Com. v. Dodge

• Decision Date: 10 February 1999
• Citation: 705 N.E.2d 612,428 Mass. 860
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Leno L. DODGE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 612

705 N.E.2d 612

428 Mass. 860

COMMONWEALTH v. Leno L. DODGE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Franklin.

Argued Oct. 5, 1998.

Decided Feb. 10, 1999.

Thomas E. Hagar, Wayland, for the defendant.

Cynthia M. Pepyne, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present (Sitting at Greenfield): WILKINS, C.J., ABRAMS, LYNCH, GREANEY, FRIED, MARSHALL, & IRELAND, JJ.

LYNCH, J.

After a bench trial in the District Court the defendant appealed from a finding of criminal contempt under Mass. R.Crim. P. 44, 378 Mass. 920 (1979). We transferred the case here on our own motion. The defendant contends that his motion to dismiss the criminal contempt charge should have been allowed because the judge lacked authority to impose pretrial conditions on his release on personal recognizance and because the conditions attached to his release failed to constitute a clear and unequivocal judicial order. In addition to challenging the defendant's contentions, the Commonwealth argues that the defendant has waived his right to challenge the terms of his release. ¹

Facts. On May 8, 1996, the defendant was arraigned in the Orange Division of the District Court Department on a complaint charging operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of G.L. c. 90, § 24. On the Commonwealth's request, the judge ordered the defendant, as a condition of his release, to undergo drug and alcohol screening as determined by probation and to participate in any outpatient counselling as determined by probation, including attending Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous meetings. ² After repeatedly refusing to undergo urinalysis testing the defendant moved to vacate the conditions of his release. The judge denied the motion and informed the defendant that his refusal to comply with the conditions would constitute contempt. Again, the defendant acknowledged that he understood the judge's order but still refused to comply. Consequently, the judge entered a judgment of contempt. ³

1. Criminal contempt. The defendant's principal argument on appeal is that the judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss the criminal contempt charge because the judge had no authority to impose conditions on his release from custody. Alternatively, the defendant maintains that the imposition of conditions on his release was not an order on which a finding of criminal contempt could be based.

"[C]ontempt decrees, or those parts of such decrees, which are aimed at vindicating the authority and dignity of the court and punishing the contemnor for an affront to it, that is criminal contempts, will survive the reversal of the [erroneous] decree which was disobeyed." Stow v. Marinelli, 352 Mass. 738, 744, 227 N.E.2d 708 (1967), citing United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293-294, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947), and cases cited.

In Stow v. Marinelli, supra, the court described the proper way to contest criminal contempt proceedings:

" 'The final decree becomes effective as soon as entered. The final decree is vacated ... and proceedings under it are stayed ... only upon the conjunction of two things, (a) an appeal therefrom seasonably claimed by one having a right to appeal ... and (b) the entry of that appeal in this court.' Lowell Bar Assn. v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 189, 52 N.E.2d 27 [ (1943) ]. When the acts which gave rise to the contempt petition occurred an appeal had been claimed but it had not been entered in this court. The decree, therefore, was in full force and effect and the conduct of [the contemnor] was a palpable violation of it. If [he] desired to be relieved from the effects of the decree pending the appeal, a remedy was open to [him]. As we pointed out in the Loeb case, supra, at pages 189-190 , 'As soon as an appeal has been claimed, and before the final decree is vacated by entry of the appeal in this court, a statutory power arises in the court that entered the decree and also in this court, to grant any needed injunction and to make any other proper interlocutory order pending the appeal. G. L .... c. 214, §§ 21, 22.' Thus, [he] could have applied for a stay pending the appeal. Instead of availing [himself] of this remedy, [he] went ahead and flouted the decree. [He was] rightly adjudicated in contempt."

Stow v. Marinelli, supra, at 743-744, 227 N.E.2d 708. In the present case, the defendant's motion to vacate the pretrial conditions was denied after a hearing. The defendant then disregarded the judge's order rather than complying with it and filing an appeal. He could not attack the propriety of the order in this manner.

