Com. v. Butler

• Decision Date: 16 October 1974
• Citation: 328 A.2d 851,458 Pa. 289
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Ronald Allen BUTLER, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 851

328 A.2d 851

458 Pa. 289

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Ronald Allen BUTLER, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Oct 16, 1974.

Richard D. James, Ronald J. Mishkin, Soren P. West, Public Defenders, Stroudsburg, for appellant.

James F. Marsh, Dist. Atty., C. Daniel Higgins, Asst. Dist. Atty., Stroudsburg, Benjamin Lerner, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS, Justice.

This case presents a significant question of the facial constitutionality of the legislative response to our decision in Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968). We agree with appellant that the Commonwealth's sentencing statutes--the Act of 1911 and the so-called new Muncy Act--by their joint operation are constitutionally impermissible. We disagree, however, that the Act of 1911 must be struck down. Instead, we hold unconstitutional that portion of the new Muncy Act directing that no minimum sentence be imposed on women convicted of crime. Because the constitutionally-offensive part of the statutory scheme has been declared invalid, we affirm appellant's judgment of sentence. ¹

Appellant on April 9, 1971, pleaded guilty to murder generally and was convicted of murder in the second degree. The court assessed punishment at ten to twenty years imprisonment and a $1000 fine. This appeal ensued. ²

Appellant's sole challenge is to the constitutionality of the legislative choice to prescribe that all men receive minimum sentences and that all women not be given minimum sentences. An understanding of this Commonwealth's sentencing scheme is necessary.

In 1911, the Legislature enacted a general sentencing statute. Act of June 19, 1911, P.L. 1055, §§ 1--6, as amended, 19 P.S. §§ 1051--1057 (1964). Section 6 of that act provided that any person convicted of a crime ³ was to be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence. 19 P.S. § 1057 (1964). ⁴ Trial courts were further instructed by section 6 to

'(s)tat(e) in such sentence the minimum and maximum limits thereof . . . and the minimum limit shall never exceed one-half of the maximum sentence prescribed by any court.'

Id. A few years later an exception to this general sentencing statute was carved out by the original Muncy Act. Act of July 25, 1913, P.L. 1311, §§ 7--26, as amended, 61 P.S. §§ 551--591 (1964). When it came to women convicted of crime, trial courts were to sentence them to the State Correctional Institution at Muncy. ⁵ Act of July 25, 1913, P.L. 1311, § 15, as amended. According to the original Muncy Act, 'Every sentence imposed pursuant to this act shall be merely a general one . . . and shall not fix or limit the duration thereof.' Id. ⁶

This disparate treatment of men and women went unchallenged until 1966, when Jane Daniel, on appeal from a robbery conviction, contended that the sentencing scheme was unconstitutional. More particularly, she argued that the failure to fix maximum sentences for women convicted of crime coupled with the requirement that men convicted of crime receive a minimum and a maximum denied her the equal protection of the laws. This Court agreed and on July 1, 1968, declared unconstitutional that portion of the Muncy Act requiring that women not be given a maximum sentence. Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).

On July 16, 1968, the Legislature passed a bill to replace that part of the Muncy Act held invalid in Daniel. Act of July 16, 1968, P.L. 349, § 1, 61 P.S. § 566 (Supp.1974). Under this new Muncy Act, women are to receive maximum sentences. However,

'(t)he court in imposing sentence shall not fix a minimum sentence . . ..'

Id. ⁷ It is the constitutionality of the proscription of minimum sentences for female offenders that is here challenged.

The significance of minimum sentences arises in connection with eligibility for parole. See generally Act of August 6, 1941, P.L. 861, §§ 1--34, as amended, 61 P.S. §§ 331.1 to 331.34 (Supp.1974). Responsibility for determining when to release a person on parole is vested in the Board of Parole. 61 P.S. § 331.17 (Supp.1974). ⁸ No person, who has received a minimum sentence, may be considered for parole prior to the expiration of that minimum sentence. Id. § 331.21 (1964). In other words, a minimum sentence serves to notify the Board when it may exercise its discretion to parole an individual. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Hendrickson v. Pennsylvania State Board of Parole, 409 Pa. 204, 207--208, 185 A.2d 581, 584 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 817, 83 S.Ct. 1713, 10 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1963). See also Commonwealth v. Tinson, 433 Pa. 328, 249 A.2d 549 (1969). Women, as we have seen, receive no minimum sentence and are accordingly eligible for parole immediately upon incarceration at Muncy. 61 P.S. §§ 331.21, 331.31 (1964). See Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. at 647 n.*, 243 A.2d at 402 n. 6. Since men alone are sentenced under section 1057, and therefore only men receive minimum sentences, section 331.21's limitation on eligibility for parole applies solely to males convicted of crimes.

