Com. v. Fletcher

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Citation896 A.2d 508
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Anthony FLETCHER, Appellee. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Anthony Fletcher, Appellant.
Decision Date21 April 2006

Kathleen E. Martin, Esq., Jerome J. Shestack, Esq., Joseph Colin Crawford, Esq., Philadelphia, for Anthony Fletcher (in No. 438 CAP).

Kathleen E. Martin, Esq., Jerome J. Shestack, Esq., Philadelphia, for Anthony Fletcher (in No. 446 CAP).

Amy Zapp, Esq., Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Esq., Harrisburg, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (in No. 446 CAP).

BEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, and BALDWIN, JJ.

OPINION

Justice SAYLOR.

In this capital appeal, the Commonwealth challenges the award of a new trial by a post-conviction court deriving from the absence at trial of testimony from the assistant medical examiner who performed the autopsy of the murder victim, as well as a limited retraction by the pathologist who furnished trial testimony at the behest of the prosecution.

The background underlying Appellee's 1993 conviction for first-degree murder and associated death sentence is set forth in Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 561 Pa. 266, 750 A.2d 261 (2000). Briefly, the killing occurred in March 1992, when Appellee approached the victim, Vaughn Christopher, and shot him twice, first in the thigh, and second, and fatally, in the right flank. The Commonwealth presented evidence that the killing was motivated by Mr. Christopher's retention of illegal drugs (and/or proceeds thereof) that had been consigned to him by Appellee for sale. Mr. Christopher was taken to the hospital, where he died during the course of emergency treatment. Apparently, his clothing was discarded or lost at the hospital facility.

Police secured statements from several eyewitnesses, including Ronald Brooks and Natalie Grant, describing the above events and indicating that Appellee approached the victim, produced a handgun, and shot Mr. Christopher in the absence of any physical confrontation or struggle. Upon his apprehension and arrest, Appellee gave a statement to police admitting to his role in the killing, but he contended that he acted in his own defense. According to Appellee's statement, he was angry because Mr. Christopher had stolen money from him in the course of a gambling activity; he approached Mr. Christopher and punched him in the head; Mr. Christopher pulled a pistol; a struggle ensued; and, during the course of this struggle, Appellee placed his hand on the gun and fired twice toward Mr. Christopher's legs.

At the preliminary hearing, the parties stipulated to the overall results of an autopsy performed by Dr. Hydow Park, then of Philadelphia's Office of the Medical Examiner, concluding with the agreement that Dr. Park would be made available at trial. See N.T., March 26, 1992, at 4. The Commonwealth also presented Natalie Grant's testimony, which was largely consistent with her statement.

At trial, Ms. Grant again testified that the killing was unprovoked and that Appellee fired from a distance of several feet as he approached the victim.1 She was extensively cross-examined by the defense, inter alia, concerning her use of illicit drugs in the overall time period during which the killing occurred;2 her history of retail theft; her status as a fugitive on account of several bench warrants that were outstanding when she gave her statement to police; and an active prosecution against her cousin, who was a fugitive, for shooting Appellee, in which Appellee was likely to be called as a Commonwealth witness. The Commonwealth also called Ronald Brooks, who denied that he had furnished an incriminatory statement to police and insisted that he was not present at the scene of the killing; therefore, the Commonwealth presented Brooks' prior inconsistent statement into evidence. Additionally, Appellee's own statement given during the police interrogation was read to the jurors, and the Commonwealth also offered into evidence substantial testimony from investigating officers describing the overall police investigation.

Finally, the Commonwealth presented evidence associated with the autopsy conducted by Dr. Park. The evidence was not introduced through Dr. Park himself, however, upon the district attorney's representation to the trial court that Dr. Park was unavailable as he was in Africa on a medical mission. Over a defense objection, the Commonwealth introduced opinion testimony from a different pathologist, Dr. Ian Hood, based upon the factual findings in Dr. Park's autopsy report, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 391 Pa.Super. 100, 104, 570 A.2d 532, 534 (1990) (indicating that, "[i]n homicide cases, pathologists may base their opinions on facts from autopsy reports prepared by others").

Immediately before Dr. Hood's testimony and pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, passages from Dr. Park's autopsy report were read into the record. In detailing the fatal wound, the report described the path of the bullet as entering Mr. Christopher's right flank thirteen inches below the top of the shoulder along the posterior axillary line (a line running downward from the rear of the armpit) and traveling "leftwards, frontwards and [slightly] upwards." N.T., January 26, 1993, at 13. The report also indicated that the bullet was recovered "from the muscles of the left anterior chest wall beneath the rib cage." Id. at 15. Further, the report stated that there was no evidence of close range firing on the skin. See id. at 13; see also id. at 15 ("The skin around the entrance wound shows no gunpowder stippling or deposits of soot."). With regard to the wound to the victim's right thigh, the report reflected that the bullet entered six inches above the knee, coursed backwards and downwards, and exited four inches above the knee and three inches away from the entrance wound. See id. The report also indicated that there was no scalp hemorrhage, but disclosed a three-by-one-inch contusion on the left lower chest. The jurors were also informed that no clothing was submitted to the Office of the Medical Examiner for examination. See id. at 18-19.

