Com. v. Chamberlain

Decision Date19 June 1961
Citation175 N.E.2d 486,343 Mass. 49
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Joseph A. CHAMBERLAIN. COMMONWEALTH v. Anders MARTENSON, Junior.

Allan M. Hale, Middleboro (Albert T. Maddigan, Middleboro, with him), for defendants.

John R. Wheatley, Dist. Atty., Brockton, for Commonwealth.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WILLIAMS, WHITTEMORE and CUTTER, JJ.

WILKINS, Chief Justice.

Each defendant is charged in a complaint that on December 13, 1959, he 'did on the Lord's day keep open his shop for the purpose of doing business or work. Ch. 136, Sec. 5.' Waiving a jury, they were tried on a statement of agreed facts, were found guilty, and have appealed.

Each defendant 'is the owner and operator of [a] coin-operated automatic laundry' in Middleboro. On Sunday, December 13, 1959, the 'place of business' of each defendant was open, and the doors were unlocked. Neither defendant nor any employees were present. Washing machines and drying machines were available and in use by patrons. To operate, patrons place laundry in them and insert a coin. Power and water are supplied automatically. The patrons perform all the labor, and on Sundays, when no merchandise is sold or offered for sale, furnish their own washing materials.

The defendants first contend that an automatic laundry as operated by them is not a 'shop' within the meaning of G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 136, § 5, which provides: 'Whoever on the Lord's day keeps open his shop, warehouse or workhouse, or does any manner of labor, business or work, except works of necessity and charity, shall be punished by a fine of not more than fifty dollars.' We disagree. As was said in Boston Loan Co. v. City of Boston, 137 Mass. 332, 336, "Shop,' in its popular as well as legal meaning, is not confined to a workshop. It is a word of various significance, and 'store' and 'workshop' are both included in it, and do not exhaust its meaning.' We think that each 'place of business,' to quote a phrase from the agreed facts, is a 'shop' within the meaning of § 5. Commonwealth v. Moriarty, 311 Mass. 116, 119-121, 40 N.E.2d 307.

The defendants' shops were open for the doing of business, as alleged in the complaints. The furnishing of machines, water, and power in return for a consideration is doing business. "Business' * * * is a word of extensive use and indefinite signification.' Collector of Taxes of Boston v. New England Trust Co., 221 Mass. 384, 388, 109 N.E. 171, 173; Boston & Providence R. R. Corp. v. Old Colony R. R., 269 Mass. 190, 197, 169 N.E. 157. See Hanson v. Culton, 269 Mass. 471, 476, 169 N.E. 272. The sweeping effect of the statute embraces the laundromat of which each defendant 'is the owner and operator,' again to quote a phrase from the agreed facts. There need not be a sale of goods. Commonwealth v. Dextra, 143 Mass. 28, 8 N.E. 756 (barber shop). In this day of automation the physical absence of the defendants or of employees was without significance.

The defendants' brief makes the assertion that 'in allowing their establishments to remain open on Sunday to permit house-wives and mothers or anyone else to launder their own or their family's clothes, there is nothing which adversely affects public safety, health, morals, or the general welfare of the public; nor is in any way inimical to the public interests. To legislate against this, whether the right to so legislate is to be interpreted broadly and liberally or with strictness, is an improper exercise of the police power.' The defendants rely upon the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and art. 1 of the Declaration of Rights.

The constitutionality of § 5 under the Constitution of this Commonwealth has been upheld by this court in two decisions which do not specifically refer to art. 1. Commonwealth v. Has, 122 Mass. 40, 42; Commonwealth v. Chernock, 336 Mass. 384, 386, 145 N.E.2d 920. We now hold that there is nothing in § 5 which is violative of art. 1. 'One assailing a statute on constitutional grounds has the burden of proving the absence of any conceivable grounds upon which the statute may be supported.' Merit Oil Co. v. Director of Div. of Necessaries of Life, 319 Mass. 301, 305, 65 N.E.2d 529, 532. The burden is not sustained by generalities, whether of law or fact. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by specific allegations. None has been made. Id.

The reliance upon the Fourteenth Amendment is twofold: denial of due process and denial of the equal protection of the laws. At the time of the arguments before us a three-judge court in the United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, by majority vote had decided that our 'so-called 'Lord's day' statute' 1 was unconstitutional as applied to the owner and customers of a Kosher market and as to rabbis having the duty of inspection. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc. v. Gallagher, 176 F.Supp. 466. The grounds given, all under the Fourteenth Amendment, were (1) violation of the due process clause by (a) denying the free exercise of religion and (b) depriving of property or liberty arbitrarily and (2) denial of the equal protection of the laws (see, particularly, pages 471, 474-476).

Although no question of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
14 cases
  • Zayre Corp. v. Attorney General
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • April 21, 1977
    ...as had the Supreme Court, the contention that the exemptions in § 6 had destroyed any rational basis for § 5. Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 343 Mass. 49, 53, 175 N.E.2d 486 (1961). In Chamberlain, the court held that in the absence of sufficient proof showing the irrationality of the scheme ......
  • Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination v. Colangelo
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • May 16, 1962
    ...129, 138-139, 85 N.E.2d 232, 237, and cases cited. Wright v. City of Peabody, 331 Mass. 161, 164, 118 N.E.2d 68. Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 342 Mass. ----, 175 N.E.2d 486. 3 Only one whose rights are impaired by a statute can raise the question of its constitutionality, and he can object ......
  • Pinnick v. Cleary
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1971
    ...274. See also Merit Oil Co. v. Director of Div. on the Necessaries of Life, 319 Mass. 301, 305, 65 N.E.2d 529; Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 343 Mass. 49, 51--52, 175 N.E.2d 486; O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257--258, 51 S.Ct. 130, 75 L.Ed. 324; Borden's Fa......
  • Com. v. King
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • December 12, 1977
    ...of a legislative enactment has an onerous burden of proof in establishing the invalidity of the statue. Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 343 Mass. 49, 51, 175 N.E.2d 486 (1961). This court will afford a presumption of constitutionality to the statute, which means that all rational inferences ar......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT