Com. v. Enders

• Decision Date: 30 July 1991
• Citation: 595 A.2d 600,407 Pa.Super. 201
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Jason L. ENDERS, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Scott Francis LIPTAK, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Alexander O. STEINBERG, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Daniel NELSON, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 600

595 A.2d 600

407 Pa.Super. 201

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Jason L. ENDERS, Appellant.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Scott Francis LIPTAK, Appellant.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Alexander O. STEINBERG, Appellant.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Daniel NELSON, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued April 18, 1991.

Filed July 30, 1991.

John P. Lawler, Stroudsburg, for appellant (at 1882).

Robin A. Spishock, Stroudsburg, for appellant (at 2030).

Nancy Aaroe, Stroudsburg, for appellant (at 2123).

William K. Sayer, Asst. Public Defender, Stroudsburg, for appellant (at 2199).

Gregory Doyle, Asst. Dist. Atty., Stroudsburg, for the Com., appellee (at 1882, 2030, 2123 and 2199).

Before MONTEMURO, BECK and TAMILIA, JJ.

MONTEMURO, Judge:

These unconsolidated appeals arise from the judgments of sentence entered after a jury trial at which all appellants, Jason L. Enders, Scott Francis Liptak, Alexander O. Steinberg and Daniel Nelson, were convicted of false imprisonment. ^{1 1} The charges stemmed from appellants' participation in a satanic cult ritual. After all appellants' post-verdict motions were denied, sentences were imposed. ² It is from these sentences that the instant appeals are taken.

Appellants, collectively and individually, raise four (4) issues for our consideration. Generally, it is alleged that: 1) the verdicts were based upon insufficient evidence and were against the weight of the evidence; and, 2) the trial court erred in (a) admitting into evidence items seized from all appellants' homes; (b) limiting the examination of co-defendants' witnesses; and, (c) failing to give a cautionary instruction at the introduction of co-defendant Nelson's inculpatory statement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we find all of appellants' allegations without merit.

The facts as established at trial, and set forth by the trial court in its opinion adjudicating appellants' post-verdict motions, are as follows:

On Friday, July 21, 1989, the victim, Charles Collier received a phone call from Jason Enders who requested that Collier come over to Enders' home. When Collier arrived at Enders' home, he spoke briefly with Enders who left the porch and entered his home. A short time later Enders returned to the porch and told Collier that some people were coming over. Thereafter, a vehicle arrived at the Enders' residence with Jason Male, Scott Liptak, Daniel Nelson and Alex Steinberg. At some point the subject of a "cult" was brought up. Collier said he wanted nothing to do with it. He was forcibly taken to an abandoned barn down the road from the Enders' home and held against his will. He was tied to stakes in the ground in spread eagle fashion over a pentagram drawn in the dirt. He had a leather collar with nails placed about his neck. Collier specifically testified that each of the defendants was involved in tying him down. A satanic or occult ritual was performed over him. Before the ritual ended, Defendant Steinberg punctured Collier's neck by pressing on the nails and placed his fingers in Collier's blood and then to his lips. Subsequently, the victim was released after being threatened by Steinberg that, if he told anyone what happened, they would kill him.

On Monday evening Collier told his grandmother about the ritual and identified the Defendants as the perpetrators. On Tuesday, the police came to interview Collier at his grandmother's home. While the police were present, Defendant Nelson arrived and was identified by Collier. The police arrested Nelson who subsequently gave two detailed statements to police. Both statements implicated all Defendants in the ritual. On Tuesday, July 25, 1989, Collier sought medical attention for the wounds to his neck. Dr. Gilkey, the treating physician, testified that the wounds were consistent with puncture wounds.

See Opinion of Trial Court, pp. 3-5 (emphasis added).

Appellants Enders, Liptak and Nelson each challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. ³ In reviewing this claim, we begin with the well-known standard which requires that we ask:

... whether, accepting as true all of the Commonwealth's evidence and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom upon which, if believed, the fact-finder could reasonably have based its verdict, such evidence and inferences are sufficient in law to establish the elements of the crime in question beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Nelson, 514 Pa. 262, 270, 523 A.2d 728, 733 (1987), cert. den. 484 U.S. 928, 108 S.Ct. 293, 98 L.Ed.2d 253 (citation omitted).