During the direct examination, Dr. Hood clarified that the fatal bullet entered around the location where the victim's right elbow would ordinarily hang on a line dropping from the back of the armpit. He also explained that:

The bullet actually entered the left chest wall right at the bottom of the rib cage, really at the junction, I guess, of the chest [w]all and the abdominal wall, where I indicated with my hand, which would be in my case wearing a shirt, pretty much right at the bottom of the breast pocket on the left.

N.T., January 26, 1993, at 22. Responsive to inquiries probing whether there was evidence of a struggle, Dr. Hood also highlighted the absence from the report of any suggestion of bruising on the victim's face as follows:

I can state only what is not mentioned in the report. There is no evidence of any abrasion, laceration or bruising. That means scraping of the skin, bruising or laceration.... You see that in people who are punched around the eyes. Typically, that would split the skin. None of that was mentioned as being present on the body and evidence of that was not seen in the photographs of the decedent.

N.T., January 26, 1993, at 28. Further, Dr. Hood attributed the bruise on the victim's chest to the fatal bullet. See id. at 28 ("[Y]ou can also see a big bruise where the bullet came close to it and entered the left chest wall."). Finally, Dr. Hood testified that the unavailability of the victim's clothing precluded him from rendering an opinion as to the distance from which the victim was shot, as follows:

Given that we [didn't] get the clothing, [the absence of such markings on the skin] doesn't mean much except that it was not a tight contact wound because that would have gone through the clothing, but since we have not get [sic] the clothing for that, that same soot and stippling, it could mean that the gun was anywhere from a few inches to as far away as you like.

N.T., January 26, 1993, at 20.

On cross-examination, Dr. Hood responded to the defense suggestion that the victim could have been struggling with someone at the time that he was shot in the following manner:

I don't think it's probable that the victim had his hands or wrists around the barrel or close to the barrel of the gun when it was fired. I would see no evidence of that. But, I cannot say from the physical evidence that there was any evidence of struggling on the part of the decedent, but it doesn't mean that that didn't occur. He did not seem to have received any blows or struck against something hard, but I cannot say anymore than that.

N.T., January 26, 1993, at 43-44. The cross-examination further proceeded as follows:

Q. You don't know where or how this [fatal gunshot] wound was inflicted. That's the bottom line of your testimony; correct?

A. That's correct. I only know where the victim came from when he was found.

Id. at 44.

In closing, the district attorney indicated to the jurors that "[t]he Medical Examiner is absolutely important to this case, because it refutes the defendant's version of what happened," N.T., January 27, 1993, at 149. Further, he argued:

Dr. Hood said no, there was no evidence of a struggle here, no bruising or anything on any part of the hands or body or most specifically if the victim's hand were on the barrel of the gun at the time it was fired there would be burning, there would be a burn on his hand because of the heat that is established on the gun and it if it [sic] happened like that there would be evidence of it and there is no such evidence in this case.

Id. at 156-57.

After the verdict, Appellee's trial counsel filed timely post-verdict motions under former Rule of Criminal...

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12 cases
  • Com. v. Daniels, No. 410 CAP.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • 23 January 2009
    ...will remand the matter to the PCRA court to write an opinion addressing all of the PCRA petitioner's claims. See Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 586 Pa. 527, 896 A.2d 508, 523 (2006) (remand necessary when PCRA court focused exclusively on one claim and failed to offer any rationale regarding app......
  • Com. v. Fletcher, No. 545 CAP
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • 28 December 2009
    ...an extensive colloquy and granted Appellant the right to represent himself. N.T. 4/4/95, 20-31; Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 586 Pa. 527, 896 A.2d 508, 512-13 (2006) (Fletcher II) (setting forth excerpts from the colloquy). Mr. Berry was then appointed to be standby Mr. Berry and Appellant fil......
  • Commonwealth of Pa. v. Spotz
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • 29 April 2011
    ...assistance claims that arose from the period of self-representation. Bryant, supra at 737; see also Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 586 Pa. 527, 896 A.2d 508, 522 n. 13 (2006) ( Fletcher II ) (explaining that the Court was applying the categorical approach of the Bryant majority “in refusing to c......
  • Commonwealth v. Spotz
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • 26 June 2012
    ...A.3d at 270;Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 604 Pa. 493, 986 A.2d 759, 774, 778 (2009) (“Fletcher III ”); Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 586 Pa. 527, 896 A.2d 508, 522 n. 13 (2006) ( “Fletcher II ”); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 579 Pa. 119, 855 A.2d 726, 736–38 (2004). Here, Appellant chose to represent h......
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