Com. v. Chopak

• Decision Date: 30 September 1992
• Citation: 532 Pa. 227,615 A.2d 696
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. William Joseph CHOPAK, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 696

615 A.2d 696

532 Pa. 227

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. William Joseph CHOPAK, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted May 6, 1991.

Decided Sept. 30, 1992.

Geoffrey S. Casher, Asst. Dist. Atty., Roy A. Keefer, Dist. Atty., for appellant.

Robert J. Mulderig, Carlisle, for appellee.

Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.

OPINION

NIX, Chief Justice.

The instant appeal is by the Commonwealth challenging the Order of the Superior Court filed November 1, 1988, [385 Pa.Super. 646, 555 A.2d 242 (table) ] which: 1) reversed the trial court's denial of reconsideration of post-verdict motions, nunc pro tunc, ordering them reinstated, and 2) reversed the trial court's Order of November 27, 1987, partially forfeiting the bail of Appellee. Upon review, the Superior Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion and reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court. We granted review and the matter is presently before us for disposition.

William Joseph Chopak, Appellee, was convicted by a jury on both counts of recklessly endangering another person, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705 and one count of aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701. ¹ The charges at issue flow from two distinct incidents in which Appellee was charged with pointing a .22 caliber revolver at a construction worker, and subsequently at a police officer who appeared at his residence to arrest him on the initial charge.

Following his conviction on these charges, Appellee continued on bail pending sentencing. As part of the sentencing process, Appellee was scheduled to appear for a psychiatric evaluation for which he failed to appear. In addition, Appellee did not appear on September 4, 1986, the hearing date of his post-trial verdict motions. As a result of this incident on September 4, 1986, the trial court ordered that bail be revoked and issued a bench warrant for Appellee's immediate arrest. ² The trial court also ordered that post-trial motions be dismissed without further consideration.

Appellee was apprehended on November 20, 1986 and was required to undergo a psychiatric evaluation at Norristown Hospital. As a result of that evaluation, he was diagnosed as suffering from a paranoid personality disorder. On May 7, 1987, Appellee was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one to five years. Subsequently, Appellee filed a motion nunc pro tunc for reconsideration of his right to raise post-verdict motions. The basis asserted was that as a result of his condition, he was not responsible for his conduct which resulted in his flight. This motion was denied on October 19, 1987. On appeal to the Superior Court, a three judge panel, in addressing the trial court's denial of reconsideration of post verdict motions nunc pro tunc and the Order forfeiting bail, found these rulings to be error and remanded the matter to the trial court. The Order remanded by the three judge panel directed that: a) the judgment of sentence be vacated; b) the Order of the trial court of October 14, 1987 be reversed; c) the post-trial motions be reinstated; and d) the Order of the Court of Common Pleas dated November 27, 1987 be reversed. The two issues instantly raised on appeal for our resolution are: 1) Whether the Superior Court properly reversed the decision of the trial court denying reconsideration of Appellee's post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc, and 2) Whether the Superior Court properly determined that the trial court committed error by first revoking Appellee's bail, then subsequent to his capture, amending the Order to require a partial forfeiture of his posted bail. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the Superior Court.

I. Post-Verdict Motions

We first address that issue raised with regard to the trial court's Order denying reconsideration of Appellee's post-trial verdict motions by Order of October 14, 1987 after he was apprehended. It is to be noted that the initial ruling dismissing the post-verdict motions during the time that Appellee was in a fugitive status is not here being questioned. Appellee concedes the propriety of such a motion. Commonwealth v. Passaro, 504 Pa. 611, 476 A.2d 346 (1984); Commonwealth v. Galloway, 460 Pa. 309, 333 A.2d 741 (1975); Commonwealth v. Borden, 256 Pa.Super. 125, 389 A.2d 633 (1978).

The Commonwealth, Appellant, argues that the trial court did not err in denying Appellee's post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc without consideration because when the Appellee fled the jurisdiction of the court, he waived certain rights which he would otherwise have had. This decision, it is argued, lies solely within the discretion of the trial court and as such, may not be overturned absent a showing of abuse of discretion. The Commonwealth further maintains that the Appellee's subsequently proffered excuse for fleeing, his "mental illness", was rejected by the trial court in its discretion based upon sound reason and judgment.