The elements of the crime in this instance are defined by the Crimes Code, which states that a person will be guilty of false imprisonment

... if he knowingly restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his liberty.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2903. After a thorough review of the notes of testimony, and construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth presented evidence sufficient to convict appellants, Enders, Liptak and Nelson, of false imprisonment. Further, appellants' attempt to assert that the evidence is insufficient as it lacks "some minimal standard of credibility" fails as it is within the jury's sole province, as fact-finder, to judge the credibility and veracity of a witness. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 518 Pa. 77, 541 A.2d 315 (1988) (The question of a witness' credibility is reserved exclusively for the jury.) As the jury chose to believe the victim over the testimony of appellants' alibi witnesses, appellants' first issue lacks merit. ⁴

It is next argued, by all appellants, that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence certain photographs of all appellants' bedrooms, their class pictures, and various items seized from their homes, including skulls and books concerning the occult. It is well-settled law that

[t]he trial court has 'broad discretion as to the manner in which a trial is to be conducted, particularly with regard to the admission or exclusion of evidence.' Commonwealth v. Lumpkins, 324 Pa.Super. 8, 14, 471 A.2d 96, 99 (1984). Relevancy is, ..., a basic requirement for the admissibility of any evidence in a criminal trial. Id.

Commonwealth v. Conway, 368 Pa.Super. 488, 493-95, 534 A.2d 541, 544 (1987), alloc. den. in 520 Pa. 581, 549 A.2d 914 (emphasis added).

Evidence is relevant when "the inference sought to be raised by the evidence bears upon a matter in issue in the case and, second, whether the evidence 'renders the desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence[.]' "

Commonwealth v. Haight, 514 Pa. 438, 440, 525 A.2d 1199, 1200 (1987), citing Commonwealth v. Stewart, 461 Pa. 274, 278, 336 A.2d 282, 284 (1975) (citations omitted in original).

However, not all relevant evidence is admissible, and a trial court may exercise its discretion to exclude relevant evidence that 'may confuse, mislead or prejudice the jury,' Id. 324 Pa.Super. at 15, 471 A.2d at 100. (citations omitted). Of course, most of the evidence offered by the prosecution in a criminal case will prejudice the defendant. Commonwealth v. Dollman, 355 Pa.Super. 108, 114, 512 A.2d 1234, 1237 (1986) (citations omitted). The inquiry therefore is whether the evidence is so prejudicial that it 'may inflame' the jury to make a decision based upon 'something other than the legal propositions relevant to the case.' Commonwealth v. Shain, 324 Pa.Super. 456, 464, 471 A.2d 1246, 1249 (1984); (citation omitted). A piece of evidence is of essential evidentiary value if the need for it clearly outweighs the likelihood of it inflaming the minds and passions of the jurors. (citation omitted). Because rulings on the admission of evidence rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, we will not reverse the trial court's decision absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Lumpkins, supra 324 Pa.Super. at 15, 471 A.2d at 100."

Commonwealth v. Conway, supra.

In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in this instance, we note that appellants were brought to trial on charges of kidnapping, conspiracy, false imprisonment and simple assault. The basis of the charged criminal activities stemmed from ritualistic acts performed upon the victim after he had been forceably abducted and confined against his will. The Commonwealth, therefore, sought to prove that the actions of all four (4) defendants were commensurate with a belief in satanism which resulted in the intentional restraint and assault of the victim. Appellants' defenses were that they were not at the barn on the evening in question, and that they were not involved in satanism. Obviously then, the Commonwealth's introduction, and the trial court's admission, of the evidence tends to establish a fact in issue--whether appellants believed in and were involved in satanism at the time of the incident, and whether appellants acted consistently with their beliefs and practices. Therefore, the evidence is relevant and probative.

In weighing the inflammatory nature of the evidence ⁵ against its probative value, the trial court found the evidence more probative than prejudicial. We do not find this to be an erroneous determination. As stated in Commonwealth v. Clark, 280 Pa.Super. 1, 421 A.2d 374 (1980), "[i]n determining whether the evidence is so remote that the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value, the court has no fixed standard on which to rely, but must instead consider the nature of the crime, the evidence being offered, and all attendant circumstances." Id. [407 Pa.Super. 209] at 7, 421 A.2d at 376, citing Commonwealth v. Kinnard, 230 Pa.Super. 134, 326 A.2d 541 (1974). As the evidence offered tends to confirm the knowledge and intent of appellants in furtherance of the alleged criminal activity, the trial court was correct in admitting the evidence in this case. ⁶ As such is the case, appellants' contentions...