Com. v. Eddings

• Decision Date: 06 November 1998
• Citation: 721 A.2d 1095
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Henry EDDINGS, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

721 A.2d 1095

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Henry EDDINGS, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued September 1, 1998.

Filed November 6, 1998.

Reargument Denied January 15, 1999.

Royce L. Morris, Harrisburg, for appellant.

Francis Chardo, Asst. Dist. Atty., Harrisburg, for Com., appellee.

Before JOYCE and HESTER, JJ., and CIRILLO, President Judge Emeritus.

JOYCE, Judge:

This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence, as made final by the denial of post-sentencing motions,¹ entered after Appellant, Henry Eddings, was convicted of third degree murder.² For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for further proceedings. Before addressing the merits of Appellant's claims, we will briefly recount the pertinent facts underlying this appeal.

The police discovered the deceased body of the victim, William Jessup, during the early morning hours of April 19, 1996. Subsequent examination revealed that the victim sustained multiple fractures to his head and neck as a result of being repeatedly struck with a rock or slab of concrete weighing approximately twenty-six (26) pounds. Appellant was later arrested and charged with various crimes in connection with this incident.

A jury trial was held in April of 1997, following which Appellant was duly convicted of the above offense. The trial court imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five (25) to fifty (50) years pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(2), as the instant offense constituted Appellant's third conviction for a crime of violence. Appellant timely filed post-sentencing motions which were denied by the trial court. This timely appeal followed. Appellant presents the following issues for review:

(1) Whether 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714 violates the ex post facto clause of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions;

(2) Whether 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714 is unconstitutionally vague;

(3) Whether the Commonwealth's burden of proving the existence of prior convictions by a preponderance of the evidence violates the due process clause of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions;

(4) Whether 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714 is unconstitutionally vague in failing to define the burden of proof necessary to determine whether the mandatory minimum term of confinement is sufficient to protect the public safety;

(5) Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Appellant's prior convictions are exempt from the time requirement set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(b); and

(6) Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the prosecutor offered legitimate race-neutral reasons for its exercise of peremptory challenges against three African-American members of the venire.

Appellant's Brief at 6-7.³ We begin with a review of Appellant's sixth issue because, if meritorious, it would render moot the sentencing claims.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the prosecutor proffered race neutral reasons for its exercise of peremptory challenges against African-American members of the venire. Appellant thus raises a Batson⁴ issue.

To establish ... a [prima facie] case [of discrimination], a defendant must show that he is [a member] of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact ... that [the use of] peremptory challenges constitutes a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen for the petit jury on account of their race. This combination of factors in the empaneling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination.

Commonwealth v. Clark, 551 Pa. 258, 278, 710 A.2d 31, 41 (1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court further requires that a defendant, in his or her prima facie case, make a record specifically identifying:

1. the race or gender of all the venirepersons in the jury pools;

2. the race or gender of all venirepersons remaining after challenges for cause;

3. the race or gender of those removed by the prosecutor; and

4. the race or gender of the jurors who served and the gender of jurors acceptable by the Commonwealth who were stricken by the defense.

Commonwealth v. Rico, 551 Pa. 526, ____, 711 A.2d 990, 993 (1998) (citations omitted).

After such a record is established, the trial court is to consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether challenges were used to exclude venirepersons on account of [their] race or gender. If the court finds in the affirmative, the prosecutor is to offer neutral reasons for each of its strikes.... The findings of the trial court are to be given great deference on appeal and will not be disturbed absent a determination that the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Rico, 551 Pa. at ____, 711 A.2d at 993 (citations omitted). We will review Appellant's argument and the decision of the trial court in accordance with the above principles.⁵

The record reflects that the prosecutor exercised three of his peremptory challenges to strike African-Americans from the venire.⁶ The trial court found that this pattern of strikes established a prima facie case under Batson. Accordingly, the trial judge required the prosecutor to articulate the reasons for his strikes. N.T. Trial, 4/7-10/97, at 14.

The prosecutor explained that he struck the first juror, an African-American, because she did not list any employment on her questionnaire. Id. at 15. The Supreme Court has found that unemployment constitutes a race-neutral reason for striking a juror. Commonwealth v. Rico, 551 Pa. at ____, 711 A.2d at 993.

The prosecutor next utilized his challenges against non-African-Americans. One juror was struck because of his slovenly appearance and long hair. Id. at 15 and 16. The other was struck because the prosecutor thought that she was of a "liberal bent." Id. at 15.

The next four strikes were exercised against jurors because the prosecutor hoped to seat a juror with whom he had been acquainted and who was further down the list. Id. at 17-18 and 20. Of these four individuals, two were African-Americans, one female and the other male. Id. at 15-16 and 18. Specifically, the prosecutor used his fourth and sixth strikes against the African-Americans. Id. at 15-16 and 18. The prosecutor further explained that he would have exercised peremptory challenges against other jurors before striking the African-American male, however, Appellant's counsel used his own peremptory challenges to strike these individuals. Id. at 20. Having reviewed the prosecutor's reasons for his strikes, we are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the prosecutor proffered legitimate race neutral reasons for his strikes. Accordingly, no relief is due on this claim.

Appellant's remaining challenges all implicate the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence. As these questions implicate the legality of Appellant's sentence, they are appealable as of right. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(a). Because we find Appellant's fifth issue to be dispositive, our analysis will focus on this claim.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Appellant's prior convictions are exempt from the time requirement set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(b). The record reflects that the Commonwealth invoked the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(2).⁷ N.T. Sentencing, 6/2/97, at 2-3. This statute provides, in relevant part:

Where the person had at the time of the commission of the current offense previously been convicted of two or more such crimes of violence arising from separate criminal transactions, the person shall be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least 25 years of total confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(2). A "crime of violence" means, inter alia, aggravated assault as defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1) or (2), or robbery, as defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(i), (ii) or (iii). 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(g).

However, all previous convictions for crimes of violence are not included for purposes of determining whether a mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed. Rather, the statute directs, in pertinent part:

For the purposes of subsection (a), an offender... shall be deemed to have prior convictions for crimes of violence if both of the following conditions hold:

(1) The offender was previously convicted of a crime of violence ... [; and]

(2) The previous conviction occurred within seven years of the date of the commission of the instant offense, except that any time during which the offender was incarcerated in any penitentiary, prison, or other place of detention or on probation or parole shall not be considered in computing the relevant seven year period....

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(b)(1) and (2).

The dispute in this case centers on the language set forth in section 9714(b)(2), supra. It is Appellant's position that only those prior convictions occurring within seven years of the date of the commission of the instant offense may be considered for purposes of imposing the mandatory minimum sentence set forth in section 9714(a)(2). Appellant's Brief at 31-32. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, asserts that the seven-year time requirement should only apply to mandatory minimum sentences imposed under section 9714(a)(1). Commonwealth's Brief at 11-12.

Neither of the parties cite to any pertinent cases in support of their respective positions. Our own research has likewise failed to uncover any pertinent decisional authority. We must accordingly resort to...