Com. v. Doucette

• Decision Date: 06 December 1983
• Citation: 462 N.E.2d 1084,391 Mass. 443
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. William H. DOUCETTE, Jr.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1084

462 N.E.2d 1084

391 Mass. 443

COMMONWEALTH v. William H. DOUCETTE, Jr.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Middlesex.

Dec. 6, 1983.

Decided March 14, 1984.

Edward Berkin, Boston, for defendant.

Margot Botsford, Asst. Dist. Atty. (Susan S. Beck, Asst. Dist. Atty., with her), for the Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

NOLAN, Justice.

On September 10, 1979, a jury convicted the defendant, William H. Doucette, Jr., of murder in the first degree. The trial judge sentenced the defendant to the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole, for a term of life. Defense counsel immediately filed a claim of appeal.

The defendant claims error in the trial judge's denial of his motion to suppress statements made to the police and the judge's instructions to the jury. He further asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. These errors, he contends, require reversal of his conviction. In the alternative he requests that we direct the entry of a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree or order a new trial pursuant to our authority under G.L. c. 278, § 33E. For the reasons stated below, we find no error in the trial judge's admission of the defendant's statements or his instructions to the jury and no denial of effective assistance of counsel. Nor does this case present an appropriate occasion for the exercise of our powers under G.L. c. 278, § 33E.

We briefly summarize the events leading up to the defendant's arrest. We shall describe the facts in greater detail as necessary in our discussion of the various arguments raised by the defendant.

In the early morning hours of February 6, 1979, the defendant and the victim, Ronald Landry, drove to a motel in Malden, Massachusetts. The defendant testified that he had been drinking, had ingested several seconals and therefore was incoherent during the drive to the motel. This testimony was partially corroborated by the testimony of the defendant's girl friend, Denise Kaminski, and friend, John Freda. The defendant stabbed and killed the victim in a motel room, allegedly due to an attempted homosexual attack.

Dr. George Katsas, a pathologist who conducted the autopsy, testified that the victim had suffered numerous stab wounds. One wound in the right chest area penetrated three to four inches inside the body, cutting through the chest bone and into the heart. In the doctor's opinion, this wound was inflicted with considerable force. The second chest wound, on the victim's left side, penetrated one to one and one-half inches inside the body and cut through a rib bone. The victim's throat was slashed from the midline front almost to the left ear. The victim was also stabbed in the lower back area. This wound was three inches long and penetrated into the body three inches. Superficial wounds were located on the front and back of the victim's right hand and just below his right knee.

Immediately following the stabbing, the defendant concealed himself on a nearby porch about 100 yards away from the motel. While on the porch he changed his coat by putting his hooded sweatshirt over his blue baracuda jacket, which was spattered with blood.

Some time later, the defendant went across the street to a gas station and conversed with the attendant on duty. The defendant testified that he told the attendant not to be afraid, that he was not there to hurt him, that he needed some help, and that he thought he had killed a man across the street.

The attendant testified that he noticed the defendant had blood on his face, shoes, and clothing. The defendant handed the attendant a knife and told him to put it somewhere. After the attendant inquired about the murder across the street, the defendant recounted that he had lured the victim to the motel by promising that they would meet some girls there. The defendant then said he stabbed the victim because he had beaten up his girl friend's brother. When the victim started calling for help, he slit the victim's throat. The attendant further testified that aside from the defendant's shivering from the cold when he first arrived, he did not notice anything unusual about his manner of speech or walk.

The defendant left the gas station in a taxi and proceeded to the North End of Boston. En route he asked the driver to stop for cigarettes. After purchasing the cigarettes, he was apprehended by the police. After removing a four inch buck knife from the defendant's pocket during a pat down, Officer David Marsters, the officer who escorted the defendant back to the motel, informed him that a murder had just been committed and asked the defendant if he would come back to the motel for some questioning. The defendant agreed. The taxi driver and Officer Marsters both testified that they had no trouble understanding the defendant.

