Com. v. DeBooth

• Decision Date: 15 November 1988
• Citation: 550 A.2d 570,379 Pa.Super. 522
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Angelo Manuel DeBOOTH, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 570

550 A.2d 570

379 Pa.Super. 522

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Angelo Manuel DeBOOTH, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Aug. 29, 1988.

Filed Nov. 15, 1988.

Charles D. Younger, Asst. Public Defender, Boyertown, for appellant.

Charles M. Guthrie, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Reading, for Com., appellee.

Before OLSZEWSKI, KELLY and HESTER, JJ.

OLSZEWSKI, Judge:

This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence after appellant was found guilty of murder in the third degree, aggravated and simple assault, indecent assault, corruption of minors, and rape. Appellant alleges that the trial court committed numerous errors and that there was insufficient evidence to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.¹ We find no merit in appellant's contentions and affirm the judgment of sentence.

On August 2, 1986, the body of sixteen-year-old Betty Jean "Cookie" Hollis was discovered in Schlegel Park located in Reading, Berks County, Pennsylvania. An autopsy revealed that Ms. Hollis had been sexually assaulted prior to being strangled to death. An investigation led to the eventual arrest of appellant, who was subsequently charged with criminal homicide, manslaughter, aggravated and simple assault, corruption of minors, rape and other related offenses.

On April 1, 1987, appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty of murder in the third degree, aggravated and simple assault, corruption of minors and rape. Post-verdict motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to combined terms of imprisonment totalling twenty-two and one-half to forty-five years.² Timely motions to reconsider the sentences were filed and denied. Appellant then filed the instant appeal.

Appellant initially contends that inculpatory statements he made to the police should have been suppressed. Two arguments are advanced: first, the statements obtained were the result of unnecessary pre-arraignment delay; and second, the statements were not knowingly or voluntarily given. We disagree.

In an appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, the role of the appellate court is to determine whether the record supports the suppression court's factual findings and the legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings. In making this determination, the Court may consider only the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses and so much of the evidence for the defense as fairly read in the context of the record as a whole remains uncontradicted. When the factual findings of the suppression court are supported by the evidence, the appellate court may reverse only if there is an error in the legal conclusions drawn from those factual findings. Commonwealth v. Vinson, 361 Pa.Super. 526, 529, 522 A.2d 1155, 1157 (1987); Commonwealth v. Reddix, 355 Pa.Super. 514, 518, 513 A.2d 1041, 1043 (1986).

The pertinent facts surrounding appellant's initial claims were adequately stated by the trial court as follows:

At approximately 5:45 a.m. on August 15, 1986, defendant was arrested on a robbery charge unrelated to this investigation. Later that morning, defendant informed the Reading Police that he had some information concerning the death of Betty Jean Hollis. The police read the Miranda rights to the defendant and after he waived the rights he gave an oral statement to police which was later reduced to writing. Defendant initialled each answer on the written statement and signed it as being true and correct. This statement was given to police at approximately 10:45 a.m. that morning.

At 11:44 a.m., the police took defendant to the District Justice's for purposes of pre-arraigning him on the unrelated robbery charge. Defendant was then returned to City Hall.

After lunch, the police obtained another statement from defendant. The police again informed the defendant of his Miranda rights. After he waived his rights, the defendant gave an oral statement to police at 2:45 p.m.

The information gleaned from this interview led police to arrest defendant for the murder and rape of Ms. Hollis. The instant arrest occurred at 5:45 p.m. on August 15, 1986. Defendant was promptly pre-arraigned before District Justice Gloria Stitzel sometime between 5:48 p.m. and 6:40 p.m. that date.

After his arrest, defendant initiated a third conversation with police concerning the incident. This statement was also reduced to written form and was signed and initialled by the defendant. Defendant was given, and also waived, his Miranda rights before making this statement. Each of the aforementioned statements were later used at trial to establish defendant's guilt.

Trial court opinion at pp. 4-5.

