Com. v. Daniels, No. 410 CAP.

• Decision Date: 23 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. 410 CAP.,No. 414 CAP.,No. 413 CAP.,No. 411 CAP.
• Citation: 963 A.2d 409
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Henry DANIELS, Appellee Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Henry Daniels, Appellant. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Kevin Pelzer, Appellee. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Kevin Pelzer, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

963 A.2d 409

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Henry DANIELS, Appellee Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Henry Daniels, Appellant.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Kevin Pelzer, Appellee.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Kevin Pelzer, Appellant.

No. 410 CAP.

No. 411 CAP.

No. 413 CAP.

No. 414 CAP.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted October 24, 2006.

Decided January 23, 2009.

Amy Zapp, Esq., PA Office of Attorney General, Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Esq., Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (no. 410 CAP).

Paul M. George, Esq., McKinney & George, Philadelphia, for Henry Daniels (no. 410 CAP).

Paul M. George, Esq., McKinney & George, Philadelphia, for Henry Daniels (no. 411 CAP).

Amy Zapp, Esq., PA Office of Attorney General, Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Esq., Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (no. 411 CAP).

Amy Zapp, Esq., PA Office of Attorney General, Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Esq., Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (no. 413 CAP).

Stuart Brian Lev, Esq., Philadelphia, for Kevin Pelzer (no. 413 CAP).

Stuart Brian Lev, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, Michael Wiseman, Esq., Matthew C. Lawry, Esq., Philadelphia, for Kevin Pelzer (no. 414 CAP).

Amy Zapp, Esq., PA Office of Attorney General, Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Esq., Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (no. 414 CAP).

BEFORE: CASTILLE, C.J., and SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY and GREENSPAN, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice CASTILLE.^*

The Commonwealth appeals from the order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas granting appellees Henry Daniels and Kevin Pelzer relief on their petitions under the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. By order dated March 25, 2003, the PCRA court granted both appellees relief on two claims, ordered a new trial, and denied the remaining claims. Appellees, acting as Cross-Appellants, have filed cross-appeals renewing the issues that the PCRA court dismissed. For the reasons set forth below we vacate the order of the PCRA court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

On November 10, 1989, following a joint trial, a jury convicted appellees of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, kidnapping, robbery, and two counts of burglary. At trial, appellee Daniels was represented by Charles Houston, Esq., a South Carolina lawyer who was granted pro hac vice status. The trial court appointed John Drost, Esq., a Pennsylvania attorney, as back-up counsel. Appellee Pelzer was represented by Donald Padova, Esq.

The guilt phase of the trial established that appellees participated in a plan to kidnap and hold for ransom sixteen-year old Alexander Porter. Appellees kidnapped the victim, bound and gagged him, and placed him in the trunk of his car. Appellees then drove the victim's car to his mother's house and burglarized the dwelling. They also used the victim's key to burglarize his father's house. They left the victim in the trunk until nightfall when they set out to dispose of his body. At this point, the victim had been in the trunk for twenty-four hours. According to appellees' police statements and Daniels' trial testimony, when appellees went to dump the victim's body, they were unable to determine whether he was dead. Appellee Pelzer shot him four times in the back of the neck, removing all doubt.¹,²

Following a penalty phase hearing, the jury found four aggravating circumstances and two mitigating circumstances with regard to both appellees. The four aggravating circumstances found were: (1) the victim was a prosecution witness to a murder or other felony; (2) the victim was being held for ransom or reward; (3) the offense was committed by means of torture; and (4) the defendant committed a killing while in perpetration of a felony.³ The mitigating circumstances were that appellees had no significant history of prior criminal convictions and the "catchall" mitigator.⁴ After weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the jury fixed the penalty at death for each appellee and the trial court imposed the sentences on November 14, 1989. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). In addition to the sentences of death, on April 23, 1990, the trial judge sentenced each appellee to an aggregate, consecutive term of twenty-five to fifty years in prison for the remaining crimes.

