Com. v. Colturi

• Decision Date: 19 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. SJC-09796.,SJC-09796.
• Citation: 864 N.E.2d 498,448 Mass. 809
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Anne E. COLTURI.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

864 N.E.2d 498

448 Mass. 809

COMMONWEALTH v.Anne E. COLTURI.

No. SJC-09796.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Franklin.

Argued February 8, 2007.

Decided April 19, 2007.

Judith Ellen Pietras, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Stephen B. Monsein, Amherst, for the defendant.

Timothy J. Cruz, District Attorney, & Robert C. Thompson, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the Plymouth District, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, SPINA, COWIN, & CORDY, JJ.

CORDY, J.

The question presented in this case is whether, or on what conditions, the result of a breathalyzer test is admissible in a criminal trial on a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), in violation of G.L. c. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1), as amended through St.2003, c. 28, § 1(OUI statute).

As a consequence of amendments to the OUI statute enacted in 2003, an OUI violation may be established on proof that a driver was operating a motor vehicle either "with a percentage, by weight, of alcohol in their blood of eight one-hundredths or greater"(per se violation), or "while under the influence of intoxicating liquor"(impaired ability violation).G.L. c. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1).A judge in the District Court Department ruled that "the Commonwealth may not offer evidence of a[b]reathalyzer test result obtained more than an hour after evidence of the defendant's last operation of a vehicle to prove the `per se' offense unless it offers expert [retrograde extrapolation] testimony establishing the defendant's blood alcohol at the time of operation ... [and] ... may not offer [such test result] to prove the `impaired ability to operate' offense unless it offers expert testimony establishing [both]the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of operation and the significance of that level as it pertains to impairment."The judge also ruled, however, that in a prosecution of an impaired ability violation, the Commonwealth may offer evidence without the need of expert testimony "that the defendant took a[b]reathalyzer test and that the test reading was greater than zero," thus indicating the presence of alcohol in the defendant's system, but nothing more.¹

The correctness of the judge's rulings is before the court on a reservation and report of a single justice following a petition by the Commonwealth for extraordinary relief pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3.The parties have filed a statement of agreed facts.

We conclude that expert testimony on the subject of retrograde extrapolation,² which was not a prerequisite to the admission of the results of a properly administered breathalyzer test prior to the 2003amendments, has not become such as a consequence of the amendments, so long as the test is conducted within a reasonable period of time after the driver's last operation of the vehicle.We also conclude that if the Commonwealth chooses to proceed only on an impaired ability theory and intends to offer evidence of a breathalyzer result of .08 or above, it must offer expert testimony on the significance of that level as it pertains to impairment.³

1. Facts.Anne Colturi was stopped at 9:10 P.M. by a State trooper who observed her operating a vehicle in an unsafe fashion.On stopping the vehicle, the trooper smelled alcohol in the vehicle and on Colturi and he observed that Colturi's speech was slurred and her eyes glassy.She swayed, was off balance, and used the vehicle for support as she walked to the rear of the vehicle.Colturi was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and consented to a breathalyzer test.Two tests were administered, the first at 10:15 P.M. and the second at 10:19 P.M.The results showed a blood alcohol level of .15 per cent.Thereafter, a complaint issued charging her with violating the OUI statute by operating a vehicle "with a percentage, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood of eight one-hundredths or greater, or while under the influence of intoxicating liquor."

2.Discussion.In 2003, the Legislature amended G.L. c. 90, § 24, in several respects.As pertains to the issues before us, the Legislature added language to the OUI statute, making it a violation to operate a motor vehicle not only under the influence of intoxicating liquor, but also with a blood alcohol level of .08 or more.Having added this language to the violation provision of the statute, the Legislature deleted language in § 24(1)(e) that had created a "permissible inference" that a person with a blood alcohol level of .08 or more was indeed "under the influence of intoxicating liquor."St.2003, c. 28, §§ 1, 4.⁴

Whether these amendments changed the law regarding the admissibility of the results of breathalyzer tests in OUI prosecutions, adding new requirements or prerequisites to it, is a matter of statutory interpretation.We interpret statutes"according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated."Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester,368 Mass. 511, 513, 333 N.E.2d 450(1975).We also presume that when the Legislature amends a statute it is "aware of the prior state of the law as explicated by the decisions of this court,"Commonwealth v. Callahan,440 Mass. 436, 441, 799 N.E.2d 113(2003), and where it has reenacted statutory language without material change, they are "presumed to have adopted the judicial construction put upon it."Nichols v. Vaughan,217 Mass. 548, 551, 105 N.E. 376(1914).

