Com. v. Bryant

• Decision Date: 10 January 1984
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Clayton M. BRYANT.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 792

459 N.E.2d 792

390 Mass. 729

COMMONWEALTH v. Clayton M. BRYANT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Essex.

Argued April 4, 1983.

Decided Jan. 10, 1984.

William C. Madden, Boston, for defendant.

Lila Heideman, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

Clayton M. Bryant appeals from his conviction of murder in the first degree. Bryant's principal claim is that he was subjected to a custodial interrogation by the Newbury chief of police in the absence of adequate Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Bryant also claims that the judge erred in the admission of evidence of his two prior attempts on the victim's life; the failure to conduct a voir dire on voluntariness; the denial of motions for dismissal, mistrial, or a new trial, due to prosecutorial misconduct; and the denial of a motion for a new trial based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant also asks us to grant him relief pursuant to G.L. c. 278, § 33E. We conclude that there is no reversible error, and that there is no reason for us to exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or direct the entry of a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt.

We briefly describe the facts, reserving the details for discussion in the context of the specific claims raised by the defendant's appeal. The defendant, a thirty-seven year old employee of the Federal government's Young Adult Conservation Corps for New England, lived on Plum Island in a trailer. Near to the defendant's trailer was P.J.'s Restaurant and store (P.J.'s), owned and run by Jane McNeal. The defendant was a regular customer of P.J.'s. Bryant was in love with McNeal, was fond of her children, and wanted to marry her. McNeal, however, would not date Bryant. McNeal had been dating the victim William Seduski for approximately one year. Seduski, an architect, lived close to the defendant's trailer and near to P.J.'s.

On November 21, 1978, Seduski was shot in the chest with a sixteen gauge shotgun at his home. Since the defendant was known to have disliked the victim, he was one of several police suspects in the investigation following the homicide. The defendant's hostility toward Seduski was based in part on jealousy of Seduski for his steady relationship with Jane McNeal.

The defendant confessed to the police on February 2 and 3, 1979. After his confessions were admitted in evidence, the defendant testified that he had confessed falsely to protect McNeal, because he believed the police's suspicions to have focused on her. There was evidence at trial from which the jury could have concluded that the shooting occurred between 6:30 and 7 P.M., a time for which the defendant had no alibi. There was also evidence placing the defendant near the victim's house immediately prior to that half-hour period. However, without the defendant's statements, there was insufficient evidence to convict.

1. The confessions. The defendant moved before trial to suppress his confessions. We summarize the facts as found by the judge on the motion to suppress, amplified by those facts which are undisputed. ¹ On the day after the murder, the State police lieutenant in charge of the homicide investigation interviewed the defendant at the police station. Prior to questioning, the defendant was given the Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, supra. The defendant voluntarily spoke to the officer but denied that he was involved in the murder. The statements made at that interview were not suppressed and are not at issue on appeal.

During the next month, the lieutenant and the defendant met briefly on the street twice, and once at P.J.'s. On one of these occasions, the lieutenant asked the defendant if they could meet again to discuss the shooting, and the defendant stated, "Anytime you want." In January, 1979, the new chief of the Newbury police department, recently appointed, was introduced to the defendant. ² On February 2, 1979, the police chief arrived at the defendant's home at 5 P.M., pursuant to an appointment to speak with the defendant. ³ The chief was wearing a uniform and carrying a gun, as he had just come off duty.

The defendant invited the chief in, and offered him a cup of coffee. After chatting for a few minutes, the chief told the defendant he was investigating the crime, and that he wanted to discuss the crime with the defendant. The defendant agreed to do so. The chief told the defendant that he did not have to talk, and that anything he said could be used against him in court. The chief asked the defendant if he could afford an attorney, and they discussed his finances briefly. ⁴ The defendant was not told that if he could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed to represent him during the interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, supra 384 U.S. at 473, 86 S.Ct. at 1627. The defendant then described his actions on the evening of November 21, 1978, and denied he was involved in the crime.

For approximately two and a half hours, the police chief and the defendant discussed general subjects, including the defendant's sex life, Maine, and snowmobiling. At 7 P.M., the chief offered to leave, but the defendant said he had no plans for the evening. He offered the chief a second cup of coffee. The conversation turned to a discussion of Jane McNeal, her relationship with the victim, and her children. At about 7:50 P.M., the chief responded to the defendant's professed dislike of Jane McNeal's relationship with the victim by saying that the defendant's relationship with Jane McNeal had deteriorated since the homicide. The chief told the defendant that Jane McNeal now became very nervous whenever the defendant walked into P.J.'s, and that her children now were afraid of the defendant. At the hearing, the chief testified that the defendant responded that he "didn't know [I] hurt the kids ... [I] just didn't want Seduski to hurt them.... I did it, I shot him." This initial statement was followed by a brief time gap, during which both the police chief and the defendant were silent. The police chief's testimony, which the judge found credible, was that he was stunned by the admission, since he had believed the defendant to be innocent. Ten or fifteen seconds after the defendant's statement that he shot the victim, the chief told the defendant that he (the defendant) "must be glad to get that off his chest," and asked the defendant "if he would like to tell me about it." ⁵ The defendant then made a detailed confession. ⁶

At the suppression hearing, the chief said that the defendant stated "that he had come home from work that day, and he knew then that this was the day he was going to kill Seduski." Bryant said that between 6:30 and 6:45 P.M., he put the gun under his clothes, walked down the street, knocked on Seduski's door, pulled the trigger when Seduski answered, broke the gun into pieces, threw the pieces into the ocean, returned to his home, changed his wet clothes, went out for supper at 7 P.M., returned home at about 7:20 P.M., called his sister in Maine, and then went out for drinks. The police chief "never said a word" during the latter confession, but simply let the defendant tell his story. The defendant did not ask him to leave at any point during the confession.

After the defendant's detailed confession, the chief arrested him. The defendant collected some clothes, fed his dog and asked if the chief wanted his snowmobile for the winter. The chief handcuffed the defendant.

At the police station, the defendant was given complete Miranda warnings and asked if he would make a written confession. The defendant wrote out a confession that confirmed the oral confession described by the chief. He specified that the time of the shooting was approximately 6:30 P.M. The defendant admitted that he used his sixteen gauge shotgun to shoot Seduski. The confession was witnessed by the police chief and a police sergeant.

Soon after the defendant was placed in a cell, a police sergeant went to see him. Prefacing his questions with the remark, "Having your rights in mind," the sergeant asked the defendant about prior attempts on the victim's life. ⁷ One of these was the burning of the victim's house on the evening of September 23, 1978; the other involved the discovery of a shotgun left pointing at the victim's house from the dunes across from it in October, 1978. The defendant confessed both to setting the fire and leaving the shotgun on the sand.

The following morning, the State police lieutenant interviewed the defendant after giving him Miranda warnings once more. The defendant restated his confessions to the shooting, the fire, and the earlier attempt from the dunes.

The judge decided that the warnings given to the defendant at the beginning of his conversation with the police chief were sufficient to meet the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In addition, the judge determined that the police chief's discussion with the defendant at his home was not "custodial interrogation," and that therefore no Miranda warnings were required at that time.

The defendant asserts that his confession to the chief of police during their February 2, 1979, conversation at the defendant's home was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, and that the defendant's subsequent confessions at the police station on February 2 and 3, 1979, after he was arrested, are the tainted fruit of the initial illegally obtained confession. Consequently, the defendant concludes that the judge erred in denying the motion to suppress.

Miranda warnings are only necessary for "custodial interrogations." Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 713, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); Miranda v. Arizona, supra 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612; ...