Appellees were represented by new counsel on direct appeal and this Court affirmed the judgments of sentence by an equally divided Court in separate opinions.⁵ The Court agreed that the jury's first-degree murder verdict should be sustained but disagreed as to whether a new penalty phase was required, because three Justices did not believe that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the offense was committed by means of torture under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(8). Additionally, two Justices did not agree that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the Commonwealth established the aggravating circumstance of killing a prosecution witness to prevent his testimony, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(5). See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 531 Pa. 210, 612 A.2d 395 (1992); Commonwealth v. Pelzer, 531 Pa. 235, 612 A.2d 407 (1992). This Court then granted appellee Daniels' Petition for Reargument and affirmed the judgment of sentence in a Majority opinion. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 537 Pa. 464, 644 A.2d 1175 (1994).⁶ Appellees did not petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.

On January 10, 1997, appellee Pelzer filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b); Commonwealth v. Fenati, 561 Pa. 106, 748 A.2d 205 (2000) (exception exists to PCRA's one-year time requirement for those petitioners whose judgments had become final before 1995 amendments to the PCRA, who were filing their first PCRA petition, so long as petition was filed within one year of effective date of amendments). Appellee Daniels followed suit and filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on January 16, 1997. New counsel entered their appearances and filed amended petitions, which were followed by many supplemental petitions. The PCRA petitions were assigned to the Honorable James A. Lineberger.⁷

On February 2, 2000, the PCRA court held a hearing at which it reviewed the twenty-one claims submitted by appellees. The court granted an evidentiary hearing as to seven of the claims and granted the Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss the remaining claims. The seven issues that were the subject of the evidentiary hearing were: (1) trial counsels' ineffectiveness for failing to object to the trial court's instruction on accomplice liability,(2) trial counsels' ineffectiveness for failing to adequately investigate and present evidence on the cause of death, (3) a challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), (4) trial counsels' failure to present mitigating evidence, (5) allegations related to appellate counsels' conduct, (6) a general request regarding the application of relaxed waiver, and (7) appellee Daniels' challenge to the aggravating circumstance, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(6) under Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 554 Pa. 586, 722 A.2d 657 (1998) (plurality). See N.T., 2/2/2000, at 80-89.

After holding hearings on the PCRA claims in December of 2001, May of 2002, and January of 2003, the PCRA court granted relief in the form of a new trial at a brief hearing on January 29, 2003. In granting relief, Judge Lineberger explained that he was persuaded by two of appellees' claims alleging trial counsels' ineffectiveness: first, for failing to object to the trial court's instruction on accomplice liability, and second, for failing to present evidence related to the cause of death.

Subsequently, on February 28, 2003, the Commonwealth submitted a Rule to Show Cause seeking clarification of the January 29th order to ensure that it was a final, appealable order. The Commonwealth's concern was that Judge Lineberger's order did not encompass all of the claims raised by the PCRA petitions. On that day, however, Judge Lineberger was unavailable, and therefore, the appropriate supervising Judge of the Criminal Division, the Honorable D. Webster Keogh, considered the Commonwealth's request. Judge Keogh granted the Rule, as follows:

AND NOW, this 28th day of February 2003, on consideration of the Commonwealth's proposed Order clarifying the order of the Court, the above defendant is directed to show cause why the Court should not issue an Order clarifying the ruling on defendants' PCRA petition claims.

This show cause hearing is listed for the 5th day of March, 2003, in Courtroom 701, at 9:30 a.m. Pending consideration of the Commonwealth's proposed order, the Court's Order of January 29, 2003, is hereby vacated.

As provided for by Judge Keogh's order, Judge Lineberger held a hearing on March 5, 2003. Following the March 5th hearing, Judge Lineberger granted the Commonwealth's requested clarification, and on March 25, 2003, he entered an order which again granted appellees relief on their joint claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness, but denied the remaining claims.

The Commonwealth filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court on April 24, 2003, challenging the PCRA court's order to the extent it granted relief. Appellees filed protective cross-appeals shortly thereafter to preserve their other claims. The PCRA court then issued an opinion in support of its order on June 29, 2004.

Meanwhile, appellees filed a Motion to Quash the Appeal by the Commonwealth, arguing that it was untimely. This Court issued an order dated December 8, 2003, deferring the quashal request and directing the parties to brief the issue of whether the Commonwealth's appeal should be quashed as untimely and whether the trial court had the authority under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 to issue a rule to show cause to modify or rescind an...