Com. v. Cook

• Decision Date: 20 May 1996
• Citation: 676 A.2d 639,544 Pa. 361
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Robert COOK, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 639

676 A.2d 639

544 Pa. 361

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Robert COOK, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Oct. 24, 1995.

Decided May 20, 1996.

[544 Pa. 367] Ramy I. Djerassi, Philadelphia, for Robert Cook.

Catherine Marshall, Philadelphia, for Com.

Robert Graci, Harrisburg, for Atty. Gen.

Before NIX, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CASTILLE, Justice.

This is a direct appeal from a sentence of death imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. ¹ Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of first degree murder, ² criminal conspiracy to commit murder, ³ possession of an instrument of crime ⁴ and robbery. ⁵ The jury found three aggravating circumstances ⁶ and no mitigating circumstances and returned a sentence of death. Post-verdict motions were denied and the trial court imposed the death sentence for the murder conviction. In addition, the trial court sentenced appellant to a consecutive term of ten to twenty years imprisonment on the robbery conviction, a consecutive term of five to ten years imprisonment on the criminal conspiracy conviction and a consecutive term of two and one-half to five years imprisonment on the conviction for possessing an instrument of crime.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Although appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, as in all cases in which the death penalty has been imposed, this Court is required to independently undertake a review of the sufficiency of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 26-27 n. 3, 454 A.2d 937, 942 n. 3 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983). The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to support all the elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 511 Pa. 429, 435, 515 A.2d 531, 533-34 (1986). After a review of the record, we find that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction.

At trial, Commonwealth witness Sondee Harmon testified that on December 6, 1986, she met with appellant, Raul Serrano and appellant's uncle to discuss with appellant a plan that appellant had for them to make some money. Appellant explained that he knew a man, whom he identified as Alvin Tyler, from whom they could steal a VCR and a substantial amount of money which Tyler had amassed from dealing drugs. Appellant cautioned Harmon that they would have to kill Tyler in order to steal the VCR and the money. Harmon testified that she would not agree to the murder of the targeted person and that appellant, therefore, had to agree that they would not kill the man or else she would not participate. Appellant explained to her that the plan was that appellant would get them all into the victim's house by telling the victim that he was bringing a woman for the intended victim, appellant and Serrano to have sex with, and that while Harmon and the victim were upstairs in the victim's house, appellant and Serrano would steal the VCR and search for money downstairs.

After they agreed to appellant's plan, the three of them proceeded to the house of Paulette Duncan, at which time appellant directed Serrano to retrieve a paper bag from the trunk of appellant's car. Harmon observed appellant remove a knife from the bag and place it under his jacket. After visiting a local bar, the three proceeded across the street to the home of the intended victim. The unsuspecting victim invited the three cohorts into the house and offered them each a beer. While the victim was in the kitchen, appellant told Serrano and Harmon not to take the beer or touch anything in the house because they would leave fingerprints. However, appellant, who was wearing gloves, accepted a beer and the four then smoked some marijuana. The victim then asked Harmon to join him upstairs to finish smoking the marijuana cigarette and, after a nudge from appellant, Harmon went to the front bedroom on the second floor with the victim.

Shortly thereafter, appellant and Serrano joined them upstairs. Once everyone was in position, Serrano grabbed the victim's arms and pulled them up over his head. At the same time, appellant took the knife out from under his shirt and plunged it into the victim's chest. Harmon ran from the room and Serrano followed her downstairs, where he found her hiding behind the couch. While downstairs, Serrano and Harmon heard sounds of a struggle upstairs. Shortly thereafter, appellant came to the top of the steps, yelled for Serrano to come back upstairs and asked if Serrano had found one of his gloves, which he had lost in the house. When Serrano returned to the second floor, Harmon noticed blood dripping from the ceiling.

When appellant came downstairs, he removed his blood-soaked jacket and replaced it with another apparently belonging to the victim. Appellant then placed the knife in a paper bag which he took from the house and the three departed. In the car, appellant joked that the deceased was a "tough dinosaur" who had to be stabbed repeatedly before he died. He also stated that the killing got his adrenaline flowing. The three returned to Duncan's house, where appellant retrieved two plastic bags into which he placed his bloody jacket, his one remaining glove and his knife before disposing of them in a dumpster.

Appellant drove Harmon home about thirty minutes later and he warned her that if she told anyone about the murder he would harm her family. He then gave her $200 and a substantial amount of marijuana. Serrano received a similar amount of money, although appellant stated that Serrano did not deserve any money because he had not taken the victim's VCR as planned. ⁷

Darcyne Brown, an acquaintance of appellant's, testified that she spoke to appellant two days later, on December 8, 1986, and that, at that time, he told her that he had murdered someone down the street from Paulette Duncan's house. Later that day, appellant again bragged about the murder while Brown drove with him to take Serrano to the airport. Appellant and Brown went to Duncan's house later that evening and, upon sighting the police at the victim's house, appellant stated in Brown's presence, "What, they're just finding the body?" After making this remark, appellant told Brown not to tell Duncan, who was by then hysterical, that he had killed the victim.

Police arrived at the victim's residence because earlier that evening, Philadelphia Police Officer Patrick Doherty was stopped by two men who told him they believed their friend was dead and directed him to the victim's house. Officer Doherty found the front door unlocked and, upon entering the house, immediately noticed blood dripping from the ceiling in the living room. The officer proceeded to the second floor, where he observed the victim Tyler naked from the waist down lying in a pool of blood in the front bedroom. Officer Doherty also noticed a large gash behind the victim's right ear. When the body was later moved, a brown leather glove, identified at trial as belonging to appellant, was found underneath the body. ⁸ Appellant was arrested on August 7, 1987, after Harmon gave a statement to police on July 14, 1987, implicating appellant in the murders. ⁹

Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for first degree murder where the Commonwealth establishes that the defendant acted with a specific intent to kill; that a human being was unlawfully killed; that the person accused did the killing; and that the killing was done with deliberation. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(d); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 528 Pa. 546, 550, 599 A.2d 624, 626 (1991). Specific intent to kill can be inferred by the use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the body. Commonwealth v. Butler, 446 Pa. 374, 378, 288 A.2d 800, 802 (1972). Here, ample trial evidence consisting of extensive eyewitness testimony and testimony regarding inculpatory statements appellant made to numerous parties demonstrated that appellant deliberately planned to murder the victim in order to steal certain of his possessions. He then successfully carried out his plan with the assistance of his two cohorts by stabbing the victim to death and stealing money and drugs from the victim's residence. Such evidence clearly established that appellant intentionally murdered the victim with the malice aforethought required for first degree murder. Therefore, no relief on this basis is warranted. ¹⁰

COURT'S REFUSAL TO GRANT A MOTION FOR A BENCH TRIAL

Appellant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant his request for a bench trial. Appellant has no absolute right to a bench trial. Commonwealth v. Miller, 541 Pa. 531, 552-53, 664 A.2d 1310, 1321 (1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 932, 133 L.Ed.2d 859 (1996). See also, Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34, 85 S.Ct. 783, 789-90, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965) (no right to a bench trial under the United States Constitution). The decision of whether to grant a defendant's request for a bench trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Miller, supra; Commonwealth v. Sorrell, 500 Pa. 355, 362, 456 A.2d 1326, 1328-29 (1982).

In the present case, the trial court denied appellant's request for a non-jury trial because the court had recently presided over appellant's prior murder trial and felt that as a result it could not be an impartial fact-finder. Miller, supra (court should consider prior exposure to inadmissible evidence; court properly exercised discretion in denying motion for bench trial where court had determined that its partiality was potentially tainted by exposure to inadmissible evidence of other crimes); Sorrell, supra (court properly exercised discretion in denying motion for bench trial where court had...