Com. v. Gibbs
| Decision Date | 13 April 1989 |
| Parties | , 57 USLW 2496 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Barry GIBBS, Appellant. . Re |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Ronald M. Bugaj, Honesdale, Barry Gibbs, I.P.P., for appellant.
Michael E. Weinstein, Matamoras, for appellee.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and STOUT, JJ.
This case involves the imposition of a death sentence. The Appellant alleges seventeen errors below. We conclude on one issue that his right to request an attorney pursuant to the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and its progeny was impaired by the authorities and his subsequent statements were admitted improperly into evidence. For this reason, we order a new trial following automatic review by this Court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h), (i).
Appellant was convicted in the shooting death of a security guard. Evidence at the guilt stage of the trial demonstrated that a co-defendant had hired Appellant to kill her husband. The shooting, however, actually resulted in the death of a co-worker guard for which Appellant and several others were arrested two days later. The following testimony relevant to this opinion was given by the State Police Trooper describing his administering of the Miranda warnings:
Q. O.K. Can you continue? Just tell us what happened when you first started the interview.
A. O.K. I read the Miranda warnings to him. He indicated that he understood. At that particular point he then asked or he made the statement, I responded by telling him,
THE COURT: I might note that the last statement of the witness was done without reading from the paper.
A. I don't really understand.
BY MR. GUCCINI:
Q. O.K. Continue.
A. O.K. Then Corporal Hague also told him that this was strictly up to him, and that he was there, he knew what happened, and he was the only one that was not family, and he had to make the decision himself on what he should do. All right. And referring to the paper, he signed the waiver at 12:05. (Reproduced Record at pp. 333-334.)
Our decision narrowly focuses on the issue of whether the Trooper's response that "the only thing is I would tell the District Attorney you cooperated for whatever good that would be" constituted an impermissible misleading inducement to the Appellant not to pursue further his ambiguous and equivocal inquiry regarding the presence of an attorney. Our recent opinion in Commonwealth v. Hubble, 509 Pa. 497, 504 A.2d 168 (1986), (per Larsen, J., with two Justices concurring, one Justice concurring specially, and one Justice concurring in part), provides the basis of our disposition of this case.
In Hubble, the Appellee and his wife voluntarily went to the State Police Barracks where Miranda rights were given by the police. At that time, the wife suggested to her husband that he get a lawyer, following which the Appellee stated to the police, "I want a lawyer," and "I want a public defender." The police thereupon encouraged and aided Hubble unsuccessfully to telephone an attorney. At his request, they also succeeded in contacting his probation officer who, likewise, advised Appellee to find a lawyer. The facts showed that the police advised him that a public defender might not come to the police barracks, while they still continued to urge him to call the public defender. Appellee and his wife then put on their coats, proceeded towards an exit, but after conferring at length and being told that the police now had information placing him at the scene of the crime, Hubble returned to give an inculpatory statement.
In an appeal of the use at trial of the admission, we held in Hubble, first, that Appellee's utterances regarding an attorney were too imprecise to trigger the prophylactic rule barring further police interrogation as required by Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), reh'g. denied, 452 U.S. 973, 101 S.Ct. 3128, 69 L.Ed.2d 984 (1981): "To hold that every utterance of the word 'lawyer' automatically" invokes Edwards "would be far too rigid and would not serve the interests of justice." We also concluded, secondly, that Appellee was not misled by the erroneous police statement regarding the public defender. We then included Appellee's utterances within the totality of circumstances test of Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983), which holds that where a suspect rather than the police initiates further conversation, the evidence is not suppressed automatically under Edwards. We buttressed this last conclusion by noting as well that even if the initial admission had been infirm, Hubble voluntarily gave statements later which in any case cured any original defect. We stressed the fact the police "scrupulously honored" Hubble's equivocal statement regarding the need for a lawyer by helping him look up an attorney's telephone number and providing him with a telephone. Finally, in Hubble we made a crucial finding that the suspect was not misled by the erroneous police statement that the public defender would not travel to the barracks, and we reiterated that conclusion in our opinion. Hubble 509 Pa. at 511, 504 A.2d at 173 and 175. We emphasize the absence of any misleading act because it is readily apparent that an opposite finding in Hubble would have resulted in a different outcome.
In the present case under review, we hold that the statement by the authorities to Griggs was an impermissible inducement and thereby tainted his admissions. By conveying the distinct impression that the district attorney would be told of his cooperation in giving a confession on the spot, there occurred an inescapable inducement which cannot be condoned under our law. For while we recognize that the police have a legitimate responsibility to conduct investigations, including interrogations, criminal suspects have a constitutional right to make up their own minds as to whether they want the Miranda protections. ...
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