Com. v. Forde

Decision Date11 July 1984
Citation466 N.E.2d 510,392 Mass. 453
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Ancil Bentley FORDE.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Roger Witkin, Boston, for defendant.

Leonard J. Henson, Asst. Dist. Atty. (Paul J. McCallum, Asst. Dist. Atty. with him), for the Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

The defendant was indicted for the murder of his wife. His motions to suppress evidence and for a required finding of not guilty were denied. The jury returned a verdict of murder in the second degree. The defendant appealed, and we transferred the case here on our own motion. We affirm.

On July 17, 1981, the defendant filed a missing person report on his wife. On July 18, he reported to the police that he had discovered his wife's body on the back porch of their apartment. A police detective found no sign of assault on the victim or of forced entry to the apartment, and was told by the defendant that he had last seen his wife alive two days earlier, when he had dropped her off near her place of work.

On July 22, Sergeant Detective John Doris and Detective Emmanuel Dambreville came to the defendant's apartment. The defendant accompanied them to the police station, where he signed an incriminating statement. The defendant testified, at a hearing on his motion to suppress the statement, that no Miranda warnings had been given, that he had maintained his innocence, and that he had signed the statement at gunpoint. Doris and Dambreville testified that Miranda warnings had been given, that the defendant had made his statement after being told that fingerprints can be taken from a corpse, and that the defendant had not been threatened or coerced. The judge found that Miranda warnings had been given, that the defendant had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, and that the statement was voluntary.

1. Admissibility of Defendant's Statement.

The defendant argues that the Commonwealth has failed to sustain its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See Commonwealth v. Day, 387 Mass. 915, 920-921, 444 N.E.2d 384 (1983). As a necessary premise to his argument, the defendant challenges as clearly erroneous the judge's subsidiary finding that the defendant initiated the conversation as to whether fingerprints can be taken from a corpse. We assume for purposes of discussion that the finding was erroneous and that Sergeant Doris initiated the conversation which precipitated the defendant's statement. 1

The defendant argues that Sergeant Doris's question implied that the defendant's fingerprints had been found on the body when in fact no fingerprint analysis had been, or ever was, done on the body, and that the defendant was thus tricked into waiving his right to remain silent. The cases cited by the defendant, however, do not support his conclusion. In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 377 Mass. 319, 325-329, 386 N.E.2d 15 (1979), the false statement made to the defendant was a form of interrogation used to induce the defendant to relinquish his right to remain silent after he had clearly asserted that right. The fact that the police used any form of interrogation after the assertion of the right to remain silent would itself have required suppression of the resulting statement. Commonwealth v. Harvey, 390 Mass. 203, 454 N.E.2d 105 (1983). Commonwealth v. Brant, 380 Mass. 876, 406 N.E.2d 1021, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004, 101 S.Ct. 545, 66 L.Ed.2d 301 (1980). See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). The fact that the statement was educed by trickery was "relevant but not conclusive." Commonwealth v. Jackson, supra, 377 Mass. at 328 n. 8, 386 N.E.2d 15. See also Commonwealth v. Meehan, 377 Mass. 552, 562-563, 387 N.E.2d 527 (1979), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 445 U.S. 39, 100 S.Ct. 1092, 63 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980). In the instant case, the defendant had not asserted his right to remain silent, and thus he is not necessarily entitled to suppression. See Commonwealth v. Doucette, 391 Mass. 443, 448-449, 462 N.E.2d 1084 (1984). Nor do the characteristics of the accused or the circumstances of the interrogation suggest that the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was anything but voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The use of misinformation by the police does not in itself defeat a showing of voluntary waiver of rights. See Commonwealth v. Meehan, supra, 377 Mass. at 563, 387 N.E.2d 527. Having considered the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the waiver was valid and that the defendant's statements to the police were admissible. 2

2. Evidence of Malice.

The defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case in chief and again at disposition. He now claims that it was error for the judge to disallow this motion, as to so much of the indictment as charged murder, because there was insufficient evidence of malice. This contention is without merit. An inference of malice arises from the intentional doing of an act likely to cause death or grievous harm. Commonwealth v. Palmariello, 392 Mass. 126, 142-143 (1984). Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 Mass. 167, 171-172, 408 N.E.2d 841 (1980). Commonwealth v. McInerney, 373 Mass. 136, 140-141, 365 N.E.2d 815 (1977). There was evidence that the victim died as a result of manual strangulation lasting a minimum of one to two minutes. This evidence alone was sufficient to raise an inference of malice.

