Com. v. Edgerly

• Decision Date: 11 April 1977
• Citation: 372 Mass. 337,361 N.E.2d 1289
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1289

361 N.E.2d 1289

372 Mass. 337

COMMONWEALTH v. George EDGERLY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Argued Sept. 13, 1976.

Decided April 11, 1977.

John C. Doherty, Asst. Dist. Atty., (Michael T. Stella, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., with him), for the Commonwealth.

P. J. Piscitelli, Brockton, for defendant.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, KAPLAN, WILKINS and ABRAMS, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

The defendant stands indicted for murder in the first degree. A judge of the Superior Court has reported two questions to us (G.L. c. 278, § 30A) concerning possible consequences of the allowance of motions filed by the Commonwealth which seek (1) an order that the defendant disclose 'whether he intends to interpose or rely upon a defense of alibi' and (2) an order that the defendant disclose the names and addresses of his witnesses. The Commonwealth has already disclosed the names of its witnesses for its case in chief and apparently is prepared to disclose the names of any rebuttal witnesses. The questions reported are set forth in the margin. ¹

The parties have treated the questions as related to (1) the authority of a judge to order disclosure of an alibi defense and of the names and addresses of witnesses in support of that defense and (2) the authority of a judge either to exclude testimony from witnesses whose identity is not disclosed seasonably or to impose some other sanction for noncompliance with a disclosure order. We believe that a judge constitutionally may order a defendant to give notice whether he intends to rely on alibi as a defense and, if he does, to supply the names and addresses of alibi witnesses provided there is a reciprocal order imposing on the Commonwealth the duty of disclosing its rebuttal witnesses on that defense. Thus, we answer the first question in the affirmative. The second question should not be answered in the abstract, and, therefore, although we shall discuss the question of sanctions, we do not answer the question.

We consider briefly the treatment of notice of alibi rules by the Supreme Court of the United States, by this court, and by other States. The Supreme Court of the United States first considered such a rule in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970). It upheld a Florida reciprocal notice of alibi rule against arguments that (1) compliance with a discovery order under such a rule compelled a defendant to be a witness against himself contrary to the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and (2) such discovery permitted against a defendant deprived him of 'due process' or a 'fair trial.' The Williams case did not involve, and the Court did not consider, the constitutionality of sanctions which might be imposed on a defendant who failed to comply with a disclosure order and thereafter undertook to present evidence in support of his asserted alibi. Id. at 83 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1893. The Court recognized the beneficial consequence of a fair notice of alibi rule, saying: 'The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played. We find ample room in that system, at least as far as 'due process' is concerned, for . . . (a rule) which is designed to enhance the search for truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence' (footnote omitted). Id. at 82, 90 S.Ct. at 1896.

In Gilday v. Commonwealth, 360 Mass. 170, 172, 274 N.E.2d 589 (1971), we vacated those portions of orders which required a defendant to disclose before trial the names, addresses, and date of birth of his alibi witnesses. We noted that the absence of 'appropriate, compulsory and reciprocal disclosure by the prosecution' may deny a defendant due process of law and that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to summon witnesses in his own behalf might be denied by the exclusion of testimony from undisclosed alibi witnesses. We concluded that '(u)ntil the constitutional uncertainties in this area are more definitely settled,' orders requiring pre-trial disclosure of alibi witnesses should not be entered, particularly where Massachusetts had neither a statute nor a rule providing for reciprocity. Id. at 173, 244 N.E.2d 589.

