Com. v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 16 October 1974
• Citation: 458 Pa. 112,74 A.L.R.3d 954,326 A.2d 387
• Parties: , 74 A.L.R.3d 954 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James J. COLEMAN, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 387

326 A.2d 387

458 Pa. 112, 74 A.L.R.3d 954

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James J. COLEMAN, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Oct. 16, 1974.

Frederick J. Lanshe, Public Defender, Allentown, for appellant.

George J. Joseph, Dist. Atty., Lawrence J. Brenner, Asst. Dist. Atty., Allentown, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION

JONES, Chief Justice.

On May 3, 1971, at approximately 6:00 a.m., Diane McCarthy was awakened by her boyfriend, James Coleman, who lived with her at her apartment in Allentown, Pennsylvania. At 6:15 a.m., Diane telephoned her mother in East Stroudsburg, saying that Coleman would not let her leave the apartment, that he would hang up the phone and that he was going to kill her. At approximately 6:25 a.m., the telephone connection was broken in Allentown, and the mother, Marilyn McCarthy, called the police as Diane had implored her to do. Five minutes later, Coleman, blood-spattered and cut about the face and hands, hailed a patrol car on a nearby street and said that he had hurt his girlfriend. The police found Diane in her apartment dead of multiple stab wounds at 6:35 a.m.

Appellant was tried before a jury in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County and convicted of aggravated assault and battery, assault with intent to kill and second-degree murder on September 24, 1971. Timely motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were denied, and appellant was sentenced to a term of ten to twenty years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.

Appellant contends that the trial judge erred in permitting the decedent's mother to testify for the Commonwealth as to the decedent's statements in the aofrementioned telephone conversation prior to her death. He maintains that admission of this testimony under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule was improper in that the decedent voiced only opinions without factual support at the time given. He argues that the effect of the judge's ruling was to preclude a successful plea of self-defense and to deter the jury from a verdict of voluntary manslaughter by evidencing the existence of malice. Appellant testified at trial that he had stabbed the decedent, but claimed that she had precipitated his action by an unprovoked attack upon him with a letter opener. He submits now, in essence, that the decedent's statements to her mother over the telephone are inadmissible as both hearsay and pure opinion. There is, however, no contention that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

The issue raised by this appeal is one of first impression in this Commonwealth. There is no doubt that the challenged testimony of decedent's mother comports with the classical definition of hearsay as an out-of-court utterance offered to prove the truth of the fact asserted, I.e. that appellant had made manifest an intent to kill Diane McCarthy. This Court must determine whether a declaration rendered in conclusory terms over a telephone conveying the substance of one's observation of another's apparently threatening behavior is properly admissible as evidence under any exception to the hearsay rule.

This Court has consistently recognized the validity and rationality of the res gestae exception to the bar against admissibility of hearsay evidence at trial. In examining the concept of res gestae, the courts of this Commonwealth have adhered to the thesis that:

'A res gestae declaration may be defined as a spontaneous declaration by a person whose mind has been suddenly made subject to an overpowering emotion caused by some unexpected and shocking occurrence, which that person has just participated in or closely witnessed, and made in reference to some phase of that occurrence which he perceived, and this declaration must be made so near the occurrence both in time and place as to exclude the likelihood of its having emanated in whole or in part from his reflective faculties.'

Allen v. Mack, 345 Pa. 407, 410, 28 A.2d 783, 784 (1942). Accord, Cody v. S.K.F. Industries, Inc., 447 Pa. 558, 291 A.2d 772 (1972); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 431 Pa. 44, 244 A.2d 683 (1968); Carney v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 428 Pa. 489, 240 A.2d 71 (1958); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 409 Pa. 268, 186 A.2d 5 (1968). The rationale underlying the exclusion of res gestae declarations from the hearsay rule is that the startling event speaks through the verbal acts of the declarant and vests reliability in an out-of-court statement whose accuracy would otherwise be suspect. Cody v. S.K.F. Industries, Inc., 447 Pa. at 563, 291 A.2d at 774. The spontaneity of such an excited declaration is the source of reliability and the touchstone of admissibility.