We must decide whether the violation of the order of release subject to conditions was a sufficient basis to warrant a judgment of criminal contempt. "In order to prove a defendant guilty of criminal contempt, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 'there was a clear, outstanding order of the court, that the defendant knew of that order, and that the defendant clearly and intentionally disobeyed that order in circumstances in which he was able to obey it.' " Commonwealth v. Delaney, 425 Mass. 587, 596, 682 N.E.2d 611 (1997), quoting Commonwealth v. Brogan, 415 Mass. 169, 171, 612 N.E.2d 656 (1993).

We conclude that the order was a proper foundation on which to base an adjudication of criminal contempt. Any lack of clarity regarding the judge's order that may have existed at the outset was dispelled during the hearing on the defendant's motion to vacate pretrial conditions. ⁴ Similarly this hearing removed any doubt about the defendant's knowledge of the order and his intentional violation of it. As a result, we affirm the defendant's conviction of criminal contempt.

Although the defendant did not appeal from the order granting his release from custody on personal recognizance subject to conditions, we nevertheless comment on the propriety of this order to aid trial judges and promote the fair administration of justice.

2. Judge's authority. We consider whether the judge had authority to impose pretrial conditions on the defendant's release on personal recognizance. ⁵

(a) Statutory authority. The Legislature has expressly authorized the imposition of pretrial conditions for a defendant's release on bail or personal recognizance under G.L. c. 276, §§ 42A, 87, and 58A (§ 42A gives authority to impose conditions in domestic abuse related crimes; § 87 authority to impose conditions on pretrial release when defendant consents and is placed on probation; ⁶ and § 58A authority to impose pretrial detention or conditions of release based on the defendant's dangerousness ⁷ ). However, none of these statutes is applicable to the defendant, and the general bail statute, G.L. c. 276, § 58, contains no such authority.

General Laws c. 276, § 58, provides in relevant part:

"A justice ... in accordance with the applicable provisions of section fifty-seven, ⁸ shall ... hold a hearing in which the defendant and his counsel, if any, may participate and inquire into the case and shall admit such person to bail on his personal recognizance without surety unless said justice ... determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person before the court. In his determination under this section as to whether release will reasonably assure the appearance of the person before the court ... said justice ... shall, on the basis of any information which he can reasonably obtain, take into account the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, ... his record of convictions, if any, any illegal drug distribution or present drug dependency...."

The preferred disposition under the bail statute is release on personal recognizance. Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 774, 673 N.E.2d 22 (1996). See Commonwealth v. Perito, 417 Mass. 674, 678, 632 N.E.2d 1190 (1994); Delaney v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 490, 495, 614 N.E.2d 672 (1993) ("Our Legislature intended § 58 to protect the rights of the defendant by establishing a presumption that he or she will be admitted to bail on personal recognizance without surety and by delineating carefully the circumstances under which bail may be denied").

Thus, where the Legislature has provided in three separate statutes the specific circumstances under which bail may be made subject to conditions, we find no implication in the detailed general bail statute that any bail determination not falling within the specific provision of those three statutes can be made subject to conditions. Such a reading of G.L. c. 276, § 58, would render the other three statutes superfluous. "[W]here the Legislature has employed specific language in one [section of an act], but not in another, the language should not be implied where it is not present." Care & Protection of Rebecca, 419 Mass. 67, 76-77, 643 N.E.2d 26 (1994), quoting Beeler v. Downey, 387 Mass. 609, 616, 442 N.E.2d 19 (1982). "[W]e must read the statute in a way to give it a sensible meaning." Beeler v. Downey, supra, citing Lexington v. Bedford, 378 Mass. 562, 570, 393 N.E.2d 321 (1979). We conclude, therefore, that no explicit statutory authority exists under G.L. c. 276, § 58, to make a defendant's pretrial release subject to conditions.

(b) Inherent authority. It is the Commonwealth's position that, absent an explicit statutory provision to the contrary, the judge had the inherent authority to set conditions on the defendant's release.

Inherent powers of the judiciary are "those 'whose exercise is essential to the function of the judicial department, to the maintenance of its authority, or to its capacity to decide cases.' " Brach v. Chief Justice of the Dist. Court Dep't, 386 Mass. 528, 535, 437 N.E.2d 164 (1982), quoting Sheriff of Middlesex County v. Commissioner of Correction, 383 Mass. 631, 636, 421 N.E.2d 75 (1981). We have recognized that the courts' inherent powers need not be...