Com. v. Canfield
Decision Date | 04 March 1994 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert CANFIELD, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Albert V.F. Nelthropp, Allentown, for appellant.
Robert L. Steinberg, Dist. Atty., Allentown, for Com., appellee.
Before ROWLEY, President Judge and McEWEN and KELLY, JJ.
Robert Canfield has appealed from the judgment of sentence which was imposed upon him following his plea of nolo contendere to Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse, a felony of the second degree. On appeal, he contends that the sentence was (1) "manifestly excessive" in violation of "the whole spirit and philosophy of the [Sentencing] Guidelines" because it failed to take into account his lack of a prior record and also in that it was greater than the sentence imposed upon his co-defendant; (2) that it was imposed without adequate consideration of his rehabilitative needs; and finally, (3) that the sentencing court failed to provide a contemporaneous statement setting forth its reasons for departing upward from the Guidelines in sentencing him to the maximum term of incarceration allowed by law. After careful consideration of the arguments presented to us on these issues and following a conscientious review of the record, we conclude that appellant's claims are meritless. Therefore, we affirm appellant's judgment of sentence.
The trial court accurately and succinctly set forth the factual underpinnings of this case, as follows "...
(Trial Court Opinion, 6/13/93, p. 3). Both appellant and his co-defendant were then arrested.
Appellant was charged with two counts of rape, two counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, two counts of aggravated indecent assault, and two counts of indecent assault. Thereafter, a plea bargain was reached in which the Commonwealth agreed to drop all eight of the above-mentioned charges if appellant would plead nolo contendere to Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse.
The criminal information was then amended to reflect the conspiracy charge and in accordance with the plea agreement, appellant pled no contest. Before he entered his plea, however, the trial court advised appellant that he could potentially receive up to the maximum of ten years in jail and a $25,000.00 fine. Appellant stated that he understood this, and further, he acknowledged his understanding that there was no agreement regarding the sentence the court would impose. Following preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report, appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than five (5) nor more than ten (10) years. 1 This timely appeal followed.
Before addressing the merits of appellant's claims, we note that this appeal is only as to the discretionary aspects of sentencing. The legality of the sentence is not at issue. As noted recently by this Court in Commonwealth v. Jones, 418 Pa.Super. 93, 613 A.2d 587 (1992) (en banc ):
Jones 418 Pa.Super. at 99-100, 613 A.2d at 590.
As to the first argument advanced in support of appellant's excessiveness claim, we rely upon Jones, supra in concluding that it fails to raise a substantial question pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). In Jones, an appellant's contention that his sentence was "manifestly excessive" due to the lack of a prior record was held not to raise a substantial question. Id. at 100, 613 A.2d at 590.
As to the second portion of appellant's excessiveness claim, we find that a substantial question has been presented because a disparity between sentences imposed upon co-defendants does touch upon the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process. Having reviewed the issue, however, we conclude that it is without merit. In so concluding, we rely upon Commonwealth v. Jorden, 333 Pa.Super. 291, 482 A.2d 573 (1984). "The appellant's claim is that the sentence is excessive, not that the sentencing judge failed to state on the record the reason for the disparate sentences." Id. at 305 n. 7, 482 A.2d at 580 n. 7 (emphasis added). Thus, in the instant case, as in Jorden, Id. at 305, 482 A.2d at 580.
Moving on to appellant's second issue, we refer to Commonwealth v. Smith, 394 Pa.Super. 164, 575 A.2d 150 (1990) in deciding that it, too, fails to raise a substantial question. In Smith, this Court decided that an argument concerning the weight that a sentencing court gives to legitimate sentencing factors (such as a defendant's rehabilitative needs) does not raise a § 9781(b) substantial question.
Appellant's third claim, however, does raise a substantial question in that it advances at least a colorable argument that the trial judge's actions were inconsistent with a specific provision of the sentencing code. In support of our conclusion in this regard, we again rely upon Jones, supra and Commonwealth v. Thomas, 370 Pa.Super. 544, 550-551, 537 A.2d 9, 12 (1988). In both cases, this Court found a substantial question existed as to the appropriateness of the sentence imposed because, in fashioning it, the sentencing court failed to provide sufficient reasons of record for deviating upward from the guidelines.
The pertinent provision of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), states as follows:
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). (emphasis added).
In Commonwealth v. Royer, 328 Pa.Super. 60, 476 A.2d 453 (1984), this Court observed that if:
"... the sentence imposed [is] outside the guidelines provided by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, two issues are raised: (1) was the statement of the court made [and recorded] at sentencing in [appellant's] presence ... a 'contemporaneous written statement'; and if so then, (2) is the statement sufficient to meet the requirements of the act."
Id. at 68, 476 A.2d at 457. (emphasis added).
We decide that, in the instant case, as in Royer, supra, the sentencing court's statement made on the record and in appellant's presence is a "contemporaneous written statement" within the meaning of § 9721(b). Id. at 69, 476 A.2d at 457. See also: Commonwealth v. Clever, 395 Pa.Super. 192, 195-196, 576 A.2d 1108, 1109 (1990). Thus, we reach the second step of the analysis, in which we are required to determine whether the sentencing court's statement of reasons is statutorily sufficient.
In addressing this sentencing issue, we observe that:
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