Com. v. Chase

Citation217 N.E.2d 195,350 Mass. 738
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Richard E. CHASE.
Decision Date03 June 1966
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Walter J. Hurley, Boston (Bernard J. Dwyer, Boston, with him), for defendant.

John J. Jennings, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and SPALDING, CUTTER, KIRK, and SPIEGEL, JJ. SPALDING, Justice.

Under an indictment charging him with the murder in the second degree of Philip Kantrowitz, the defendant was found guilty. The case comes here by appeal under G.L. c. 278, §§ 33A--33G, with numerous assignments of error. A report relating to certain aspects of this and a prior indictment was before us in Commonwealth v. Chase, 348 Mass. 100, 202 N.E.2d 300.

The indictment arose out of the following events. On Thursday, January 12, 1956, Chase, who was then fifteen years old, together with Reginald F. Metcalf, aged thirteen, entered Kantrowitz's store in New-buryport with a rifle for the purpose of committing a robbery. They forced the victim to lie down on the floor and, while Chase was attempting to bind his hands, the rifle was discharged by Metcalf, killing Kantrowitz. Metcalf's case was considered by us in Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 338 Mass. 648, 156 N.E.2d 649.

1. The defendant contends that the judge abused his discretion in ordering that he be manacled during the trial. While it is desirable, where possible, to avoid the shackling of a defendant during his trial (see Commonwealth v. Agiasottelis, 336 Mass. 12, 16, 142 N.E.2d 386), a judge's refusal to order the removal of the shackles, where there exists any reasonable basis for anticipating that a prisoner may attempt to escape, will not be overruled. Commonwealth v. Millen, 289 Mass. 441, 477--478, 194 N.E. 463; Commonwealth v. Agiasottelis, 336 Mass. 12, 16, 142 N.E.2d 386. Here, it appeared that the defendant had attempted to escape on two prior occasions, and this fact was brought to the attention of the judge. This, taken together with the serious nature of the crime for which the defendant was being tried, was sufficient to justify the action of the judge.

2. The defendant's second assignment relates to the denial of his motion to quash the indictment on the ground that it contained the words 'and the jurors further say that the defendant is guilty of murder in the second degree and not in the first degree.' The presence of the word 'guilty' in the quoted phrase, it is argued, deprived the defendant of his presumption of innocence. There is no merit in this contention. The phrase meant no more than that the defendant was charged with murder in the second degree. The indictment was in the form prescribed by statute when 'murder in the first degree is not alleged' (G.L. c. 277, § 79), and has been in use in this Commonwealth for many years. See Commonwealth v. Ibrahim, 184 Mass. 255, 68 N.E. 231.

3. Assignments of error 3, 5 and 11 challenge the judge's denial of a motion to suppress a document recording a confession of the defendant, and his subsequent ruling admitting the document. It is contended that the circumstances under which the confession was obtained were so coercive as to render its use at the trial violative of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of our Federal Constitution. The defendant relies on Haley v. State of Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224. In that case the Supreme Court reversed the conviction for first degree murder of a fifteen year old boy, based upon incriminating statements drawn from him after intense grilling by relays of police for five hours in the dead of night. During the interrogation, at the time of his confession, and for several days thereafter, the boy was held incommunicado.

There was conflicting evidence regarding the precise circumstances in which Chase was interrogated and in which he initially implicated himself. But in reviewing a trial judge's preliminary determination regarding the voluntary or involuntary nature of a confession, 'only those * * * circumstances * * * unquestioned in the State's version of what happened are relevant to the constitutional issue.' Commonwealth v. Makarewicz, 333 Mass. 575, 586 132 N.E.2d 294, 300. The quoted language was taken from Watts v. State of Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51--52, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 93 L.Ed. 1801.

Chase and Metcalf were apprehended on the morning of January 13, 1956, and brought to police headquarters in Newburyport. There they were questioned by two State police officers, one of whom told Chase that 'he didn't have to tell us anything, that it was a serious crime, that the man was dead.' Chase admitted before noon that he had been present when the crime was committed, after which he ree nacted, at the scene of the crime, what had taken place. At no time was he beaten, threatened, coerced, or promised special treatment in return for making a statement. He was permitted to see his parents around 1 P.M. About 8:30 P.M. on the same day, after he had spoken with his mother, Charse gave the statement of what had occurred in the presence of a stenographer, his mother, his father, the principal of his school and various State and local officers.

Considering similar objections to the admission of a defendant's incriminating statements in Commonwealth v. Makarewicz, 333 Mass. 575, 584--589, 132 N.E.2d 294, we held that the circumstances in which those admissions were made fell short of the kind of coercion which may be said to render a statement involuntary and inadmissible. The facts surrounding Chase's confession reveal an even higher standard of behavior on the part of the officers in charge of his interrogation. There is no evidence of prolonged or intense grilling; Chase was seen by his parents prior to making his formal statement; and the statement was made in the presence of persons who were clearly not hostile toward the defendant. In short, it would appear that the interrogation was conducted with scrupulous regard for his rights.

Nor do we perceive any violation of the defendant's rights as delineated by the Supreme Court in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490--491, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977. Prior to Chase's apprehension by the police, his parents were made aware of his possible criminal involvement and they sought, though unsuccessfully, to retain counsel for him. There was, moreover, no evidence that while he was in custody counsel or anyone else sought and was refused access to the defendant.

The admissibility of the confession is not affected by the fact that Chase was not formally arraigned until the morning after his confession. The decision in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819, is not based on constitutional principles but on the supervisory powers of the Supreme Court over lower Federal courts. But even if the McNabb doctrine were applicable there was here no evidence of the sort of conduct on the part of the police which was before the court in that case.

We might add that the question of the legality of Chase's confession was rendered academic when he took the stand at the trial, with full knowledge of the significance of what he was doing, and corroborated every material element contained therein. 1 Thus, had there been error in admitting the confession, this testimony removes conclusively the possibility 'that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.' Fahy v. State of Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86--87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230, 11 L.Ed.2d 171. Commonwealth v. McNeil, 328 Mass. 436, 438--439, 104 N.E.2d 153.

4. The defendant takes nothing by his fourth and twelfth assignments. These challenge the admissibility of the document containing the confession on the ground that it was an incomplete record. There was evidence before the court, including testimony of the stenographer who recorded the...

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