On May 18, 1971, the voters of this Commonwealth adopted an equal rights amendment to our Constitution. Article I, section 27 provides:

'Equality of rights unde the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual.'

That the purpose of this constitutional provision was to end discriminatory treatment on account of sex is clear. See generally L. Kanowitz, Sex Roles in Law and Society (1973); Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L.J. 871 (1971). In this Commonwealth, sex may no longer be accepted as an exclusive classifying tool. In the recent past, we have unhesitatingly accepted the mandate of article I, section 27. Conway v. Dana, Pa., 318 A.2d 324 (1974). ⁹ We will not hesitate here.

The statutory scheme on its face treats men less favorably than women. Few interests are more substantial than freedom from lawfully-imposed confinement. ¹⁰ See State v. Chambers, 63 N.J. 287, 295, 307 A.2d 78, 82 (1973); United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F.Supp. 8, 16 (D.Conn.1968). Indeed, parole is a fundamental public policy of this Commonwealth. 61 P.S. § 331.1 (1964). Parole may mean an opportunity to start anew in society, and may be a determinative step in a person's 'rehabilitation, adjustment and restoration to social and economic life.' Id. ¹¹

That one person (assuming equality of considerations as, for example, prior criminal record or rehabilitative progress) should be eligible for parole at a different time than another person solely because of his or her sex is discrimination of the most obvious sort. ¹² We perceive no basis, let alone a rational basis, for predicating eligibility for parole on a person's sex. ¹³ The discrimination between men and women envisioned by the joint operation of the Act of 1911 ¹⁴ and the new Muncy Act ¹⁵ with respect to minimum sentences therefore violates article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

We are buttressed in our conclusion by cases interpreting the equal protection clause in the context of sexual discrimination. ¹⁶ Chief among these is our own decision in Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968). ¹⁷ See also United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F.Supp. 8 (D.Conn.1968). In Daniel, as has been noted, this Court struck down the original Muncy Act's interdiction of maximum sentences for women. In an opinion authored by the late Chief Justice Bell, this Court stated:

'(W)e fail to discern any reasonable and justifiable difference or deterrents between men and women which would justify a man being Eligible for a shorter maximum prison sentence than a woman for the commission of the same crime, especially if there is no material difference in their records and the relevant circumstances.'

430 Pa. at 650, 243 A.2d at 404 (emphasis in the original). By a parity of reasoning, the conclusion we reached in Daniel holds for sex-based discrimination in eligibility for parole.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey was recently confronted with the identical issue. ¹⁸ That court held that 'the statutory provisions . . . for the sentencing of a female offender to an indeterminate term are unconstitutional in a situation where a male offender convicted of the same offense would be sentenced to State Prison for a minimum-maximum term.' State v. Chambers, 63 N.J. 287, 294, 307 A.2d 78, 81 (1973) (citation & footnote omitted). See also State v. Costello, 59 N.J. 334, 282 A.2d 748 (1971). Using an equal protection analysis, the New Jersey Supreme Court found there was no rational basis to warrant a different sentencing procedure for men than for women. ¹⁹

In other contexts, much has been written about the equal protection clause (especially about its impact on sex discrimination ²⁰) and many different views of its scope and role propounded. ²¹ And although at times the equal protection clause can at best be seen through a glass darkly, one aspect is perceived clearly: if a legislative classification bears no reasonable relationship to the purposes of the legislation, the equal protection clause is offended. E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 561--562, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920); cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1216, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). Because we have concluded that there is no rational relationship between the sex of a convicted person and the Commonwealth's interest in parole eligibility, the denial of equal protection occasioned by the joint operation of the Act of 1911 and the Muncy Act furnishes an independent basis for our decision.

Having decided that the statutory sentencing scheme is unconstitutional, we conclude that the provision in the...