When the defendant entered the motel, Detective Thomas Spartichino, the chief investigating officer, inquired about the substance on his clothing. The defendant replied that he had spattered his clothing with lobster sauce while working at a fish market. Detective Spartichino smelled alcohol on the defendant's breath, but testified that the defendant appeared perfectly normal. Detective Spartichino advised the defendant of his Miranda rights at approximately 5:30 A.M. According to Spartichino, the defendant stated that he understood his rights and wanted to talk.

Initially, the defendant told the police that while at a bar with a girl friend, a black pimp explained the life of a prostitute to the girl. An altercation ensued, and the defendant stated that he took a knife away from the pimp and stabbed him with it. Spartichino and Detective-Lieutenant John Gearty, who was also present during the interrogation, indicated to the defendant that they did not believe his story. Spartichino explained that his alibi could easily be disproved and that the victim's car, which was being processed, would reveal the defendant's fingerprints.

The defendant became emotional and was either crying or on the verge of tears. Detective Spartichino concluded with, "Why don't you unburden yourself?" "I feel you want to tell us something?" The defendant then blurted out that the victim tried to rape him while holding a knife to his throat. At this point, Spartichino reminded the defendant of his rights, but the defendant stated that he wanted to tell the story. When Spartichino asked the defendant whether he did engage in sexual intercourse with the victim, the defendant refused to speak any further without the presence of an attorney. All interrogation ceased at this time.

Paul Conley, a chemist who worked for the Massachusetts Department of Public Safety, testified that he found seminal fluid in the seat area of the victim's undershorts. Dr. Katsas also testified that sperm was found in the victim's rectum, mouth, and throat. He could not give an absolutely certain opinion, but he testified that the sperm located in the mouth, having not degenerated, had been present there for no more than an hour or two. He could give no opinion as to the sperm located in the rectal area, but did state that the presence of the sperm in the rectum would depend mainly on the frequency of the victim's defecation.

1. Motions to suppress statements. The defendant first argues that the judge erred in admitting in evidence his statements to the police because the Commonwealth failed to prove a valid waiver of Miranda rights and the voluntariness of the defendant's statements. For these reasons, he contends that we should grant him a new trial. We disagree.

In reviewing a judge's determination that a defendant validly waived his Miranda rights or that the defendant voluntarily made statements to the police, we will accord substantial deference to a judge's ultimate findings and uphold a judge's subsidiary findings ¹ if warranted by the evidence. Commonwealth v. Williams, 388 Mass. 846, 851, 448 N.E.2d 1114 (1983). However, we must also make an independent determination about the correctness of the judge's application of the constitutional principles to the facts. Id.

Our first inquiry is whether the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. The Commonwealth bears a heavy burden in demonstrating a valid waiver. Commonwealth v. Silva, 388 Mass. 495, 500-501, 447 N.E.2d 646 (1983). The defendant asserts that the Commonwealth did not meet this burden because the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the interrogation. He argues that the judge was not warranted in finding a knowing and intelligent waiver, because the evidence of intoxication introduced by the defendant offset the evidence of coherency and sobriety introduced by the prosecution. The defendant places great emphasis on the Billerica jail infirmary report of February 6, 1979. This report, compiled after the intake screening, indicated that the defendant appeared "to be under the influence of an unknown substance."

Intoxication alone is not sufficient to negate an otherwise voluntary act. Commonwealth v. Hooks, 375 Mass. 284, 289, 376 N.E.2d 857 (1978). Although some evidence suggests that the defendant may have been drinking or may have taken drugs, the judge found that the defendant was aware of his position at the time of the interrogation. The judge placed considerable significance on the fact that while the defendant had no memory of receiving his Miranda rights, ² he did have a clear memory of the details of the incident in the motel room.

The judge's subsidiary findings are based on the judge's assessment of the witnesses' credibility. The judge is not required to find all evidence credible. Commonwealth v. Perry, 389 Mass. 464, 466, 450 N.E.2d 615 (1983). Although the defendant asserted that he was extremely intoxicated, every person who met the defendant in the three hours immediately following the murder and who testified found him normal.

The defendant...