Com. v. Daniels

• Decision Date: 07 January 1975
• Citation: 321 N.E.2d 822,366 Mass. 601
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Russell W. DANIELS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 822

321 N.E.2d 822

366 Mass. 601

COMMONWEALTH v. Russell W. DANIELS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

Argued Sept. 17, 1974.

Decided Jan. 7, 1975.

Howard J. Alperin, Boston (J. Arthur Hickerson, Springfield, with him), for defendant.

John T. McDonough, Asst. Dist. Atty. (William W. Teahan, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., with him), for the Commonwealth.

Before TAURO, C.J., and REARDON, BRAUCHER, HENNESSEY and WILKINS, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

The defendant (Daniels), a mentally retarded young man with a second-grade reading ability and an I.Q. of fifty-three, was found guilty of murder in the second degree solely on the basis of his confession to the Sprinfield police. In this appeal, which is subject to G.L. c. 278, §§ 33A--33G, Daniels argues that, for various reasons, evidence of his alleged confession and admissions should have been suppressed, and that, if they had been suppressed, he would have been entitled to a directed verdict. Although they were not the subject of any exception (or even objection) at trial, Daniels also challenges certain aspects of the judge's charge to the jury, asking this court to consider these challenges within its power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E.

In the middle of the morning of August 22, 1972, the body of the eighty-three year old victim, a butcher knife stuck in her throat, was found in her apartment at 976 State Street in Springfield. There were superficial cuts on her right breast, and stab wounds in her stomach and vagina. There was medical testimony that she had died sometime during the previous day.

Daniels, who was then twenty-six years old, lived alone in an apartment at 986 State Street in Springfield. He did janitorial work in apartment buildings in the neighborhood, including the victim's, and worked at a menial job in a local restaurant. It was stipulated that Daniels had a second-grade reading ability. It appeared at a hearing on Daniels's motion to suppress, but not at the trial, that Daniels had spent between thirteen and fifteen years at the Belchertown State School, a school for the retarded. It further appeared at that voir dire, but not at trial, that Daniels had been diagnosed in October, 1972, at Bridgewater State Hospital as having 'a full scale I.Q. of 53, classifying him at the mild to moderate range of mental deficiency.' ¹ The evidence at the voir dire and before the jury showed that Daniels had left the Belchertown State School at the end of 1970 to live in a 'half-way house' in Springfield. In May, 1971, he moved to his own apartment where he took care of himself.

Late in the morning of the day the victim's body was found, a Springfield police officer spoke to Daniels in the vicinity of 976 and 986 State Street. He told Daniels that there had been an incident and asked him if he would go to the police station to talk with the investigating officers. Daniels agreed and went of his own volition.

The account of what transpired at the police station, summarized next in this opinion, is based on the findings made by the judge following the voir dire and on the evidence which was introduced at trial. As to events at the police station, there was no significant difference between the evidence introduced at the voir dire and the evidence introduced at the trial. ²

Daniels was turned over to the officer in charge of the investigation at approximately noontime. He was taken to an interrogation room, approximately ten feet square. Four officers questioned him from time to time, but not all were present at all times. Initially he was given 'his Miranda warnings.' ³ See Miranda v. Arizona, 38j U.S. 436, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Daniels said he knew he had rights, because he had heard about them and seem them on television. He also was told that See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. The officers testified that Daniels said he understood the explanations of his rights which were given to him.

Although, initially, he denied that he had ever been in the victim's apartment, by 3 P.M. he had made an oral confession to stabbing the victim with a knife. About 3 P.M. an officer who previously had not been present came in. He also gave Daniels Miranda warnings, and, being uncertain whether Daniels understood, he explained them again in detail. A written statement was then prepared, which Daniels tried to read but could not. It was read to him, and he signed it. Daniels then went with five policemen to the victim's apartment, where, according to testimony from policemen, he described how he committed the crime. ⁴ Daniels was booked at the police station shortly before 7 P.M., on his return from the apartment, and was arraigned the next morning.

