Com. v. Ferreira

Decision Date25 April 1994
Citation632 N.E.2d 392,417 Mass. 592
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Robert FERREIRA.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Bruce Ferg, Brockton, for defendant.

Julia K. Holler, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com.

Before WILKINS, ABRAMS, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

Convicted of murder in the first degree on the grounds of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, the defendant, Robert Ferreira, appeals. 1 The defendant alleges error in the instructions to the jury. He requests that we exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E (1992 ed.), to order a new trial or to reduce the verdict to murder in the second degree. We conclude that the convictions should be affirmed and that there is no basis to exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, on the conviction of murder in the first degree and order a new trial or enter a lesser degree of guilt.

Facts. On June 2, 1987, police discovered the victim's body, partially submerged in the water of the Cape Cod Canal. The victim's hands were bound behind his back. His legs were wrapped with automobile jumper cables attached to a metal tool box. An autopsy revealed that the cause of death was drowning, associated with a blunt impact injury. A medical examiner testified that injuries to the victim's head and nose were inflicted while the victim was still alive. The medical examiner further testified that the victim would have been unable to swim due to the ligatures around his hands and feet.

The police learned that the victim's automatic teller machine (ATM) bank card had been used to withdraw $200 in the early morning hours of June 2, 1987. Police developed photographs taken by surveillance cameras at the ATM machine. The defendant was identified from these photographs as the man withdrawing the money.

John Winters and Anthony Leite, two friends of the defendant, testified that on the evening of June 1, they drove the defendant and Kevin Galford 2 to a rest area on Route 140. The defendant and Galford said they wanted to go to the rest area to collect some money owed to them. Leite and Winters both testified that the defendant appeared sober. Leite stated that he thought they might have gone to the rest area to beat up homosexuals.

At about 10 A.M. on June 2, 1987, the defendant and Galford, driving a blue Pontiac 6000, the same model of automobile owned by and registered to the victim, went to the home of Tammy Ferris. The defendant bought food and drinks for a cookout. At the cookout, the defendant told Ferris that he got $200 to burn the Pontiac. The defendant said that he and Galford took the automobile to Cape Cod the night before, throwing certain papers out the window on the way. 3 Ferris also testified that the defendant asked, "Where do you think we got the car or all this money? You think we drowned someone for this?"

Rebecca Carpenter, a friend of the defendant, testified that she went for a ride with the defendant on the morning of June 2, 1987, and that she noticed both front seats of the Pontiac were wet. Carpenter accompanied the defendant to New York to visit his father from June 3 to June 12, 1987. While in New York, the defendant told Carpenter that he and Galford had robbed and drowned the victim. According to Carpenter, the defendant said that he and Galford went to the rest area on Route 140 and picked up the victim. They then took the victim's car, made him withdraw $200, and drowned him in the canal. Carpenter said that the defendant told her he wanted to kill Galford for talking too much about the incident.

After an arrest warrant was issued, the defendant turned himself in at the Taunton police station. Officer James Cummings testified that the defendant initially denied the murder. He said that Galford had given him $200 and the keys to the Pontiac, telling him to burn the car. When the defendant was shown the photographs taken at the ATM machine, he turned his head away and admitted, "I did it, but Galford was with me." Later, while being transported in a police cruiser, the defendant asked about Galford. When he was told Galford was not under arrest for murder, he became upset and shouted, "I'm not going down for this alone. He was there with me." The defendant also told the police that, unlike Galford, he had a "conscience" and had not "slept a night since this happened." The theory of defense was that the defendant was paid $200 for an "insurance job" to get rid of the car, and that Galford, alone, had committed the murder. 4

Discussion. The only issues the defendant raises on appeal concern the judge's jury instructions. The defendant did not object to the instructions at trial. We therefore review the challenged instructions, pursuant to G.L. c. 278, § 33E, to determine whether the instructions created a "substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice." We view the charge to the jury in its entirety "since the adequacy of instructions must be determined in light of their over-all impact on the jury." Commonwealth v. Sellon, 380 Mass. 220, 231-232, 402 N.E.2d 1329 (1980).

1. Joint venture. The defendant asserts that the judge should have instructed the jury that they could consider evidence of the defendant's intoxication in assessing whether the defendant was capable of forming the specific intent necessary to sustain a conviction on a joint venture theory. The defendant argues that Commonwealth v. Parker, 402 Mass. 333, 336-337, 522 N.E.2d 924 (1988), requires an instruction that the jury may consider evidence of voluntary intoxication with respect to joint venture. Contrary to the defendant's assertion, we left open the question "whether a separate intoxication instruction on the ability to form a shared intent is required when the Commonwealth argues a joint enterprise theory at trial." Parker, supra at 336, 522 N.E.2d 924. Nothing the judge said precluded the jury from considering evidence of intoxication on the defendant's ability to form a shared intent. Cf. Commonwealth v. Glass, 401 Mass. 799, 809-810, 519 N.E.2d 1311 (1988).

The judge correctly instructed the jury on the elements of joint venture. 5 See Commonwealth v. Mandile, 403 Mass. 93, 99-100, 525 N.E.2d 1322 (1988). The judge then made the following reference to specific intent: "Now, bear in mind, when we get into the second phase of my instructions, that I'm going to lay out for you the specific intent required to be proved with reference to the crimes of murder, unarmed robbery, and kidnapping." At that point, the judge then reiterated the elements of joint venture, which properly included "sharing with the perpetrator of the crime the required mental state or intent to commit that particular crime." The judge's instructions made clear that in order to sustain a conviction, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant shared the specific intent necessary for murder, unarmed robbery and kidnapping. During his instructions, the judge repeatedly told the jurors that the defendant's sobriety or lack of sobriety was a factual determination. The judge explicitly linked the element of specific intent with the defendant's intoxication. 6

The judge's instruction did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice on the indictment for murder in the first degree, see G.L. c. 278, § 33E, nor did the instructions create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice on the crimes of kidnapping and unarmed robbery. See Commonwealth v. Pares-Ramirez, 400 Mass. 604, 609, 511 N.E.2d 344 (1987).

2. Malice. The defendant alleges error in the judge's definition of malice. We set forth the challenged instruction in the margin. 7 The defendant claims that the instruction was incorrect because it was "overbroad and drastically lowers the threshold for a finding of malice aforethought; and ... did not give any guidance to the jurors as to what constituted 'extenuating circumstances sufficient in law to reduce the crime to manslaughter.' " We do not agree. 8

The language challenged by the defendant is almost identical to the instruction in Commonwealth v. Adrey, 397 Mass. 751, 754, 493 N.E.2d 875 (1986). It is clear that the judge accurately conveyed the Commonwealth's burden to the jury. The judge correctly defined the three prongs of malice. Commonwealth v. Moore, 408 Mass. 117, 134 n. 9, 556 N.E.2d 392 (1990). The language did not suggest that malice was presumed or implied. Cf. Commonwealth v. Starling, 382 Mass. 423, 428, 416 N.E.2d 929 (1981). Further, the judge repeatedly emphasized the Commonwealth's burden to prove each element of the crimes charged, and the defendant's presumption of innocence. See Commonwealth v. Doucette, 391 Mass. 443, 451-452, 462 N.E.2d 1084 (1984); Commonwealth v. Medina, 380 Mass. 565, 578, 404 N.E.2d 1228 (1980). There was no error.

3. Failure to instruct on manslaughter. 9 The defendant asserts that the jury should have been permitted to consider a verdict of manslaughter. The defendant argues that because the jury could have found that the element of malice was absent due to his voluntary intoxication, he was entitled to a manslaughter instruction.

A judge must give an instruction on manslaughter if any view of the evidence will permit a finding that the offense was manslaughter. See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 393 Mass. 612, 613-614, 473 N.E.2d 167 (1985). In this case, no view of the evidence would permit such a verdict. An instruction on voluntary manslaughter was not appropriate because there was no evidence of provocation. See Commonwealth v. Parker, 402 Mass. 333, 344, 522 N.E.2d 924 (1988).

An instruction on involuntary manslaughter was unwarranted because there was no evidence that this was an unintentional death during the commission of a battery. See Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 404 Mass. 774, 776, 537 N.E.2d 583 (1989). "A killing without malice does not automatically become involuntary manslaughter. The traditional...

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