Com. v. Coyle

• Decision Date: 14 October 1964
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. John J. COYLE, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 782

203 A.2d 782

415 Pa. 379

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. John J. COYLE, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Oct. 14, 1964.

Mary Alice Duffy, Philadelphia, for appellant

Thomas M. Reed and William H. Wolf, Jr., Asst. Dist. Attys., William D. Harris, Chief Asst. Dist. Atty., Arlen Specter, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Litigation Div., F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Jr., First Asst. Dist. Atty., James C. Crumlish, Jr., Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for the Commonwealth.

Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

EAGEN, Justice.

The appellant-defendant, John J. Coyle, was convicted by a jury in the court below of first degree murder. Punishment was fixed at death. Motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were denied. Following imposition of sentence in accordance with the jury's verdict, the issue A brief summary of the facts incident to the killing involved and the events leading to its occurrence as established by the evidence is as follows:

was brought to this Court by an appeal from the judgment.

On December 26, 1958, John Coyle and his brother, William Coyle, committed an armed robbery of a store in Buzzard's Bay, Massachusetts. Shortly thereafter, fearing detection and arrest, they decided to leave Buzzard's Bay where they had been residing, traveled to Bangor, Maine, and eventually to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to hide out.

On January 29, 1959, they rented a furnished apartment at 1539 Erie Avenue, Philadelphia, under fictitious names. Although they had relatives and close friends in the city, they continuously concealed their real identity and refrained from contact with persons who knew them.

On April 3, 1959, being in need of money, they decided to rob again. At ten o'clock that morning, they took at gun point an automobile and its owner (one Ralph Gallagher) from the parking lot of La Salle College, Philadelphia. Gallagher was later forced into the trunk of the automobile where he remained imprisoned for several hours. The Coyles then drove around the city to find 'an easy job to rob.' About eight-thirty o'clock that evening, they committed an armed robbery of a Philadelphia taproom known as the Wistar Tavern. They fled the scene in the Gallagher automobile, later abandoning it in another section of the city, with the owner left in the locked trunk. They then returned to their apartment.

Following this episode, their fear of apprehension increased and they both armed themselves with concealed, loaded revolvers every time they ventured forth from the apartment.

In the month of May, 1959, their money ran out again. They began sneaking out of the apartment in the early morning hours and stealing milk from porches of residences nearby. The method of operation was for one of the brothers to approach the residence to get the milk while the other would stand armed nearby to 'cover him.' If anyone tried to apprehend them, it was agreed that they would shoot their way out if necessary.

Before dawn on the day in question, June 5, 1959, they both armed themselves with revolvers and again went out in the neighborhood seeking food. At a nearby residence on Sydenham Street, William was engaged in stealing milk from the front porch when James Kane, a uniformed officer of the Philadelphia Police Department, who was patroling a beat in the area, came down the street and caught him in the act. ¹ John, armed, was out in the street nearby. The police officer pulled his gun and yelled to William: 'What are you doing there? Halt or I'll shoot.' Someone else then said, 'I'll kill you.' Before the officer fired a shot, one of the two Coyle brothers fired five shots from a .38 caliber revolver, three of which entered Kane's body killing him instantly.

MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT

One eyewitness to the occurrence definitely identified John Coyle as the actual killer. This evidence, in itself, is sufficient to sustain the verdict. See, Commonwealth v. Gooslin, 410 Pa. 285, 189 A.2d 157 (1963); Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 413 Pa. 48, 195 A.2d 338 (1963).

Other testimony indicates that William Coyle fired the fatal shots. ² However The motion in arrest of judgment was, therefore, properly overruled.

if this is correct, the evidence was also sufficient to establish that John Coyle was present on the scene aiding and abetting his [415 Pa. 386] brother in the commission of the crimes. Under these facts, both were equally guilty and John, as a principal in the second degree, would be subject to the same punishment as if he were the principal felon. See Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 1105, as amended, 18 P.S. § 5105; Perkins, 'Parties to Crime,' 89 U. of P. Law Review 581 (1941); Herz, 'Principals and Accessories to Crime under Pennsylvania Law,' 30 Temple Law Quarterly 180 (1957); 1 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, Parties, § 115 (1957); Commonwealth v. Klose, 4 Kulp 111 (1886); Commonwealth v. Strantz, 328 Pa. 33, 195 A. 75 (1937); Commonwealth v. Parmer, 364 Pa. 11, 70 A.2d 296 (1950).

