Com. v. Campbell

Decision Date23 May 1978
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Paul R. CAMPBELL, Jr.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Michael J. Monahan, Boston, for defendant.

James W. Sahakian, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and KAPLAN, WILKINS, LIACOS and ABRAMS, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

On an indictment charging murder in the first degree Paul R. Campbell, Jr., was convicted by a jury of the murder in the second degree of his roommate, James Duffey. Campbell was also convicted of possession of a dangerous weapon (knife) and assault by means of a dangerous weapon (knife) on William Biciocchi, another roommate. In this appeal pursuant to G.L. c. 278, §§ 33A-33G, Campbell challenges only his conviction of murder in the second degree 1 and argues assignments of error concerning (1) the denial of his motion for a directed verdict of not guilty of murder in the second degree; (2) the admission of a photograph of the deceased after surgery; and (3) the failure of the judge to strike a word from the testimony of the government's expert witness. We conclude that the conviction should be affirmed.

We summarize first the evidence presented by the Commonwealth. Campbell, Duffey (the victim of the homicide), William Biciocchi (the victim of the assault by means of a dangerous weapon), and one Brenda Loveless had been part of the "same crowd" for approximately six years. In 1973, Campbell, Duffey, and Biciocchi shared an apartment in Cambridge. Brenda Loveless and the defendant started dating in February of 1969. They broke off and then resumed their relationship a number of times; at one time they had been engaged to be married.

In 1971, during one of the periods in which Brenda and the defendant were not seeing each other, Brenda started dating Duffey. About six weeks prior to the homicide, she spent one night with Duffey at the apartment. After the defendant learned of this, he told a friend that he was very upset that Brenda and Duffey were seeing each other and stated that he would not do such a thing to a friend.

Shortly before the homicide the defendant and Brenda again resumed their relationship. On the night of the killing, they went to a lounge where they had a few drinks. 2 Later, when the defendant was driving Brenda home 3 and away from his apartment, Brenda asked to leave the car and walk. She got out of the car and started to walk. The defendant turned the car around and stopped near Brenda who was, at that time, opposite the apartment.

Brenda and Campbell began arguing loudly and heatedly about Brenda's feelings for the defendant and their relationship. A portion of the argument concerned Brenda's having stayed with Duffey. The defendant then forced Brenda to go into the living room of the apartment, where Duffey was asleep on the couch. Brenda and Campbell continued their quarrel, thereby partially awakening Duffey.

Before Duffey awakened, the defendant went to his own room and took a switchblade knife from a dresser drawer. On his return, Campbell found Duffey awake. Duffey moved to leave the room, but the defendant pushed him back. The defendant then repeatedly ordered Brenda and Duffey to have sexual intercourse in front of him. Brenda was hysterical and screaming. Duffey repeatedly asked, "What's going on?" The defendant continued to yell.

At this point, Biciocchi entered the room. The defendant pointed the knife at him and said, "Get back. This is none of your business. Get out of here." Biciocchi told the defendant to put the knife down, and, when Campbell did not comply, Biciocchi left to call the police.

The defendant continued screaming at Brenda and Duffey and pointing the knife at them. Brenda, the only witness other than the defendant in the room when the stabbing which followed occurred, testified that she saw Duffey "bounce onto the couch, grab his chest, and slide to the floor." Brenda did not actually see the defendant stab Duffey.

Immediately thereafter the defendant went into the outside hall to get help from a nurse who lived in the apartment above. He also tried to summon help from a hospital and the police.

When the police arrived, the defendant told them that he had stabbed Duffey, but that it was an accident since Duffey had walked into the knife. He stated that he had had an argument with Duffey over a girl.

The next morning the defendant was interviewed by the Cambridge police. He repeated that he had argued with Duffey about Brenda. He stated that he had kicked Duffey onto the couch while holding the open knife in his hand. He said that Duffey had bounced back up from the couch and "walked into the knife."

Duffey died a week later as a result of the knife wound. A pathologist testified that a "forceful" thrust, not a glancing thrust, would have been required to cause the wound which killed Duffey.

The defendant testified in his own behalf. The defendant's account of his relationship with Brenda, of his feelings about Brenda's staying with Duffey, and of the general events of the night of the killing was basically similar to the evidence presented by the Commonwealth. However, he stated that he never intended to hurt anyone with the knife; rather he only planned to use it to scare Brenda and Duffey. He also stated that after he kicked Duffey onto the couch, Duffey bounced toward him and was wounded.

1. Motions for a Directed Verdict.

At the close of the Commonwealth's case and again after the defense rested, the defendant moved for a directed verdict of not guilty on so much of the indictment as charged murder in the first and second degree. The motions were denied. In considering whether these denials were correct we review only the evidence introduced up to the time that the Commonwealth rested its case. Commonwealth v. Kelley, --- Mass. ---, --- - --- a, 346 N.E.2d 368 (1976). 4

The denial of the motions for a directed verdict raises the issue whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant submission of the charge of murder in the second degree to the jury. 5 See Commonwealth v. Kelley, supra at --- b, 346 N.E.2d 368; Commonwealth v. Caine, 366 Mass. 366, 372-374, 318 N.E.2d 901 (1974). Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Commonwealth v. Caine, supra at 373, 318 N.E.2d 901. Malice includes any intent to inflict injury without legal excuse or palliation. Commonwealth v. Mangum, 357 Mass. 76, 85, 256 N.E.2d 297 (1970). The defendant argues that the Commonwealth introduced insufficient evidence on the element of malice.