3. Evidence of Premeditation.

The defendant asserts that it was error for the judge to charge the jury on murder in the first degree. Even if there were insufficient evidence of premeditation, the error would be rendered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury's verdict of murder in the second degree. Commonwealth v. Benoit, 389 Mass. 411, 429, 451 N.E.2d 101 (1983). Commonwealth v. Richard, 377 Mass. 64, 65-66, 384 N.E.2d 636 (1979). There was, however, adequate evidence of premeditation. In addition to evidence of the manner of death, there was evidence that the victim and the defendant had been quarreling, and that when the defendant saw the victim approaching with a pot of boiling water, he stepped into the bathroom, then stepped out, knocked the pot from her hand, and began choking her. The jury would have been warranted in finding that, despite the relatively short time that had elapsed, "a plan to murder was formed after the matter had been made a subject of deliberation and reflection." Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 494, 76 N.E. 127 (1905). See Commonwealth v. Palmariello, supra at 143-144; Commonwealth v. McInerney, supra, 373 Mass. at 153-154, 365 N.E.2d 815.

4. Corroboration of the Confession.

The defendant urges that we overrule our decisions that a conviction can be based solely on evidence of an extrajudicial confession by the accused. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 321 Mass. 290, 73 N.E.2d 468 (1947). See Commonwealth v. Fiore, 364 Mass. 819, 822, 308 N.E.2d 902 (1974); Commonwealth v. Machado, 339 Mass. 713, 716, 162 N.E.2d 71 (1959); Commonwealth v. DiStasio, 294 Mass. 273, 286, 1 N.E.2d 189 (1936), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 683, 58 S.Ct. 50, 82 L.Ed. 527 (1937); Commonwealth v. Zelenski, 287 Mass. 125, 129-130, 191 N.E. 355 (1934); Commonwealth v. Killion, 194 Mass. 153, 80 N.E. 222 (1907); Commonwealth v. Williams, 171 Mass. 461, 465 (1898); Commonwealth v. Shaheen, 15 Mass.App. 302, 307, 445 N.E.2d 619 (1983). In support of his argument the defendant asserts that the rule in all of the forty-nine other States is that an uncorroborated confession is insufficient to prove guilt. See State v. Curlew, 459 A.2d 160, 164 (Me.1983); Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1316 (1956). We note that, despite the impressive numbers, the majority rule has been criticized, and diluted, and the advantages of our flexible rule have been acknowledged. See, e.g., State v. Tillman, 152 Conn. 15, 18-20 & n. 2, 202 A.2d 494 (1964); State v. Pickard, 104 N.H. 11, 13, 177 A.2d 401 (1962); 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2070, at 510 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978). Nonetheless, the majority rule has much to commend it, in that it precludes the possibility of conviction of crime based solely on statements made by a person suffering a mental or emotional disturbance or some other aberration. We therefore agree with the defendant, and we hereby adopt the corroboration rule.

Although we have accepted his argument, the rule we have adopted is of no assistance to the defendant. The corroboration rule requires only that there be some evidence, besides the confession, that the criminal act was committed by someone, that is, that the crime was real and not imaginary. State v. Curlew, supra, 459 A.2d at 165. State v. Jones, 150 Me. 242, 246, 108 A.2d 261 (1954). The corroborating evidence need not point to the accused's identity as the doer of the crime. R. Perkins, Criminal Law 97-100 (2d ed. 1969). In its typical form, the corroboration rule requires that there be some evidence tending to establish the "corpus delicti," the strictness or liberality of the rule depending upon how "corpus delicti" is defined. It is usually defined to include not only the specific kind of loss or injury embraced in the crime charged (as death in a murder case), but also a criminal agency as the source of that loss or injury. 3 See, e.g., 7 J. Wigmore, supra § 2072, at 526, quoting Chief Justice Shaw's instructions in the Webster case (Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295 [1850] ), as reported by G. Bemis. However, according to Wigmore, the orthodox meaning of "corpus delicti" is merely the fact of the loss or injury sustained. Id. at 524. We think that, in light of the purpose of the corroboration rule, i.e., to guard against...

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