Com. v. Cargo
Decision Date | 23 April 1982 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Kevin CARGO a/k/a Kevin Davis, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Robert B. Lawler, Chief, Appeals Div., Sarah Vandenbraak, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before O'BRIEN, C. J., and ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY, KAUFFMAN and WILKINSON, JJ.
This is a direct appeal from the judgment of sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia. Appellant, Kevin Cargo, was convicted in a non-jury trial of murder of the first degree 1 and possession of an instrument of crime, 2 and sentenced to life imprisonment and a consecutive sentence of two and one-half to five years. We affirm.
The evidence presented by the Commonwealth established the following. 3 At approximately four a. m. on May 8, 1977, appellant was sitting in a taxicab he had stolen the previous evening, waiting for the victim, Gerald Kramer, appellant's former employer, outside Kramer's store at 17th Street and Belfield Avenue in Philadelphia. When Kramer left his store, appellant shot him twice from inside the cab with a twelve-gauge sawed-off shotgun, causing Kramer's death. Appellant left Philadelphia the next day, spending the next several months in North Carolina, Georgia and Virginia. He returned to Philadelphia on September 9, 1977, and was arrested in his mother's home on outstanding warrants for Kramer's murder and the earlier robbery of Kramer's store, as well as for a second, unrelated murder, 4 on September 10, 1977. Appellant gave statements to the police confessing to both murders at that time.
Trial counsel filed a timely post-verdict motion, seeking arrest of judgment and a new trial, in which he asserted that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, that appellant's confession was fabricated by the police and his signature thereon obtained by coercion, and that a prior statement made to the police by a Commonwealth witness was impermissibly read into the record by the detective who recorded the statement. The motion was denied. New counsel entered his appearance at the post-verdict stage and was granted leave to file post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc. No written post-verdict motion was subsequently filed. New counsel did, however, submit a brief, styled as a "Brief in Support of Defendant's Post Trial Motions," to the trial judge. This brief was not included in the record certified to this Court. 5 The record shows that new counsel requested that the post-verdict court incorporate his brief into the record in lieu of oral argument. 6 The post-verdict court did not address this request; it did indicate that it had read the brief, and denied the relief requested therein. N.T. June 13, 1978 at 2-3. Appellant was sentenced on September 15, 1978. This direct appeal followed. 7
Appellant argues first that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to admit as substantive evidence the prior written statement of a Commonwealth witness who, at trial, denied any present recollection of the events about which he was asked to testify. The statement established that the witness had seen appellant in a yellow cab on the evening preceding Kramer's murder. Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of that statement. We are convinced that the trial court properly admitted the statement under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule in light of the foundation laid by the Commonwealth.
The witness, Santos Thornton, a sixteen year old boy, testified initially that he did not remember hearing of Kramer's murder or being interviewed by a police detective on the morning following the murder. 8 The Commonwealth pleaded surprise, but later withdrew that plea, attempting instead to lay a foundation for the admission of Thornton's prior statement as past recollection recorded. This Court set forth the requisite elements of such a foundation in Commonwealth v. Cooley, 484 Pa. 14, 21-22, 398 A.2d 637, 641 (1979):
Commonwealth v. Shaw, 494 Pa. 364, 431 A.2d 897 (1981). See Commonwealth v. Canales, 454 Pa. 422, 426, 311 A.2d 572, 574 (1973); Commonwealth v. Butts, 204 Pa.Super. 302, 309-310, 204 A.2d 481, 485-486 (1964) (allocatur denied ); 1 Henry, Pa. Evidence § 460.5 (Supp.1978); McCormick, Evidence §§ 300-303 (2d ed. Cleary 1972); 2 Wharton, Crim. Evidence § 417 (13th ed. Torcia 1972 & Supp.1981); 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 736, 744-748 (Chadbourn rev. 1970 & Supp.1981); Fed.R.Evid. 803(5), 28 U.S.C.A.; Model Code of Evidence, rule 504 (1942); Uniform Rule of Evidence 803(5).
The trial court explained its basis for admitting Thornton's statement in its opinion:
Commonwealth v. Cargo, supra at n. 7, at 4.
It is clear from the record that the first and second requirements of Cooley, supra, that the witness have "firsthand knowledge of the event," and that the "written statement [be] made at or near the time of the event and while the witness had a clear and accurate memory of it," have been satisfied. The fourth requirement, that "the witness must vouch for the accuracy of the written memorandum," has been met in spite of Thornton's conflicting testimony. Thornton identified his signature on the statement, stated that he told the police the truth, and recalled making and signing the statement. We are satisfied that the trial court properly resolved any inconsistencies and believed only that portion of the witness' testimony which tended to show that he adopted the statement. Commonwealth v. Duncan, 473 Pa. 62, 68, 373 A.2d 1051, 1053-1054 (1977).
Cooley's third requirement, that "the witness must lack a present recollection of the event," becomes problematic in the instant circumstances. In Commonwealth v. Shaw, supra, this Court stated:
"...
Id. at 369, 431 A.2d at 899 (emphasis supplied; footnote omitted). See United States v. Klein, 488 F.2d 481, 483 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091, 95 S.Ct. 683, 42 L.Ed.2d 684 (1974); McCormick, supra, § 302; cf. United States v. Senak, 527 F.2d 129, 137-138 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907, 96 S.Ct. 1500, 47 L.Ed.2d 758 (1976); but cf. Annot., Denial of Recollection as Inconsistent with Prior Statement so as to Render Statement Admissible, 99 A.L.R.3d 934, 954-957 (1980).
Further, Pennsylvania case law requires only that the proponent of the prior statement present evidence of the witness's lack of present recollection. Commonwealth v. Cooley, supra, 484 Pa. at 22, 398 A.2d at 641 ( ); Commonwealth v. Canales, supra, 454 Pa. at 426, 311 A.2d at 574 (...
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