to trial on June 18, 1974. The jury found appellant guilty of murder of the second degree. Post-verdict motions were denied, and appellant was sentenced to ten to twenty years imprisonment. In this appeal, ¹ appellant contends that the court erred in denying his application to suppress incriminating statements taken from him by the police. We agree, reverse judgment of sentence, and remand for a new trial. ²

I

When ruling on suppression motions, the suppression court is required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(i). The suppression court must determine whether the Commonwealth has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged evidence is admissible. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(h). On review, our responsibility is "to determine whether the record supports the factual findings of the court below and the legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings." Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 460 Pa. 516, 521, 333 A.2d 892, 895 (1975).

If the suppression court has determined that the evidence is admissible, "this Court will consider only the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses and so much of the evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted." Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 264, 280, 361 A.2d 282, 290 (1976); see Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 604, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1878, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.). This rule is subject to the limited exception that where, as here, certain findings by the suppression court are supported by defense testimony, we accept those findings as true even though they are in conflict with evidence presented by the Commonwealth.

Applying these standards, the evidence establishes the following: On Saturday, October 13, 1973, the victim was stabbed to death while working after-hours in an office on the twenty-third floor of the Koppers Building, a downtown Pittsburgh office building. Her body was discovered at about 2:00 a. m., the next morning.

On Sunday, October 14, the Pittsburgh Police Department interviewed individuals who had been in the building the night before. Two detectives went to the home of appellant, a security guard who had been on duty in the Koppers Building the night of the killing. They arrived at appellant's home at 11:00 a. m. They requested appellant to accompany them to the Public Safety Building for questioning. Appellant complied and was taken to the Public Safety Building.

Appellant arrived at the Public Safety Building at noon. Appellant was taken to an interview room where he was left for approximately an hour. The room had no windows, and the door was left closed. The two detectives returned to the interview room at 1:00 p. m., Sunday. Appellant was not advised of his constitutional rights before questioning but was told he was not under arrest. The two detectives asked him about his work schedule at the Koppers Building the night before. The detective who testified at the suppression hearing could not remember if appellant was asked if he was involved in the killing.

Appellant was questioned intermittently all afternoon. Other members of the Koppers Building staff were also questioned at the Public Safety Building Sunday afternoon.

At approximately 9:00 p. m., appellant agreed to take a polygraph examination. The polygraph operator, who had been called in earlier that day, examined two individuals: appellant and James Robinson, a security guard who had been on duty with appellant the night of the killing. Appellant was given Miranda warnings ³ in connection with the polygraph examination. The examination began with background questions, including questions relating to appellant's work schedule the night of the killing. Appellant was also asked if he had been on the twenty-third floor that night, and if he knew who might have committed the killing. Appellant was then asked ten specific questions relating to the crime.

After the polygraph examination, appellant was asked to consent to the search of his home. He was informed orally of his right to refuse to consent to the search and signed a consent form. The consent form included a statement that appellant understood he was not in custody.

Appellant was then driven back to his home by the two detectives who picked him up that morning. They arrived at appellant's home at 10:30 p. m. After appellant gave the officers the clothes he had been wearing on the night of the killing, they drove him back to the Koppers Building, where appellant completed the balance of his 4:00 p. m. to midnight shift.

The next afternoon, Monday October 15, appellant attended a meeting of security guards called by Koppers Building officials. Police officers were present and took handwriting samples, hair samples, and photographs of the security personnel. Lieutenant James Pampena, who was in command of the police investigation, interviewed Robinson and appellant at the Koppers Building. After noting certain discrepancies between Robinson's and appellant's stories, Pampena requested that appellant accompany him and three other officers to the Public Safety Building to "iron out" the discrepancies. Robinson was also taken to the Public Safety Building.

They arrived at the Public Safety Building at approximately 5:15 p. m. Pampena first questioned Robinson for about five minutes, then began interrogation of appellant. During this session, appellant made statements which conflicted with statements he made earlier that afternoon. At 7:35 p. m., Pampena confronted appellant with these discrepancies and gave appellant Miranda warnings. Appellant subsequently admitted he killed the victim. He agreed to have his statement recorded on tape and, after being given a second set of Miranda warnings, repeated his admission on tape. Appellant was arraigned at about 10:00 p. m., Monday, October 15.

II

Appellant contends he was subjected to custodial interrogation without being informed of his rights, requiring suppression of his oral admission and the taped statement which followed. We agree. ⁴

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and the decisions of this Court, see e.g., Commonwealth v. Fisher, 466 Pa. 216, 352 A.2d 26 (1976); Commonwealth v. Romberger, 464 Pa. 488, 347 A.2d 460 (1975), require that, before an individual is subjected to custodial interrogation, he must make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel, U.S.Const. amend. V, VI, XIV; Pa.Const. art. I, § 9, after adequate warning as to these rights. ⁵ Here, appellant was questioned at the Public Safety Building on Sunday, October 14, and Monday, October 15, without first being informed of his rights. Therefore, we must determine whether this questioning constituted custodial interrogation for which warnings were required.

As this Court stated in Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 456 Pa. 288, 292, 318 A.2d 713, 715, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1092, 95 S.Ct. 686, 42 L.Ed.2d 685 (1974) (emphasis deleted) the test for custodial interrogation is

" 'whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action of movement is restricted by such interrogation . . . .' Commonwealth v. Romberger, (454 Pa. 279, 283, 312 A.2d 353, 355 (1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 964, 94 S.Ct. 3166, 41 L.Ed.2d 1136 (1974), reinstated on remand, 464 Pa. 488, 347 A.2d 460 (1975)), citing Commonwealth v. Marabel, (445 Pa. 435, 441, 283 A.2d 285, 288 (1971))."

Accord, Commonwealth v. Fisher, 466 Pa. 216, 352 A.2d 26 (1976). Thus, custodial interrogation does not require that the police make a formal arrest, nor that the police intend to make an arrest. Id.; Commonwealth v. O'Shea, supra; Commonwealth v. Bordner, 432 Pa. 405, 247 A.2d 612 (1968). Rather, the test of custodial interrogation is whether the individual being interrogated reasonably believes his freedom of action is being restricted.

Applying this standard, and considering the effect of appellant's contact with the police on both Sunday and Monday, we conclude that appellant reasonably believed his freedom of action was restricted when he was taken to the Public Safety Building on the second day of interrogation, Monday, October 15. Thus, the subsequent questioning constituted a custodial interrogation, for which prior warnings were required.

On Sunday, October 14, the police took appellant to the Public Safety Building, and questioned him intermittently over a ten hour period. Appellant was not brought back home until the police wanted to pick up his clothing.

The following afternoon, Monday October 15, Lieutenant Pampena questioned appellant at the Koppers Building about his activities the night of the killing. After this additional questioning, Pampena informed appellant that there were discrepancies between his statements and those made by the other security guard on duty with him the night of the killing. Pampena requested that appellant return to the Public...