Com. v. Eagles

Citation419 Mass. 825,648 N.E.2d 410
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
Decision Date04 April 1995
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Michael J. EAGLES.

Bruce Ferg, for defendant.

Robert C. Thompson, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH and GREANEY, JJ.

GREANEY, Justice.

The defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree by reason of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder 1 and of armed robbery. Represented by new counsel on appeal, he argues error in the denial of his motion to suppress and in the jury instructions on malice, mental impairment, and felony-murder. He also argues that we should abolish the felony-murder doctrine. In the alternative, the defendant urges that we exercise our authority under G.L. c. 278, § 33E (1992 ed.), to reduce the murder verdict to murder in the second degree. We reject the defendant's arguments, and we also find no basis to grant relief under G.L. c. 278, § 33E. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's convictions.

The background of the case is as follows. The victim, who was seventy-nine years old, lived alone in a trailer in Middleborough. The victim kept cash in his trailer (bills in the amounts of one hundred, fifty, and twenty dollar denominations), an envelope full of one dollar bills, and a beer stein half full of change. The victim also kept a shotgun under his bed.

On the night of July 29, 1986, the defendant and Jeffrey Roberio went to the victim's trailer. 2 The defendant and Roberio were driven part of the way to the trailer by one Paul DeMoranville, Roberio's cousin. Roberio had told DeMoranville earlier that "he was going to break into some guy's house." The defendant was standing next to Roberio when this statement was made.

The victim was found in the afternoon of July 30, on the floor in the living room of his trailer. His television set was on and tuned to channel 6. 3 He had been savagely beaten and strangled by a pillowcase which was tightly knotted around his neck. The autopsy revealed, and the medical examiner and a pathologist told the jury, that the victim's spine had been fractured, an elbow had been dislocated, bones in his neck had been fractured and several ribs had been fractured on each side. He had extensive injuries to his entire face, and he also had multiple lacerations on his right hand consistent with defensive wounds. The medical examiner also told the jury that the victim was alive when his injuries were inflicted, and that the cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries and strangulation by ligature.

When the police searched the victim's trailer no money was found anywhere, "not even a dollar." The trailer was in disarray, and there were pools of blood and blood stains throughout the trailer. 4 All of the blood stains were type O blood which was the victim's blood type. A police officer who examined the outside of the trailer discovered that the telephone wires had been pulled out. The beer stein that had contained coins was empty and had Roberio's fingerprint on it. Police investigation eventually disclosed (a) the presence of type O blood on a pair of the defendant's pants 5; (b) the presence of occult blood on the defendant's hands; (c) the presence of blood on one of the defendant's shirts and his sneakers; (d) hairs found in the victim's left hand which were consistent with the defendant's hair. A footprint found on a pillowcase on the floor of the living room in the trailer came from one of the defendant's sneakers. The defendant was seen after the crimes taking handfuls of change out of his pocket. Roberio had possession of the victim's shotgun and tried to hide it, but eventually told DeMoranville that he could not dispose of the gun because it was "hot."

The defendant gave the police a tape recorded statement in which he basically denied any involvement in the crimes. At trial, the defendant testified and contradicted his recorded statement. The defendant claimed that on the afternoon and evening of the crimes, he had consumed a considerable amount of alcohol, taken some "acid," and ingested cocaine. The defendant testified that he did not actually take part in the robbery and murder, but admitted to going to the victim's trailer for the purpose of standing watch while Roberio entered the trailer and took the victim's money. According to the defendant, he acted as a lookout for about twenty minutes, and then went into the trailer. At that point, the defendant observed the victim lying on the floor. He bent over and touched the victim's back and concluded that the man was "still breathing, but he was knocked out like." The defendant testified that he had tried to loosen the ligature around the victim's neck.

The defendant presented the testimony of Dr. Wesley E. Profit, a licensed clinical psychologist and director of forensic services at Bridgewater State Hospital. Dr. Profit indicated that the defendant had "a passive dependent personality disorder with depressive features" and "some sort of learning disability." When asked whether, on the night of the murder, the defendant lacked the substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the law as the result of the consumption of drugs or alcohol, Dr. Profit gave the following response: "My opinion is that [the defendant] lacks that capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law as a result of the specific ingestion of a number of substances on the evening of this event and the fact that he already possesses some difficult [sic ], some learning disability which would have made it, even had he not been making use of these substances, difficult for him to understand what was going on." Dr. Profit also expressed the opinion that the defendant "could have been a participant in a housebreak and certainly if that had been presented to him as the enterprise which [he and Roberio] were to engage in ... he would have accepted that routinely." Dr. Profit concluded that, as the result of the ingestion of drugs and alcohol, the defendant "would not have been thinking beyond the circumstances [as] they presented themselves to him," and thought he was just participating in a housebreak. Dr. Profit indicated that the defendant did not suffer from any major mental illness, but that he was severely depressed and had, perhaps, "a borderline personality disorder." 6

Dr. Michael S. Annunziata, a forensic psychiatrist, testified in rebuttal for the Commonwealth. He stated that he did not think the defendant was retarded, and, despite his poor education, "seemed fairly quick." Based on his review of records and interviews with the defendant, several of the defendant's acquaintances and police officers who had spoken with the defendant on the morning he was taken to the police station, Dr. Annunziata concluded that the defendant was "able to form the specific intent to commit such a crime as armed robbery or murder," that "he had the capacity to deliberately premeditate murder" and that "he was able to form an opinion to consciously disregard the risk to human life."

The jury's verdicts indicate their essential acceptance of the Commonwealth's theory of the case which was warranted by the evidence. 7 That theory was to the effect that Roberio and the defendant, acting as joint venturers, went to the victim's trailer intending to break in and steal his money. On arriving at the trailer, they discovered that the victim was inside. They proceeded to cut off any chance of help being called by severing the telephone line. Roberio and the defendant then entered the trailer and confronted the victim who resisted them forcefully. In the course of robbing the victim, Roberio and the defendant beat him mercilessly, tied a cloth around his neck, and in one fashion or another, brought him from room to room to force him to tell them where he kept his money. When the robbery and assault had been completed, the defendant and Roberio left the victim either dying or dead.

1. Motion to suppress. The defendant's trial counsel filed a motion which sought to suppress the defendant's statement to the police, physical evidence taken by the police which belonged to the defendant, and an out-of-court identification of the defendant by DeMoranville. The defendant's trial counsel argued in his memorandum of law that the police had made a "de facto" arrest of the defendant at his residence and were required to furnish him with Miranda warnings prior to questioning him. Since they did not give him Miranda warnings until he reached the station, it was argued that all statements he made, and the seizure of physical evidence, should be suppressed.

A judge (not the trial judge) held an evidentiary hearing on the motion and made findings of fact and rulings of law to support the order denying the motion. The judge's findings may be summarized as follows. After preliminary investigation disclosed to the police that the defendant might have been with Roberio on the night of the murder Middleborough and State police officers went to 15 Archer Court in Middleborough. This was the residence of one Kenneth Jones with whom the defendant had been living for about one and one-half months. The defendant had no fixed living space or room of his own at the residence. He slept either on a couch in the living room or in a room upstairs and kept his clothes and personal belongings in a cardboard box.

The police arrived at 15 Archer Court at 3:45 A.M. Kenneth Jones gave the police permission to enter, and they woke the defendant and asked him to come to the Middleborough police station. In response to a question by a State trooper, the defendant stated that he owned a red and white baseball-type shirt, and that the shirt was in an upstairs bedroom. The defendant gave the trooper permission to retrieve the shirt and confirmed to the trooper that no area or room in the house was specifically assigned to him, that he just put his "st...

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