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

One of the many assignments of error alleges that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a finding that John Coyle 'aided and abetted' his brother, William, (assuming the latter was the actual killer) in the murder of Officer Kane, and that the trial court, therefore, erred in submitting this question to the jury. With this, we do not agree.

If the jury concluded that William fired the fatal shots, the evidence was also sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that John Coyle was present nearby as a 'lookout'; that he was armed with a deadly weapon; that in accordance with a previous agreement with his brother, he was prepared and ready to shoot and kill any person who tried to apprehend either one. Thus, he was present aiding, encouraging and sustaining his brother, not only in the stealing of the milk but in any effort necessary to prevent arrest. It, therefore, was a concerted action. This constitutes 'aiding and abetting.' See, Commonwealth v. Klose, supra; Commonwealth v. Ford, 86 Pa.Super. 483 (1926); Weston v. Commonwealth, 111 Pa. 251, 2 A. 191 (1885); Commonwealth v. Mendola, 294 Pa. 353, 144 A. 292 (1928); Commonwealth v. Strantz, supra; commonwealth v. Lowry, 374 Pa. 594, 98 A.2d 733 (1953).

As stated in Lowry at pages 600-601, 98 A.2d at pages quoting from Weston v. Commonwealth, supra, 111 Pa. at 263, 2 A. at 263: "'It is not necessary, however, to prove the the party actually aided in the commission of the offense; if he watched for his companions, in order to prevent surprise, or remained at a convenient distance in order to favor their escape, if necessary, or was in such a situation as to be able readily to come to their assistance, the knowledge of which was calculated to give additional confidence to his companions, in contemplation of law, he was aiding and abetting."'

Another assignment of error complains that it was prejudicial error to admit in evidence at trial proof that John and William Coyle Committed other crimes prior to the date of the Kane killing.

In oral statements and written confessions made to the investigating officers following his arrest, the appellant described the commission of these crimes including the Buzzard's Bay robbery, the stealing of the Gallagher automobile, the abduction of its owner, the Wistar Tavern robbery and the practice of carrying concealed weapons. He also recited their fear of arrest for this criminal activity and their plans to avoid arrest.

With the exception of the Wistar robbery, the evidence of which was admitted for the purpose of motive as well as an aid to the jury in fixing the penalty in the event of a first degree murder verdict the appellant's admissions and description of the commission of these prior crimes were admitted at trial solely for penalty purposes. The jury was instructed in clear language on several occasions that this evidence was not to be considered in resolving the question of guilt. ³

The trial was conducted and concluded prior to the effective date of the Split-Verdict Act of December 1, 1959, P.L. 1621, 18 P.S. § 4701. Under the rules of procedure, then in existence for determining penalty in such cases, it was not error to admit this evidence for penalty purposes: Commonwealth v. Dague, 302 Pa. 13, 152 A. 839 (1930); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 389 Pa. 382, 133 A.2d 207 (1957); Commonwealth v. Rucker, 403 Pa. 262, 168 A.2d 732 (1961); United States ex rel. Rucker v. Myers, 3 Cir., 311 F.2d 311, cert. denied 374 U.S. 844, 83 S.Ct. 1901, 10 L.Ed.2d 1064 (1962).

The Split-Verdict Act was not retroactive: Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 399 Pa. 110, 160 A.2d 215 (1960). Nor has it application in the present case, even though the judgment of sentence was entered after the legislation went into effect. See, Commonwealth v. Rucker, supra, which presents a similar situation. The Split-Verdict Act merely changed the method or procedure to be employed in fixing the penalty in subsequent relevant trials: Commonwealth v. McCoy, 405 Pa. 23, 172 A.2d 795 (1961). It did not invalidate prior trials conducted in accordance with procedural rules then proper and valid.

Nor is there merit to the contention that appellant's pretrial admissions of these prior crimes were inadmissible because he had not been previously convicted and sentenced thereon. A statement or confession of an accused admitting the actual commission of other crimes, if relevant, is admissible even though no prior convictions had been effected. See, Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 594, 50 A.2d 342 (1947); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353 (1949); and, Commonwealth v. Rucker, supra.

Evidence of appellant's prior crimes was also admissible in the present case for purposes other than penalty.

It is patently clear from the record and particularly appellant's own admissions, that these prior crimes were all interwoven and directly connected with the Kane killing. In fact, the killing...