Almost a year after the denial of Daniels's motion to suppress, the judge filed a memorandum and order which contained strong findings that Daniels 'did knowingly, willingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his constitutional rights under the Miranda warnings,' in an act 'which was a product of a rational intellect.' The judge further found that 'the prosecution has carried its heavy burden that the defendant knowingly, willingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel during the period he was in custody.' He found that no force was used and no promises were made by the police to obtain the oral and written statements. He further found that there was no 'physical or psychological pressure by the police at any time,' and that Daniels's statements to the police were a meaningful act of violation. He made no reference in his findings to Daniels's I.Q. We turn first to a consideration of the legal principles governing the admission in evidence of confessions made in the course of police interrogation of persons like Daniels.

A minor may waive constitutional rights and make a confession which is admissible against him. See West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467, 468--469 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. den., 393 U.S. 1102, 89 S.Ct. 903, 21 L.Ed.2d 795 (1969); Cotton v. United States, 446 F.2d 107, 110 (8th Cir. 1971). See, for decisions not governed by the Miranda case, Commonwealth v. Bond, 170 Mass. 41, 48 N.E. 756 (1897); Commonwealth v. Makarewicz, 333 Mass. 575, 132 N.E.2d 294 (1956); People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 378--386, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202 (1967), cert. den., 392 U.S. 945, 88 S.Ct. 2303, 20 L.Ed.2d 1407 (1968); People v. Hester, 39 Ill.2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1968), cert. dism. as improvidently granted, 397 U.S. 660, 90 S.Ct. 1408, 25 L.Ed.2d 642 (1970); United States ex rel. Richardson v. Vitek, 395 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1968). Similarly, an adult with a diminished or subnormal mental capacity may make an effective waiver of his rights and render a voluntary, knowing and admissible confession. See Commonwealth v. Clark, 292 Mass. 409, 411--412, 198 N.E. 641 (1935); Commonwealth v. Valcourt, 333 Mass. 706, 709--710, 133 N.E.2d 217 (1956); Commonwealth v. Harrison, 342 Mass. 279, 284--285, 173 N.E.2d 87 (1961); Commonwealth v. Femino, 352 Mass. 508, 515--516, 226 N.E.2d 248 (1967); United States v. White, 451 F.2d 696, 700 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. den., 405 U.S. 998, 92 S.Ct. 1268, 31 L.Ed.2d 468 (1972) (post-Miranda). But see United States v. Hull, 441 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1971) (thirty-four year old mental defective). However, circumstances and techniques of custodial interrogation which pass constitutional muster when applied to a normal adult may not be constitutionally tolerable as applied to one who is immature or mentally deficient. See Commonwealth v. Cain, --- Mass. ---, --- (fifteen-year old boy), ^a 279 N.E.2d 706 (1972); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54--55, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962) (fourteen-year old boy); United States v. Blocker, 354 F.Supp. 1195, 1200--1202 (D.D.C.1973) (limited mental ability). In such cases, 'special care in scrutinizing the record must be used.' Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599, 68 S.Ct. 302, 304, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948). Whether the facts support the admission of a confession in any given case must be determined by an examination of 'the totality of all the surrounding circumstances--both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.' Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).

We have carefully reviewed the evidence, both before the judge at the voir dire and before the jury, and we conclude that there was evidence which warranted the findings made by the judge and which would have warranted a conclusion by the jury that the confession could be considered by them. A finding that the police used physical force, intimidation or threats would not have been justified. Certainly a finding that the questioning was improper, leading or suggestive of desired answers would not have been appropriate on the evidence. Daniels was not denied access to food or drink. He declined to speak on the telephone to a friend who had helped him occasionally and who called during the police questioning. The interrogation lasted not over three hours before Daniels confessed. Cf. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 196--197, 77 S.Ct. 281, 1 L.Ed.2d 246 (1957), reh. den., 352 U.S. 1019, 77 S.Ct. 553, 1 L.Ed.2d 561 (1957); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407, 88 S.Ct. 523, 19 L.Ed.2d 634 (1967). ⁵

The fact that Daniels was mildly to moderately mentally retarded, with an I.Q. of fifty-three, does not compel a determination as matter of law on this record that Daniels did not knowingly and willingly waive his Miranda rights and make a voluntary confession, admissible pursuant to constitutional standards. Daniels, although mentally retarded, had had twenty-six years of living experience and had been discharged into the community from a State school for the mentally retarded by way of a 'half-way house.' He testified before the judge on the voir dire and before the jury at trial. In these circumstances and...