Com. v. Franklin
| Decision Date | 16 December 1970 |
| Citation | 265 N.E.2d 366,358 Mass. 416 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Roger L. FRANKLIN (and two companion cases between the same parties). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
James D. Ragland, Boston, for defendant.
Terence M. Troyer, Legal Asst. to the Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.
Before SPALDING, CUTTER, KIRK, SPIEGEL, REARDON, and QUIRICO, JJ.
The defendant was found guilty on two indictments charging unlawful possession of narcotic drugs (marihuana and LSD) and one charging unlawful possession of marihuana with intent to sell. We was tried in company with one Paul B. Curley, who was indicted for and found guilty of unlawful possession of marihuana, unlawful possession of marihuana with intent to sell, and operation of a motor vehicle without authority during suspension of his license. The cases are here under G.L. c. 278, §§ 33A--33G. Prior to trial the defendant filed with respect to each indictment a motion to dismiss, a motion to sever his trial from that of Curley, and a motion to suppress evidence seized in his apartment on the day of his arrest. These motions were denied. During the trial, and also after the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all indictments, he filed motions for directed verdicts and for the entry of verdicts of not guilty, which were denied. He now assigns as error the denial of his various motions.
The facts are these. At 10:20 A.M., January 9, 1969, Officer Mario A. Rizzo of the Massachusetts State police received information from the Suffolk County District Attorney's office that a gray Jaguar bearing New Hampshire license plates and driven by one 'Dave' was leaving Beacon Hill for apartment No. 511 at 888 Massachusetts Avenue in Cambridge, where the driver was to pick up a large quantity of marihuana. It is the defendant's contention that this information was based on a wiretap of the telephone of one Jerry Hafford during the period from December 18 through December 23, 1968, and from January 1 through January 9, 1969. Officer Rizzo and two other officers, Gianquitto and Towsey, left immediately for Cambridge. In the meantime Officer Alphonse T. Rheaume proceeded to the Third District Court of Eastern Middlesex where he prepared an affidavit in support of an application for a warrant to search apartment No. 511 at 888 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, detailing the substance of information in his possession and further reciting that events substantially as described below had in fact transpired according to this information. 1
Shortly after Officers Rizzo, Gianquitto and Towsey arrived in an unmarked car in the proximity of the Massachusetts Avenue address and parked, they observed a gray Jaguar with New Hampshire license plates pull up opposite No. 888 Massachusetts Avenue. The driver, later identified as Curley, took two suitcases out of the trunk of the car and entered No. 888 Massachusetts Avenue, coming out five minutes later to look up and down the street. He ree ntered the building, whereupon the defendant came out and made a motion toward the building. Curley then reappeared carrying two suitcases and a duffel bag, which he put in the trunk of the Jaguar. As he was driving away he was stopped by the police and arrested. The officers took the suitcases and duffel bag out of the trunk of the car and found that they contained what was subsequently determined to be thirty-one kilos of marihuana. Five or ten minutes later the defendant was observed walking along Massachusetts Avenue by Officer Rizzo, who ascertained from him his name and address and arreted him 'for conspiracy.' Records of the Cambridge police department show that the defendant's arrest took place at 11:50 A.M.
In the meantime, after Curley was removed to the police cruiser, a search was begun in apartment No. 511 at 888 Massachusetts Avenue. Officer Gianquitto testified that about four officers, including himself, 2 entered that apartment, and that he had a warrant with him. Officer Rizzo placed the time of his entrance into the apartment at five to ten minutes after the defendant's arrest. However, an assistant clerk of the Third District Court of Eastern Middlesex gave evidence that to the best if his recollection Officer Rheaume signed the affidavit and application for the warrant in his presence between 11:45 A.M. and 12:15 P.M. on January 9, after having been apprised by telephone of the events occurring at the site. In the apartment the officers found thirty-one kilos of marihuana in plastic-wrapped packages in a bathtub, as well as other drug paraphernalia and pills.