Our concern about the constitutionality of an alibi disclosure procedure which failed to impose reciprocal obligations on the prosecution was well founded. In Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade enforcement of a notice of alibi requirement unless reciprocal discovery rights were given to criminal defendants. There the defendant's conviction was reversed where testimony from undisclosed alibi witnesses had been excluded. The Supreme Court noted that it was expressing no position on the question whether exclusion of alibi testimony would be a permissible manner of enforcement of a notice of alibi rule which was otherwise valid. Id. at 472 n. 4, 93 S.Ct. 2208. In its Wardius opinion, the Court did not criticize notice of alibi rules in general. It recognized that such rules were 'in use in a large and growing number of States . . .' and 'are based on the proposition that the ends of justice will best be served by a system of liberal discovery which gives both parties the maximum possible amount of information with which to prepare their cases and thereby reduces the possibility of surprise at trial.' Id. at 473, 93 S.Ct. at 2211. The Supreme Court described the growth of such discovery devices as a salutary development which enhances the fairness of the adversary system. Id. at 474, 93 S.Ct. 2208.

The decision of the Commonwealth in this case to seek disclosure of an alibi defense, with an offer of reciprocal disclosure, was no doubt prompted in part by the Supreme Court's comments in its Wardius opinion. This is the first occasion we have had to consider the requirement of disclosure of an alibi defense since our opinion in the Gilday case. ²

As far as we are aware, notice of alibi requirements in other jurisdictions have been imposed by rule or, more commonly, by statute. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 n. 11, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970), which refers, as of 1970, to such requirements in sixteen States. Notice of alibi provisions now exist in at least six other jurisdictions. See Me.R.Crim.P. 16(b) (1965); Mont.Rev.Codes Ann. § 95--1803(d) (1967); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 174.087, as amended (1971); N.M.R.Crim.P. 32 (1972); N.D.R.Crim.P. 12.1 (1973); Wash.Super.Ct.Crim.R. 4.7(b)(2)(xii) (1973). The validity of notice of alibi requirements has been upheld generally, where adequate reciprocal obligations have been placed on the prosecution. See Williams v. Florida, supra at 83, 90 S.Ct. 1893; Note, Constitutional Implications of Notice-of-Alibi Provisions, 21 Wayne L.Rev. 1415, 1416 n. 7 (1975). Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 958, 963 (1972). Contra, Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 785 (Alas.1974) (Alaska Constitution).

In general, a requirement of disclosure of an alibi defense and the identity of alibi witnesses does not deny constitutional or statutory rights where reciprocal obligations are placed on the prosecution. A defendant is not 'compelled to . . . furnish evidence against himself . . .' nor is he denied absolutely his 'right to produce all proofs, that may be favorable to him . . . and to be fully heard in his defense by himself, or his counsel, at his election.' Art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Such a defendant is not denied his right under G.L. c. 263, § 5, to defend himself or to produce witnesses and proofs in his favor. We see no denial generally of defendants' rights to due process of law under the State Constitution or under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, including (by incorporation) any rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Federal Constitution.

It is true that a notice of alibi order upsets the traditional view that a defendant need not reveal his defense, if any, until the prosecution has disclosed its entire case. Under such a rule, a criminal defendant may be forced to make a pre-trial disclosure of an alibi defense or run the risk of losing his rights to present that defense in full. However, where such a defendant is granted substantial reciprocal rights and the right to considerable additional disclosure, ³ the system is not fundamentally unfair. We recognize that the Supreme Court of the United States has left open the question of the constitutionality of the imposition of sanctions under a notice of alibi requirement. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 n. 4, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973).

Whether in a particular case, the imposition of sanctions, particularly the sanction of barring testimony from others in support of any alibi defense, may constitute an abuse of discretion or a denial of a defendant's constitutional rights, we leave for consideration on a case by case basis. We expect that the extreme sanction, preclusion of testimony from alibi witnesses other than the defendant, would be imposed only where the Commonwealth is prejudiced significantly by surprise and there is no reasonable, alternative means of achieving the purpose of the rule. In some instances, granting a continuance may be such a reasonable alternative. When a case involving sanctions against a defendant arises, a significant constitutional question will be whether, in the circumstances of that case, the defendant was barred unconstitutionally from presenting a defense, as the Constitutions of the Commonwealth (art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights) and of the United States (Sixth Amendment) permit. See generally, Note, The Preclusion Sanction--A...