In an elightened analysis of the historical application of the res gestae doctrine, Professor McCormick has indicated that the term res gestae is move generic than particular in nature. See McCormick, Evidence § 274 at 585 (1954). He concludes and we agree that within the scope of res gestae there exist four distinct exceptions to the hearsay rule, all possessing different indicia of reliability: (1) declarations of present bodily condition; (2) declarations of present mental state and emotion; (3) excited utterances; and (4) declarations of present sense impression. The practice in many courts, including those of this Commonwealth, has been to refer to the particular exception by the generic designation. Res gestae statements as defined by this Court in Allen v. Mack partake of the characteristics of excited utterances. The exception for excited utterances is not applicable to the present circumstances.

We note that the decedent's statements to her mother resemble more a verbalization of her preception of appellant's attitude and behavior than a declaration of emotion engendered by a prior physical occurrence. In a well-reasoned essay on the subject of res gestae, Professor Morgan asserted that there should be an exception to the hearsay rule for precent sense impressions, I.e., declarations concerning conditions or non-exciting events which the declarant is observing at the time of his declaration. Morgan, Res Gestae, 12 Wash.L.Rev. 91, 96 (1937). The indicium of reliability for such a declaration is in his view its contemporaneousness with the observation of the occurrence or condition. Relative immediacy of the declaration insures that there will have been little opportunity for reflection or calculated misstatement. There is no necessity for the presence of a startling occurrence or accident of serve as a source of reliability, for:

'The declaration is 'instictive, rather than deliberative--in short, the reflex product of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by restrospective mental action. These are the indicia of verity which the law accepts as a substitute for the usual requirements of an oath and opportunity for cross-examination.''

Morgan, Res Gestae, 12 Wash.l.Rev. at 96, Citing Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Lowery, 184 Ala. 443, 448, 63 So. 952 (1913); See McCormick, Evidence § 298 at 710 (1972).

Various courts throughout the United States have embraced the precepts underlying an exception to the hearsay rule for declarations of present sense impressions. ^* Of particular pertinence to our considerations in this case is the decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942). Therein, the defendant in an automobile collision case offered through a witness the declaration of one Mrs. Cooper that when the plaintiff's car passed her at a point some four miles prior to that of the eventual accident, she had said: '(T)hey must have been drunk, that we would find them somewhere on the road wrecked if they keep that rate of speed up.' Objection to the admissibility of this testimony was sustained at trial, but the Supreme Court reversed. It found that the evidential value of the remark was more than merely cumulative and that the comment possessed exceptional reliability in that it was contemporaneous in time with the observation, was safe from any defect in memory or opportunity for calculated misstatement, and had been made to the testifying witness who had an equal opportunity to observe and hence to check a misstatement. See also Hastings v. Ross, 211 Kan. 732, 508 P.2d 514 (1973) (statement of witness when she saw automobile pass her house that 'that boy is going to kill somebody one of these days,' uttered prior to the actual collision, held admissible); Claybrook v. Acreman, 373 S.W.2d 287 (Tex.Civ.App.1963) (statement of bystanders that 'they won't last long at that rate of speed' held admissible); McCullom v. McClain, 227 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Civ.App.1949) (declarations of bystanders relating to high speed of plaintiff's motorcycle just before collision held admissible); Marks v. I. M. Pearlstine & Sons, 203 S.C. 318, 26 S.E.2d 835 (1943) (statement by witness to recing by trucks that 'the trucks are going to kill somebody yet' held admissible). Indeed, Rule 803(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides for the admissibility of declarations of present sense impression made either during or immediately after perception of the event or condition.

Thorough consideration of the decedent's statements to her mother over the telephone in light of the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule leads us to agree with the decision of the Court of Common Pleas that they are properly admissible as evidence. The decedent told her mother that appellant would not let her leave the apartment, that he would hang up the phone and that as soon as the phone had been hung up, he would kill her. The mother testified that appellant could be heard shouting in the background, and appellant himself testified that he and the decedent had engaged in a loud argument immediately prior to the telephone call. Contemporaneity of the declarations with the observation seems clear. There existed a sufficient...