Com. v. Doranzo
| Decision Date | 23 July 1987 |
| Citation | 365 Pa.Super. 129,529 A.2d 6 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Carmen DORANZO. 1368 Phila. 1983 |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Leonard Deutchman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for Com. appellant.
James A. Lardani, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and TAMILIA, JJ.
This appeal, by the Commonwealth, is from an order granting appellee's petition to return property. The Commonwealth argues that the petition was improperly granted in light of the fact that appellee pled guilty to 47 counts of receiving stolen property and the property subject to the petition was commingled with items appellee admitted were contraband.
Because we find that the trial court, in effect, imposed an improper burden upon the Commonwealth, we reverse the order in question.
Appellee had been suspected by the Philadelphia Police Department of running an illegal "fencing" operation.
On July 18, 1979 members of that Department executed search and seizure warrants at five different properties owned by appellee. As a result of the execution of those warrants hundreds of items of personal property were seized and taken into police custody. Appellee was arrested on that same date and charged with sixty-seven (67) counts of theft by receiving stolen property. Following a preliminary hearing appellee was held for court on forty-seven (47) of those counts. On November 24, 1980 appellee pled guilty to forty-seven (47) counts of theft by receiving stolen property. At the time of the guilty plea it was stipulated by appellee that all of the property involved in the 47 counts was stolen. Furthermore, it was clear at that time that those items had been identified as belonging to designated owners/complainants. On April 23, 1981 appellee filed a petition for return of property seeking return of those items of personal property held by the Philadelphia Police since July 18, 1979 which were neither identified as belonging to nor claimed by any persons other than appellee.
The trial court granted appellee's petition on March 23, 1982 and the Commonwealth appealed to this Court. We reversed and remanded for further development of the record. 309 Pa.Super. 473, 455 A.2d 708. On April 22, 1983 a second hearing was held on the matter and resulted in the granting of the petition a second time. This appeal followed.
At the second hearing the Commonwealth presented the testimony of three detectives who had been personally involved in the execution of the search warrants and the seizure of the property in question. The collective testimony of the detectives revealed that although personal property was found in dwelling houses there were no signs that anyone had been living in those houses. Furthermore, the property was often grouped together and, to some degree, in the words of one of the detectives, resembled "a small K-Mart." The property subject to the petition was freely commingled with property admitted by appellee to have been stolen and a known burglar was seen delivering stolen property to one of the residences just prior to the search.
The Commonwealth argues that the testimony regarding the nature and volume of the goods and the way they were arranged when taken in conjunction with appellee's guilty plea to 47 counts of receiving stolen property circumstantially proves that the contested property was contraband and therefore subject to forfeiture. The Commonwealth admits it does not have direct evidence connecting the personalty in question to illegal activity but insists that illegality can be proven circumstantially. The trial court apparently disagreed stating "that property cannot be forfeited as derivative contraband since it has not been directly traced to illegal activity." We believe the standard imposed upon the Commonwealth was too strict.
Certainly, it would have been desirable to see direct evidence linking the property in question to illegal activity. This would resolve almost all doubt as to the legality or illegality of the possession of the property. However, the fact that the Commonwealth did not have such direct evidence does not mean that appellee was in lawful possession of the property. The trial court, sitting as fact finder, was required to make a finding as to the appellee's lawful possession of the property. The Commonwealth has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the property in question was contraband. Commonwealth v. Landy, 240 Pa.Super. 458, 362 A.2d 999 (1976). Preponderance of the evidence is tantamount to "more probable than not." We believe the Commonwealth sustained this burden.
The Commonwealth introduced irrefutable evidence that the appellee was engaged in a business of receiving and reselling stolen property. The whole of the evidence created a very strong inference that the property in question was illegally possessed. The fact that no one had claimed the property does not necessarily controvert the impression that the property was illegally possessed. There are many reasons which could explain why stolen property could go unidentified. The owner may never have realized that it was stolen, believing it to have been misplaced or lost. Or, despite it being stolen, the owner may not have bothered to report it believing it to be an exercise in futility. Or the property may have been stolen in another county or state and made its way into appellee's possession. Furthermore, appellee didn't even offer his testimony to establish that he was in lawful possession of the property or to otherwise explain how he came into its possession or its source.
Proof by the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Commonwealth of Pa. v. Janda
...they were firearms and a firearm was used in the underlying offense. Id. at 1384–85. We distinguished Maglisco in Commonwealth v. Doranzo, 365 Pa.Super. 129, 529 A.2d 6 (1987). In Doranzo, the defendant was convicted of 47 counts of receiving stolen property, and sought return of various it......
-
Com. v. Crosby
...se. However, just as surely, like contraband items, there were impairments to a claim of good or lawful title. Commonwealth v. Doranzo, 365 Pa.Super. 129, 529 A.2d 6 (1987), is perhaps most representative of these cases. In Doranzo the petitioner was seeking a return of items which were fou......
-
Commonwealth v. Burke
...the scales are tipped.” Commonwealth v. Fid. Bank Accounts, 158 Pa.Cmwlth. 109, 631 A.2d 710, 718 (1993) (citing Commonwealth v. Doranzo, 365 Pa.Super. 129, 529 A.2d 6, 8 (1987)) (emphasis omitted). Where money is found in close proximity to illegal controlled substances a rebuttable presum......
-
Commonwealth v. Crosby
...of good or lawful title. Commonwealth v. Doranzo, 365 Pa.Super. 129, 529 A.2d 6 (1987), is perhaps most representative of these cases. In Doranzo petitioner was seeking a return of items which were found to be stolen. Thus, it would appear, in that case, the forfeiture was essentially predi......