Appellant argues that these statements to the police should have been suppressed because they were violative of the rule announced in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 370 A.2d 301 (1977), and Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972). According to this rule, where a defendant is not pre-arraigned within six hours of his arrest, statements obtained after arrest but before arraignment must be excluded from evidence. Under the facts of the case at bar, we find that appellant's argument lacks merit.

Initially, we take note that the rule as announced in Davenport, has recently been modified by our Supreme Court in the case of Commonwealth v. Duncan, 514 Pa. 395, 525 A.2d 1177 (1987). In Duncan, the Court declared:

The [Davenport] rule has been applied on a mechanical basis to violations which bear no relationship to the statement obtained and has shielded the guilty for no reason relevant to the individual circumstances of their case. [Citations omitted.] ... If the statement is obtained within the six hour period, absent coercion or other illegality, it is not obtained in violation of the rights of an accused and should be admissible. In keeping with the underlying objectives of the rule, only statements obtained after the six hour period has run should be suppressed on the basis of Davenport.

Id. at 405-406, 525 A.2d at 1182-1183.

In the case at bar, appellant's first statement is clearly admissible. As the record indicates, it was taken some time after appellant's initial arrest on the robbery charge and prior to his lawful arraignment on that charge which took place within the six hour limitation. Accordingly, under either Davenport or Duncan, appellant's initial statement was properly admissible at trial.

Regarding appellant's second statement, the record indicates that it occurred after appellant had been arraigned on the robbery charge. As this Court has previously stated:

While the Futch formula was not designed to terminate police interrogation, it was intended to interrupt it after a reasonable period of time to allow the suspect to be advised of his custodial rights by an impartial judicial officer, as opposed to police officials, and in appropriate cases to establish the conditions of his release pending trial.

Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. 144, 148, 454 A.2d 1004, 1006 (1982). In the present case, appellant was lawfully arraigned before a magistrate within six hours of his arrest. At that time, he had the opportunity to be advised of his custodial rights by an impartial judicial officer. Accordingly, appellant's second statement was properly admissible at trial.

Finally, with regard to appellant's third statement, the record indicates that appellant initiated the conversation complained of after he was lawfully arraigned on the charges in the case at bar. Therefore, for the above reasons, we find that this statement was also properly admissible.

Next, we turn to appellant's second argument relating to the suppression of his statements to the police. Appellant argues that these statements were not voluntarily given because, at the time of the questioning, he was under the influence of L.S.D. and was threatened by the Commonwealth with execution. Keeping in mind our standard of review in addressing suppression issues, we find no merit in these contentions. Perusal of the record of the suppression hearing reveals that three different police officers testified that appellant appeared normal, alert, coherent and rational when he spoke. His signature was clear and concise. While appellant testified that L.S.D. made him asocial, two of the three statements complained of were made at his request. Moreover, upon being questioned by police, appellant never mentioned L.S.D., stating only that he had consumed a small portion of marijuana. Finally, we agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth never "threatened" appellant with execution. Accordingly, we agree that appellant's statements were knowingly and voluntarily made and that they were properly admissible against him.

Appellant's next contention is that the trial court erred in granting the Commonwealth's Petition to extend under Pa.R.Crim.P., Rule 1100, 42 Pa.C.S.A. Two arguments are advanced: first, the petition was never "signed;" and second, the court erred in finding judicial unavailability and due diligence on the part of the Commonwealth. We disagree.

Appellant argues that the Commonwealth's petition to extend time for trial under Rule 1100 was never "signed." In support of this argument, he cites Rule 9020 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, the pertinent part of which states as follows:

(b) A written motion shall comply with the following requirements:

(1) The motion shall be signed by the person or attorney making the motion. The signature shall constitute a certification that the attorney has read the motion, that to the best of the attorney's knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support the motion, and that it is not interposed for delay.

Pa.R.Crim.P., Rule 9020, 42 Pa.C.S.A.

A review of the record indicates that the Commonwealth's petition was timely filed on February 11, 1987. Further review indicates that the petition itself was not signed but that the affidavit accompanying the...