Com. v. Graves

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: Before JONES; NIX; EAGEN, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which JONES, C.J., and O'BRIEN; EAGEN; JONES, C.J. and O'BRIEN
• Citation: 334 A.2d 661,461 Pa. 118
• Decision Date: 18 March 1975
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Daniel Lee GRAVES, Appellant.

Page 661

334 A.2d 661 461 Pa. 118 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania
v.
Daniel Lee GRAVES, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. March 18, 1975.

[461 Pa. 120] James C. Hogan, Easton, for appellant.

Charles H. Spaziani, Dist. Atty., John E. Gallagher, 1st Asst. Dist. Atty., Easton, for appellee.

Page 662

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION

NIX, Justice.

Daniel Lee Graves was convicted by a jury in Northampton County for first degree murder, robbery and burglary. After denial of post-trial motions and the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment under the murder indictment, this appeal was filed. ¹

On September 28, 1971, Daniel Graves, appellant, and his cousins, Thomas and Edward Mathis, pursuant to a prior conceived plan, burglarized the residence of one Sebastiano Patiri, a 75 year old man and robbed him. During the course of the robbery and burglary, Mr. Patiri sustained injuries which resulted in his death.

Appellant Graves testified at trial that on the day of the incident he consumed a quart or more of wine and had taken a pill which was a form of Lysergic Acid Diephylanide (LSD). Appellant testified that he began hallucinating and saw 'cars jumping over each other', as well as other strange phenomena. He then became unconscious and suffered limited amnesia, thus he contended that he had no recollection of the occurrence at the Patiri home.

The defense called a Dr. Sadoff, a professional psychiatrist who testified that he initially saw Graves on February 29, 1972, and then again on May 16th of that year. As a result of this examination and evaluation, which included[461 Pa. 121] a polygraph and a sodium amytal test, he determined that Graves was telling the truth when he stated that he was under the influence of the wine and the LSD tablets during the afternoon of September 28, 1971. The doctor testified that in his opinion, appellant was under the influence of the two intoxicants and at the time of the Patiri attack 'his mind was such that he wasn't able to form the proper conscious intent to take a life, to assault.' Defense counsel then attempted to elicit from the doctor an opinion as to whether or not Graves at the time of the incident 'could consciously form the specific intent to take or steal from a person or individual.' An objection to this question was sustained and this ruling is assigned as error. Concomitantly, it is argued that the trial court erred in refusing a request to charge the jury that if they found Graves incapable of forming the intent to commit burglary or robbery because of the consumption of wine or the ingestion of the drug, or both, he could not be guilty of these offenses. ²

Relying on this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Tarver, 446 Pa. 233, 284 A.2d 759 (1971), the trial court concluded that evidence of intoxication was irrelevant as to the robbery and burglary charges. Regrettably, although the trial court was adhering to a pronouncement of this Court, this ruling was erroneous and the judgments of sentence must now be reversed.

In Commonwealth v. Tarver, Supra, this Court stated:

'If the charge is Felonious homicide, intoxication, which is so great as to render the accused incapable of forming a wilful, deliberate and premeditated design to kill or incapable of judging his acts and their consequences, may properly influence a finding by the trial court that no specific intent to kill existed, and hence to conclude the killing was murder in the second degree. See Commonwealth v. Ingram, supra, 440 Pa. [461 Pa. 122] 239, 270

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A.2d 190, and Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 50 A.2d 317 (1947). Although it is clear that this Court has employed the aforementioned rule to Lower the degree of guilt within a crime, the crime still remains at murder. This Court has never extended the rule to lower murder in the second degree to voluntary manslaughter, not has it applied this principle to any other crime outside of Felonious homicide. Thus, exemplifying the fact that the rule has never been applied where its effect would change the nature of the crime, we have always limited its application to changing degrees within a crime. See Commonwealth v. Ingram, supra; Commonwealth v. Brown, 436 Pa. 423, 260 A.2d 742 (1970); Commonwealth v. Walters, 431 Pa. 74, 244 A.2d 757 (1968); Commonwealth v. McCausland, 348 Pa. 275, 35 A.2d 70 (1944); Commonwealth v. Walker, 283 Pa. 468, 129 A. 453 (1925). Since there are no analogous degrees of robbery, the principle has no application and defendant's acts are a felony, notwithstanding his alleged intoxication.' Id. at 239--240, 284 A.2d at 762. (Footnote omitted) (Emphasis in original).

In reaching its conclusion that evidence of intoxication is limited to reducing the degree within a crime and may not be introduced to change the nature of the crime, the Tarver Court clearly misconceived the underlining basis for the relevance of evidence of intoxication in criminal matters. It is fundamental law in this jurisdiction that voluntary intoxication neither exonerates nor excuses criminal conduct. Commonwealth v. Ingram, 440 Pa. 239, 270 A.2d 190 (1970); Commonwealth v. Brabham, 433 Pa. 491, 252 A.2d 378 (1969); Commonwealth v. Reid, 432 Pa. 319, 247 A.2d 783 (1968); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 862, 70 S.Ct. 96, 94 L.Ed. 528 reh. denied, 338 U.S. 888, 70 S.Ct. 181, 94 L.Ed. 546. The only permissible probative value evidence of intoxication[461 Pa. 123] may have in criminal proceedings is where it is relevant to the question of the capacity of the actor to have possessed the requisite intent of the crime charged. Where the legislature, in its definition of a crime, has designated a particular state of mind as a material element of the crime, evidence of intoxication becomes relevant if the degree of inebriation has reached that point where the mind was incapable of attaining the state of mind required. It must be emphasized that although evidence of intoxication never provides a basis for exoneration or excuse, it may in some instances be relevant to establish that the crime charged in fact did not occur. ³

Rejecting the view that an evidentiary rule relating to the introduction of evidence of intoxication must be strictly construed to avoid condoning voluntarily induced intoxication, most text writers have recognized the issue as being whether the crime in fact has been committed and considered the question accordingly:

'Where a particular purpose, motive, or intent is a necessary element to constitute the particular kind or degree of crime, it is proper to consider the mental condition of accused, although produced

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by voluntary intoxication, and, where he lacked the mental capacity to entertain the requisite purpose, motive, or intent, such incapacity may constitute a valid defense to the [461 Pa. 124] particular crime charged, and the same rule applies to voluntary intoxication resulting in mental incapacity to indulge premeditation or deliberation, which precludes conviction of an offense wherein premeditation is essential,

The majority rule, holding intoxication to an extent precluding capacity to entertain a specific intent or to premeditate to be a defense, does so not because drunkenness excuses crime, but because, if the mental status required by law to constitute crime be one of specific intent or of deliberation and premeditation, and drunkenness excludes the existence of such mental state, then the particular crime charged has not in fact been committed.

Where a specific intent is an ingredient of the crime charged, the fact that accused's drunkenness is voluntary does not render the defense of intoxication incompetent, since the intent to become intoxicated does...