Com. v. Eller
| Court | Superior Court of Pennsylvania |
| Writing for the Court | Before WATKINS; VAN der VOORT |
| Citation | 232 Pa.Super. 99,332 A.2d 507 |
| Decision Date | 11 December 1974 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Ronald ELLER, Appellee. |
Page 507
v.
Ronald ELLER, Appellee.
Page 508
[232 Pa.Super. 100] Stephen B. Harris, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Doylestown, for appellant.
Paul Laskow, Asst. Public Defender, Doylestown, for appellee.
Before WATKINS, President Judge, and JACOBS, HOFFMAN, CERCONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT and SPAETH, JJ.
VAN der VOORT, Judge.
On August 27, 1973, a criminal complaint was filed against defendant-appellee. He was arrested and arraigned on September 22, 1973. October 17, 1973, had been set for hearing, but defendant did not appear and was declared a fugitive. On July 23, 1973, the Grand Jury returned an indictment of 'theft' against defendant, 1 who was re-arrested and arraigned on May 3, 1974. At this Arraignment, defendant's counsel moved to dismiss the indictment on grounds of violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1100(a)(1), 19 PS. Appendix, which provides that 'trial in a court case . . . shall commence no later than two hundred seventy (270) [232 Pa.Super. 101] days from the date on which the complaint is filed.' 2 Violation was alleged because trial was set for May 28, 1974. Trial court granted the application to dismiss at trial on the latter date.
For purposes of this appeal, the Commonwealth urges upon us that the trial court erred in the computation of time for the running of the 270 day period, and that said error was grounded upon a misinterpretation of the effect of the Commonwealth's denial of one of defendant's statements in his Application to Dismiss the Indictment. The crucial dates for computation of the '270 days' are August 27, 1973, for its commencement, and May 28, 1974, the date of trial. This period is four (4) days in excess of two hundred seventy (270) days. The Commonwealth contends that the appellee was unavailable from July 23, 1973, to May 3, 1974, so that this period of time must be excluded from the running of the 270 day period. 3 Section (d)(1) of Rule 1100 specifically so provides. 4 If the time during which the appellee was not available is excluded from
Page 509
the computation, the 270 day period had not expired.The Commonwealth impliedly admitted that the appellee had not caused more than 30 days delay. Paragraph 6 of appellee's pre-trial application to dismiss reads:
'6. There has been no delay or continuance in [232 Pa.Super. 102] excess of 30 days attributable to the...
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Com. v. Benson
...to answer will not constitute an admission of well-pleaded facts unless an answer is ordered by the court). Commonwealth v. Eller, 232 Pa.Super. 99, 332 A.2d 507 (1974), in which the Commonwealth admittedly did not answer upon its mistaken determination that the averment was a conclusion of......
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Commonwealth v. Benson
...to answer will not constitute an admission of well-pleaded facts unless an answer is ordered by the court). Commonwealth v. Eller, 232 Pa.Super. 99, 332 A.2d 507 (1974), in which the Commonwealth admittedly did not answer upon its mistaken determination that the averment was a conclusion of......
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Com. v. Bean
...Cutillo, 235 Pa.Super. 131, 339 A.2d 123 (1975); Commonwealth v. Hickson, 235 Pa.Super. 496, 344 A.2d 617 (1975); Commonwealth v. Eller, 232 Pa.Super. 99, 332 A.2d 507...
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Com. v. Pugh
...the suppression court should have accepted as true all of the well-pleaded facts averred in Pugh's applications. 5 Commonwealth v. Eller,232 Pa.Super. 99, 332 A.2d 507 The Commonwealth argues that, even if the suppression court erred in not following the mandate of Rule 308, supra, no preju......
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Com. v. Benson
...to answer will not constitute an admission of well-pleaded facts unless an answer is ordered by the court). Commonwealth v. Eller, 232 Pa.Super. 99, 332 A.2d 507 (1974), in which the Commonwealth admittedly did not answer upon its mistaken determination that the averment was a conclusion of......
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Commonwealth v. Benson
...to answer will not constitute an admission of well-pleaded facts unless an answer is ordered by the court). Commonwealth v. Eller, 232 Pa.Super. 99, 332 A.2d 507 (1974), in which the Commonwealth admittedly did not answer upon its mistaken determination that the averment was a conclusion of......
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Com. v. Bean
...Cutillo, 235 Pa.Super. 131, 339 A.2d 123 (1975); Commonwealth v. Hickson, 235 Pa.Super. 496, 344 A.2d 617 (1975); Commonwealth v. Eller, 232 Pa.Super. 99, 332 A.2d 507...
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Com. v. Pugh
...the suppression court should have accepted as true all of the well-pleaded facts averred in Pugh's applications. 5 Commonwealth v. Eller,232 Pa.Super. 99, 332 A.2d 507 The Commonwealth argues that, even if the suppression court erred in not following the mandate of Rule 308, supra, no preju......