The purpose of G.L. c. 90, § 24, generally, is to "protect the public from drivers whose judgment, alertness, and ability to respond promptly and effectively to unexpected emergencies are diminished because of the consumption of alcohol."Commonwealth v. Connolly,394 Mass. 169, 172-173, 474 N.E.2d 1106(1985).The expressly stated purpose of the 2003amendments was to "avoid loss of life and the loss of federal highway aid funds" by the prompt enactment of further provisions "necessary for the immediate preservation of the public safety."St.2003, c. 28, emergency preamble.It is beyond reasonable dispute that, in adding a per se violation to the OUI statute, the Legislature intended to strengthen the protections afforded the public from drivers who might be impaired by the consumption of alcohol.It is in this context that we examine whether the Legislature also intended to change the law with respect to the admissibility of breathalyzer test results to make it more difficult for the Commonwealth to present what has otherwise been considered relevant and highly reliable evidence of the level of alcohol in the blood of a driver arrested for OUI.Commonwealth v. Durning,406 Mass. 485, 490, 548 N.E.2d 1242(1990)("The Legislature and this court have recognized \the reliability of the scientific principles underlying the use of breathalyzer evidence").

Our decisions prior to the enactment of the 2003 amendments rejected attempts to exclude breathalyzer test results because of the lapse between the time of the alleged offense and the administration of the breathalyzer test, which often occurs away from the scene of the arrest, at a police station, and always occurs some period of time thereafter.Commonwealth v. Marley,396 Mass. 433, 438, 486 N.E.2d 715(1985)(results admissible despite more than two and one-half hours between time of accident and breathalyzer test).Even when confronted with expert evidence that "it was possible for a person's blood alcohol level to increase [rather than decrease] over a short period of time even though no additional alcohol was ingested during that time,"we had not required expert testimony on retrograde extrapolation as a prerequisite to the admissibility of breathalyzer test results, and consistently ruled that any delay in the administration of the breathalyzer test goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.Commonwealth v. Durning, supra at 494 n. 11, 548 N.E.2d 1242, citingCommonwealth v. Marley, supra.Other State courts have reached the same conclusion.See, e.g., State v. Taylor,132 N.H. 314, 319, 566 A.2d 172(1989)(delay between operation of a motor vehicle and testing goes to weight accorded the test by trier of fact);Commonwealth v. Zugay,745 A.2d 639, 647(Pa.Super.Ct.2000)(amount of time elapsed between time of driving and testing affects weight not admissibility of evidence);State v. McDonald,421 N.W.2d 492, 494(S.D.1988)(lapse of time between operation of vehicle and testing goes to weight not admissibility of test result in prosecution for driving while under the influence);Garcia v. State,112 S.W.3d 839(Tex.App.2003)(tests done two hours after accident not rendered inadmissible by failure of State to extrapolate).⁵

The position proposed by the defendant and accepted by the judge, that expert testimony on retrograde extrapolation must now be offered as a prerequisite to the admission of breathalyzer test results, imposes new and significant burdens on the Commonwealth.It is contended by the Commonwealth, and undisputed on the present record, that numerous OUI cases are prosecuted every day in courts throughout the Commonwealth, that there are few State employed experts on retrograde extrapolation available, and that the costs of utilizing private experts at these trials would be inordinate.More importantly, in many, if not most cases, the Commonwealth will not be able to acquire the information necessary to construct an accurate retrograde extrapolation because such information (e.g., when and in what amounts the defendant consumed the alcohol prior to driving)⁶ will almost always be in the possession of defendants and protected by...