A defendant's intent may properly be proved by reasonable and possible inferences from the evidence. Commonwealth v. Beckett, --- Mass. ---, --- c, 366 N.E.2d 1252 (1977). See Commonwealth v. Amazeen, --- Mass. ---, --- - --- d, 375 N.E.2d 693 (1978); Commonwealth v. Sandler, 368 Mass. 729, 335 N.E.2d 903 (1975). See also Commonwealth v. Earltop, --- Mass. ---, --- - --- e, 361 N.E.2d 220 (1977); Commonwealth v. Gagne, 367 Mass. 519, 526-527, 326 N.E.2d 907 (1975). The Commonwealth presented evidence concerning the defendant's relationship with Brenda, his feelings concerning Brenda's seeing Duffey, and his heated argument with Brenda and Duffey on the night of the killing. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably have inferred that the defendant intentionally killed Duffey because of hatred, jealousy, or a desire for revenge.

The existence of malice may also be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon. Commonwealth v. Greene, --- Mass. ---, --- f, 362 N.E.2d 910 (1977); Commonwealth v. Festa, --- Mass. ---, --- g, 341 N.E.2d 276 (1976); Commonwealth v. Gagne, supra, 367 Mass. at 522, 326 N.E.2d 907; Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 351 Mass. 203, 209-210, 218 N.E.2d 408 (1966). From the facts that the defendant went to his room to obtain a switchblade knife and that Duffey was subsequently stabbed with the knife, the jury could have found that the defendant intentionally used a deadly weapon on the victim. From this finding the jury could have inferred the existence of malice.

The defendant argues, however, that because his statements to the police, and later his own testimony, demonstrate that he did not intend to kill Duffey, the circumstantial evidence of malice was insufficient and the inference of malice from the use of a deadly weapon was rebutted. We disagree. A jury is not required to believe any or all of a defendant's statements; rather, it may believe only such portions of the statements as it may consider trustworthy. Commonwealth v. Amazeen, supra, --- Mass. at --- n. 5 h, 375 N.E.2d 693. Commonwealth v. McInerney, --- Mass. ---, --- - --- i, 365 N.E.2d 815 (1977). Commonwealth v. Goldenberg, 315 Mass. 26, 30, 51 N.E.2d 762 (1943). Under either theory, general circumstantial evidence or inferred malice from the use of a deadly weapon, to the extent that a defendant's words and his conduct permit conflicting inferences, it is for the jury to determine where the truth lies. See Commonwealth v. Amazeen, supra, --- Mass. at --- - --- j, 375 N.E.2d 693; Commonwealth v. McInerney, supra, --- Mass. at --- - --- k, 365 N.E.2d 815; Commonwealth v. Greene, supra, --- Mass. at --- - --- l, 362 N.E.2d 910; Commonwealth v. Gagne, supra, 367 Mass. at 522-524, 326 N.E.2d 907.

The judge was correct in determining that he could not rule as matter of law that the defendant lacked malice.

2. Photograph of Deceased.

During the course of the trial a photograph of the deceased was admitted showing one incision held together with black stitches extending down the chest beneath the nipple and a second penetration below the incision. The defendant argues that the admission of this picture constituted prejudicial error because the picture was inflammatory and because it was unnecessary to prove the Commonwealth's case since there had already been verbal testimony concerning the nature of the wound.

The admission of such...

To continue reading

Request your trial
36 cases
  • Com. v. Moran
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • November 18, 1982
    ...274 N.E.2d 795 (1971). 2 The defendants argue that murder is an unlawful killing with malice aforethought, Commonwealth v. Campbell, 375 Mass. 308, 312, 376 N.E.2d 872 (1978); Commonwealth v. Amazeen, 375 Mass. 73, 80, 375 N.E.2d 693 (1978); Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 304 (1850),......
  • Commonwealth v. Bresilla
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • January 16, 2015
    ...determining that the relevance of each witness's testimony was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Cf. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 375 Mass. 308, 313–314, 376 N.E.2d 872 (1978) (no error in admission of both photographic and verbal testimony illustrating nature of murder victim's wound ......
  • Com. v. Campbell
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • August 7, 1979
    ...the unlawful killing of a human being by another human being with malice aforethought. Commonwealth v. Campbell,--- Mass. ---, --- C, 376 N.E.2d 872 (1978). Commonwealth v. Caine,366 Mass. 366, 373, 318 N.E.2d 901 (1974). Commonwealth v. McCauley, 355 Mass. 554, 559, 246 N.E.2d 425 (1969). ......
  • Com. v. Callahan
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • February 8, 1988
    ......Albert, 391 Mass. 853, 859-861, 466 N.E.2d 78 (1984); Commonwealth v. Stillwell, 387 Mass. 730, 733, 443 N.E.2d 1272 (1982). See also Commonwealth v. Campbell, 375 Mass. 308, 312, 376 N.E.2d . Page 250. 872 (1978), and cases cited. The burden of proof was not shifted.         d. McHoul defense. There is no dispute that the judge specifically and repeatedly instructed the jurors that "[a] person is not responsible for criminal conduct if, at ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT