Com. v. Corporan

• Citation: 613 A.2d 530,531 Pa. 348
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Pedro CORPORAN, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 17 June 1992
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 530

613 A.2d 530

531 Pa. 348

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Pedro CORPORAN, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted April 8, 1992.

Decided June 17, 1992.

[531 Pa. 349] Floyd P. Jones, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Christy H. Fawcett, Deputy Prosecutor, for appellee.

Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FLAHERTY, Justice.

In 1989, in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, the appellant, Pedro Corporan, was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Appellant was sentenced to three to six years imprisonment, and a fine of fifteen thousand dollars was imposed. An appeal was taken to the Superior Court, whereupon the judgment of sentence was affirmed. 406 Pa.Super. 660, 583 A.2d 830. The present appeal, by allowance, ensued. We affirm.

The three year minimum term of imprisonment and fifteen thousand dollar fine imposed upon appellant was prescribed by the mandatory sentencing provision in 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(3)(ii). The issue presented in this appeal is whether the sentencing provision was properly applied.

Appellant was convicted for being in possession of a mixture of powder containing cocaine. By its express terms, the mandatory sentencing provision is to be applied when possession of the controlled substance has involved a quantity of the substance having a specified minimum weight, to wit, ten grams. There was no evidence in this case that the cocaine itself, as opposed to the mixture of cocaine and powdered cutting agents, met that weight requirement. The total weight of the powder, containing cocaine, that was seized from appellant was 14.19 grams. The weight of the pure cocaine contained in that powder is not known.

Appellant contends that the mandatory sentencing provision applies only where the weight of the pure cocaine seized meets the ten gram requirement, rather than where the weight of the mixture of cocaine and cutting agent together meets that requirement. We do not agree. Such a contention is plainly contrary to the express language of the statute.

When appellant was sentenced, 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a) provided in pertinent part as follows: ^*

(3) A person who is convicted of violating section 13(a)(14) or (30) of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act where the controlled substance is coca leaves or is any salt, compound, derivative or preparation of coca leaves or is any salt, compound, derivative or preparation which is chemically equivalent or identical with any of these substances or is any mixture containing any of these substances except decocainized coca leaves or extracts of coca leaves which (extracts) do not contain cocaine or ecgonine shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and a fine as set forth in this subsection:

....

(ii) upon the first conviction when the amount of the substance involved is at least ten grams and less than 100 grams; three years in prison and a fine of $15,000....

(Emphasis added).

This is not a case where the meaning of the statute in question is ambiguous, such that we would need to search for legislative history or resort extensively to rules of statutory construction to discern the legislative intent. When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect in accordance with its plain and common meaning. Commonwealth v. Larkin, 518 Pa. 225, 232-33, 542 A.2d 1324, 1328 (1988); Commonwealth v. Bell, 512 Pa. 334, 339-40, 516 A.2d 1172, 1175 (1986); Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). See also 18 Pa.C.S. § 105 (provisions of the Crimes Code (Title 18) are to be construed according to the "fair import" of their terms).

When there has been a conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(3)(ii) requires that a three year minimum sentence of imprisonment and a fine of $15,000 be imposed "when the amount of the substance involved is at least ten grams...." (Emphasis added). Appellant contends that the weight of the "substance" should be determined without including the weight of the cutting agent, i.e., that it is the weight of the cocaine rather than the weight of the mixture containing cocaine that is determinative. Such a contention, however, ignores the plain definition that the same statutory provision accords to the term "substance."

In 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(3), supra, it is expressly stated that the mandatory minimum sentence shall apply "where the controlled substance is coca leaves or is any ... preparation of coca leaves ... or is any mixture containing any of these substances...." (Emphasis added). The legislature could not have been more clear in expressing that, for purposes of the sentencing statute, a preparation or mixture containing cocaine is to be counted as a "substance." This reflects the legislature's awareness that cocaine is commonly possessed and circulated in a mixture containing cocaine and adulterants which serve as cutting agents. Within the same statutory provision, at subparagraph (3)(ii), supra, reference to the weight of the "substance" must be taken as referring to the same substance, namely the pure cocaine or any preparation or mixture thereof. To conclude otherwise would be to accord the term "substance" two different definitions within the same statutory provision, a result which would be both unreasonable and unsupported by any language in the statute. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1) (legislature cannot be presumed to intend an absurd or unreasonable result).

Appellant's contention is essentially that subparagraph (3)(ii) of the statute should be construed as though it used the term "pure cocaine" rather than "substance" in describing the material to be weighed. The language chosen by the legislature, however, is controlling. "Substance" is expressly defined in the statute to include a "preparation" or "mixture." If the legislature had not intended to include preparations and mixtures containing cocaine as substances whose weights could trigger the mandatory sentencing provision, it would have made reference to the weight of the cocaine rather than the weight of the "substance" as the triggering factor for imposition of a mandatory sentence. See Commonwealth v. Perez, 397 Pa.Super. 574, 580 A.2d 781 (1990) (weight of the mixture containing cocaine, rather than weight of the pure cocaine contained therein, triggers application of mandatory sentencing under 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(3)).

Thus, the Superior Court properly held that, based upon the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, the mandatory sentencing provision can be triggered by the weight of a mixture in which cocaine has been combined with a cutting agent. Inasmuch as appellant was found to be in possession of 14.19 grams of such a mixture, he was properly sentenced under the provision in question.

Order affirmed.

ZAPPALA, J., concurs in the result.

CAPPY, J., files a dissenting opinion.

CAPPY, Justice, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree with the majority that the language of the statute at issue, 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(3)(ii), is clear and...