Com. v. Daniels

• Decision Date: 22 August 1994
• Citation: Com. v. Daniels, 644 A.2d 1175, 537 Pa. 464 (Pa. 1994)
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Henry DANIELS, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 1175

644 A.2d 1175

537 Pa. 464

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Henry DANIELS, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Jan. 21, 1992.

Decided July 7, 1994.

Reargument Denied Aug. 22, 1994.

[537 Pa. 468] George Henry Newman, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Ronald Eisenberg, Deputy Dist. Atty., Catherine Marshall, Chief, Appeals Div., Kathy L. Echternach, Robert A. Graci, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

REARGUMENT GRANTED AND CASE RESUBMITTED ON BRIEFS PREVIOUSLY FILED LIMITED TO THE PENALTY ISSUES ONLY--October 1, 1993.

Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS, CAPPY, CASTILLE, and MONTEMURO, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

On November 10, 1989, Appellant, Henry Daniels, was convicted by a jury of murder of the first degree, criminal conspiracy, kidnapping, robbery, and two counts of burglary. On November 14, 1989, a sentencing hearing was held pursuant to the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711, and the jury unanimously sentenced Appellant to death for the murder of the first degree conviction; whereupon the trial judge formally imposed the death sentence. On April 23, 1990, post-trial motions were heard and denied by the trial judge, who sentenced Appellant to an aggregate, consecutive term of twenty-five to fifty years in prison for the other aforementioned crimes. This direct appeal followed.

Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for murder in the first degree; however, we are required to review the sufficiency of the evidence in all capital cases. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1236, 104 S.Ct. 31, 77 L.Ed.2d 1452 (1983). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, and must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to enable the jury to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Bryant, 524 Pa. 564, 574 A.2d 590 (1990). Accordingly, we find the following evidence sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to support the jury's verdict of murder in the first degree.

On September 1, 1988, Appellant participated in a scheme to kidnap and hold for ransom sixteen year old Alexander Porter. Appellant and three other individuals set up a purported drug transaction with Porter, in order to lure him to a meeting, whereupon they bound and gagged him, confiscated his keys, and stuffed him in the trunk of his car. One of the conspirators, a "friend" of Porter's, allowed himself to be tied up in front of Porter, so that Porter would not realize his involvement. He was "released" after Porter was locked in the trunk, then taken home so that Porter would later believe that he had been murdered. The remaining conspirators drove Porter's car, with Porter in the trunk, to the garage of one of the individuals and parked it there. They proceeded in another car to Porter's mother's house, and using Porter's key, burglarized the dwelling. They then used Porter's key to burglarize his father's house, whom they believed to be very wealthy.

Upon their return, they discovered that Porter had loosened his restraints. Before restraining him again, one of the individuals demanded to know how much Porter was worth to his father, and insisted that he disclose his mother's and father's telephone numbers. They told Porter that they had killed his friend and if he did not cooperate, they would kill him too. Porter provided them with his mother's telephone number and his father's beeper number. The captors then decided to abandon their ransom plan, in favor of eliminating Porter. To keep Porter from moving around while they drove, they wedged two milk crates into the trunk, further restricting his movement and forcing his body to bounce off of these objects, as they drove around in search of a place to kill him. Unable to find a place to effect the killing, they returned to the garage to await nightfall.

Under cover of darkness, Appellant and one of his cohorts, set out to dispose of the victim. ¹ They drove to a wooded area, removed the stiff body from the trunk, and placed Porter face down on the side of the road. Uncertain as to whether Porter had expired from strangulation as a result of the gagging, Appellant's cohort shot him four times in the back of the neck with a .25 caliber automatic handgun. The two of them then abandoned Porter's car and discarded his keys into a sewer. The gun was later discovered in Appellant's car. Appellant was arrested and confessed his part in the scheme to set up Porter in order to obtain money from his father. Appellant denied that he ever intended to kill Porter; rather he placed the blame on one of his cohorts.

Based upon the foregoing, we find that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of murder in the first degree.

At the penalty hearing, immediately following the verdict, the jury sentenced Appellant to death, based upon its finding of our aggravating circumstances which outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The jury found the existence of the following aggravating circumstances: (1) "[t]he victim was a prosecution witness to a murder or other felony committed by the defendant and was killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony against the defendant in any grand jury or criminal proceeding involving such offenses," 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(5); (2) "[t]he victim was being held by the defendant for ransom or reward," 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(3); (3) "[t]he offense was committed by means of torture," 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(8); and (4) "[t]he defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony," 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(6). As a mitigating circumstance, the jury unanimously found "other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(e)(8). Six jurors found as a mitigating circumstance that "the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal convictions." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(e)(1). ² The jury then unanimously found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and sentenced Appellant to death.

Appellant argues that three of the four aggravating circumstances found by the jury were unsupported by the evidence. Specifically, he challenges the jury's findings: (1) that the victim was a prosecution witness to a felony and was killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony; (2) that the victim was held for ransom; and (3) that the offense was committed by means of torture. Upon review of the record, we find that the evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to establish these three aggravating circumstances.

A finding of the existence of the aggravating circumstance set forth in § 9711(d)(5) requires proof that the victim was killed to prevent his testimony in a pending grand jury or criminal proceeding. Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 516 Pa. 441, 532 A.2d 813 (1987). The existence of this particular aggravating circumstance may be found, absent a pending criminal proceeding, only where the facts establish by direct, rather than circumstantial evidence, that the killing resulted from the intention to eliminate a potential witness. Commonwealth v. Appel, 517 Pa. 529, 537-38 n. 2, 539 A.2d 780, 784 n. 2 (1988); accord Commonwealth v. Henry, 524 Pa. 135, 569 A.2d 929 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931, 111 S.Ct. 1338, 113 L.Ed.2d 269 (1991). This burden will not be met by simply showing that an individual who witnessed a murder or other felony committed by a defendant was also killed by the defendant. Commonwealth v. Crawley, 514 Pa. 539, 526 A.2d 334 (1987). In order to establish that the motivation for the killing was to prevent the victim from being a witness against Appellant, the Commonwealth elicited testimony from Appellant that he and one of his cohorts had discussed the need to get rid of Porter because he knew where they lived. Appellant also testified that he was concerned that Porter would "tell" if he were released. (N.T., 11/3/89, p. 40).

Appellant contends that the killing was motivated, not by fear of prosecution, but by fear of retaliation in kind by the victim's father. Although this may have been a partial motivation for the killing, it is not inconsistent with the jury's finding that Appellant was motivated by a desire to prevent the victim from testifying in a criminal proceeding. The direct evidence introduced by the Commonwealth clearly supports the jury's finding.

Appellant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding that the victim was being held by the defendant for ransom or reward.

The evidence establishes that the conspirators discussed ransoming Porter, asked Porter how much he was worth to his father, and demanded the telephone numbers of his mother and father. (N.T., 10/30/89, pp. 91, 138; 11/3/89, pp. 70-72). A co-defendant stated that the idea of the whole thing was to "kidnap the boy for money." Upon the realization that ransom calls may have revealed their identities, the captors abandoned their plan, and instead decided to kill their victim.

Appellant argues that because there was no overt act by the captors to either elicit or attempt to elicit ransom from someone other than the victim, the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's finding that the victim was held for ransom. There is nothing in our statute that supports Appellant's contention that the captors must convey their ransom demand to a third party. All that is required is that "[t]he victim was being held by the defendant for ransom...." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(3). An overt act toward execution of that purpose is sufficient to sustain the jury's conclusion that the victim was held for ransom. The acts...