Appellee, however, maintains that his diagnosed paranoid personality disorder was responsible for his flight and asserts that since his behavior was solely attributable to that mental disorder, it ought not be a basis for denying his right to appeal. He further contends that the record of the proceedings below does not support the trial court's finding that his mental illness was insufficient to render him not responsible for his flight.

The decision to grant or deny a nunc pro tunc post-verdict motion lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Craddock, 370 Pa.Super. 139, 535 A.2d 1189 (1988), affirmed, 522 Pa. 491, 564 A.2d 151 (1989). Contrary to the assertions of Appellee, it is apparent from the trial court's opinion that it fully considered, not only Appellee's legal responsibility for having fled the jurisdiction of the court, but also his competence to stand trial. Rather than overlooking the newly proffered defense of psychological disorder as alleged by Appellee, the trial court analyzed Appellee's mental and emotional condition and merely determined that in its estimation, those problems did not warrant the re-consideration of his post-verdict motions.

As the trial court stated in its opinion filed with the Order dismissing the nunc pro tunc petition for post-verdict motions:

There has never been the slightest indication that defendant was insane or incompetent to stand trial. His refusal to admit error can either be described as stubborn or deranged. In the absence of proof of derangement it can only be concluded that the attitude is, at most, anti-social. The report from Norristown State Hospital indicated a diagnosis of paranoid personality disorder. There was no indication of psychosis. Indeed, the report said defendant was ready for sentencing.

Commonwealth v. Chopak, Nos. 187-86 and 188-86 slip op. at 3 (Court of Common Pleas of Adams County, Pennsylvania, October 14, 1987).

Instantly, we are presented with a situation similar to that faced by the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Edward, 303 Pa.Super. 454, 450 A.2d 15 (1982), which involved the revocation of a defendant's probation for violations of the conditions of his probation. In considering the issue of the defendant's competency to participate in the probation revocation hearing, the Edward court stated:

Thus, the record reflects inconsistent at least, if not conflicting, psychiatric evidence, erratic behavior by appellant, and an expression of uncertainty by the lower Court. Nevertheless, we have concluded that we should not disturb the lower court's finding that appellant was competent to participate in the probation revocation hearing. The lower court judge is an experienced judge, who plainly considered the case conscientiously. He knew appellant from appellant's past appearances before him, and he had the advantage, which we do not have, of seeing appellant.

Id. at 465, 450 A.2d at 20 (emphasis added). Instantly, the trial court was aware of Appellee's mental condition and considered the psychiatric evaluation in denying Appellee's request for reconsideration. ³

In Commonwealth v. Higgins, 492 Pa. 343, 349, 424 A.2d 1222, 1225 (1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 919, 101 S.Ct. 3057, 69 L.Ed.2d 424 (1981), this Court concluded that an individual who had been suffering from a lengthy and chronic psychological malady was nonetheless competent to stand trial. In Higgins we reiterated:

"The test to be applied in determining the legal sufficiency of [a defendant's] mental capacity to stand trial, or enter a plea at the time involved, is not the M'Naghten 'right or wrong' test, but rather his ability to comprehend his position as one accused of murder and to cooperate with his counsel [in making a rational] defense."

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Melton, 465 Pa. 529, 534, 351 A.2d 221, 224 (1976)). See also Commonwealth v. Tyson, 485 Pa. 344, 402 A.2d 995 (1979).

Instantly, the question raised is limited to whether or not Appellee should have the consequences of his flight from the jurisdiction mitigated by virtue of an alleged mental defect whose validity was considered suspect by the trial court. There is no evidence that Appellee lacked the capacity to comprehend the position he was in or that he was unable to assist counsel in his defense. Appellee merely displayed a "bad attitude" and refused to cooperate with his examiners. Indeed, his very flight prior to sentencing could well reflect an astute awareness on his part of the gravity of his situation. Therefore, for the reasons so properly set forth in Commonwealth v. Edward, supra, we believe that the action of the trial court was a valid exercise of its discretion resulting from a thorough firsthand analysis and observation of Appellee.

It is well settled that while trial courts have broad discretionary powers, the exercise of such discretion may be subjected to appellate scrutiny when it is apparent that those discretionary powers have been abused....