The basic contentions of the defendant center, with one exception, on the search of the apartment.
1. His first contention is that the search was improper because it was conducted without a warrant. He relies on the fact the Officer Rizzo testified at the hearing on the motions that he went into the building five or ten minutes after the defendant's arrest, or between 11:20 and 11:25 A.M., whereas the clerk who issued the warrant testified that he issued it sometime between 11:45 A.M. and 12:15 P.M. However, this was not the only evidence on this subject. There was Officer Gianquitto's testimony, which came in at the trial before the defendant first raised this argument on a motion to dismiss, that he and the other officers entered the premises with a warrant. In addition, Officer Rheaume, who obtained the warrant, was one of the men who searched the apartment and there is no evidence that he arrived after the search had begun. Nor would it seem likely that a group of policemen, aware of the consequences of conducting a search without a warrant, who had taken precautions to assure that one would be issued as soon as their tip was authenticated, and who were not faced with any emergency situation requiring immediate action, would nonetheless search the apartment without waiting for the arrival of the warrant.
The defendant's argument is based on the discrepancy in time between the estimates given by Officer Rizzo on when he first entered the apartment and by the clerk on when he issued the warrant. However, each estimate could easily be off by a number of minutes, which would account for the discrepancy in time to which the defendant calls our attention. In view of the strength of the prosecution's evidence directly on this issue, and the fact that the burden was on the defendant to prove that there was no warrant and that the evidence was therefore illegally seized (Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 305 Mass. 393, 400, 26 N.E.2d 235; Commonwealth v. Fancy, 349 Mass. 196, 202, 207 N.E.2d 276; Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 350 Mass. 459, 464, 215 N.E.2d 324; Commonwealth v. Coco, 254 Mass. 78, 79, 235 N.E.2d 555), the defendant's contention was properly rejected. All the evidence points to carefully planned and executed police work carried out properly in accordence with the mandates of G.L. c. 276.
2. The defendant further argues that the search was illegal because of the insufficiency of the affidavit supporting the warrant. He relies on G.L. c. 94, § 213, which authorizes the issuance of a warrant to search for narcotics upon a complaint that 'any narcotic drug * * * is kept or deposited by a person named therein' (emphasis supplied). It is his argument that all warrants for narcotics must comply with this statute rather than the general provisions of G.L. c. 276, §§ 1, 2, 2A, 2B, and 2C, and that since this affidavit in no way mentions the defendant's name as the occupant of the premises to be searched it is inadequate.
This argument is ingenious but not persuasive. The affidavit does not purport to be drawn under G.L. c. 94, § 213, but rather under the foregoing sections of c. 276. Those sections as they now stand came substantially into being by St.1964, c. 557, following Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723. The purpose of the Legislature was to incorporate as statutory requirements for affidavits those features which the court held in the Aguilar case to be constitutional requirements. Section 2C states that warrants issued pursuant to certain other provisions, including c. 94, § 213, must be issued as provided in G.L. c. 276, §§ 2, 2A and 2B, 'in so far as they are applicable.' Since it states no more than what is constitutionally required, it is clear that the above sections of c. 276, are applicable to all warrants, including those brought under provisions not mentioned in § 2C. See Commonwealth v. Pope, 354 Mass. 625, 627, 241 N.E.2d 848 ().
However, the converse proposition--that the requirements of G.L. c. 94, § 213, apply across the board to all warrants issued in narcotics cases--is not sound. General Laws c. 94, § 213, was enacted well before the 1964 amendments of c. 276. It authorizes a warrant to issue on the mere statement by the affiant 'that he has reason to believe that any narcotic drug * * * is kept * * *.' Prior to 1964 it was employed in precisely this fashion. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 350 Mass. 459, 215 N.E.2d 324. The requirement that a person be named is only reasonable when no statement of underlying facts or circumstances is required. However, it would be highly unreasonable, and certainly not in accord with the intention of the Legislature, to carry over the requirement that a person be named in...
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