Com. v. Green

• Decision Date: 25 April 1980
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Raynard GREEN, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 651

413 A.2d 651

488 Pa. 611

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Raynard GREEN, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 3, 1980.

Decided April 25, 1980.

[488 Pa. 613] Jay S. Nedell, Erie, for appellant.

Michael J. Veshecco, Dist. Atty., Shad Connelly, Asst. Dist. Atty., Erie, for appellee.

Before EAGEN, C. J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY and KAUFFMAN, JJ.

OPINION

LARSEN, Justice.

On April 25, 1978, appellant Raynard Green entered the Erie County residence of eighty-seven year old Harriet Mikielski. After emptying the contents of the kitchen drawers on the floor, he realized that Mrs. Mikielski was in the next room and had observed his activities. In order to prevent Mrs. Mikielski from later identifying him for the police, appellant struck her in the face with what the Commonwealth theorizes was an isometric exercise machine. This single blow was inflicted with such force that it caused almost immediate death.

Appellant was tried by a jury and found guilty of murder of the first degree and burglary. Following the denial of post-verdict motions, appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction and five to ten years imprisonment on the burglary conviction, the sentences to run consecutively. Appellant now appeals directly to this Court.

Appellant's first contention is that the trial court abused its discretion in consolidating for trial the information charging burglary with the information charging murder of the first degree. Appellant, however, does not advance a single valid reason to support his allegation that the consolidation was prejudicial or improper, ¹ and the Commonwealth correctly points out that the charges are interrelated and arose out of what was clearly one criminal episode. Under such circumstances, this Court will not disturb the trial court's ruling with respect to the consolidation of separate informations. Commonwealth v. Hill, 479 Pa. 346, 388 A.2d 689 (1978).

Appellant's next two contentions concern the introduction of four photographs into evidence. The first of these photographs was a recent snapshot of the victim sitting on a couch next to her daughter and grandchildren. The other three photographs were police photographs; one depicting a blood-stained curtain found near the victim's body, one depicting blood spots and stains on the wall above the victim's head, and the last photograph depicting the position of only the lower portion of the victim's body. Appellant asserts that these photographs lacked relevancy and were prejudicial and likely to inflame the passions of the jury. We disagree.

Appellant's version of the incident was that the victim came to the doorway between the kitchen and the living room and was observing him routing through the contents of her kitchen drawers. When appellant noticed her, she attempted to flee. Appellant pursued the victim and caught her in the living room where he struck her with his fists and she fell back onto the sofa. Appellant then "lost it", and the next thing he recalls is placing a covering over the victim's face because it was "a bloody mess." The Commonwealth's version, on the other hand, was that appellant never struck the victim with his fist, and that the victim, who was eighty-seven years of age, could not have attempted to flee and perhaps never arose from the sofa. Further, the Commonwealth theorized that appellant was at all times aware of his actions, and that he used a "bullworker", the victim's grandson's isometric exercise bar, to inflict the fatal wound and carefully wiped the blood off of it and onto the curtain next to the sofa. This was consistent with the pathologist's testimony that only one blow was struck and, because it splintered all of the bones in the victim's face, it was not the type of blow that could be struck with a naked fist.

The photographs in question also corroborate and support the Commonwealth's version of the circumstances surrounding the homicide. The photographs of the victim, the blood on the wall above the sofa, and the position of the body indicated that the victim did not arise from the sofa and was sitting there helplessly when the bone-crushing blow was inflicted. Further, the photograph of the curtain explains why the police were unable to find identifiable traces of blood on the "bullworker". These pictures were, therefore, clearly relevant to the issues presented at trial and, since even the photograph of the corpse did not depict the victim's crushed face, there is nothing excessively gruesome or inflammatory about the photographs. It was thus not error to admit them into evidence. ² Commonwealth v. Petrakovich, 459 Pa. 511, 329 A.2d 844 (1974).

Next, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting statements made by him prior to the homicide which concerned the sale and use of marijuana and cocaine. These statements came into evidence through the testimony of a thirteen year old boy and his mother. They testified that less than one hour before the homicide, appellant approached the boy and two other children on the street and asked them which houses on their newspaper routes had televisions, stereos, and sofas; how old their mothers were; whether their fathers were home; and whether the children would like to earn some money selling marijuana and cocaine. This frightened the child so that he ran home and related the incident to his mother who, in turn, called the police. The child then assisted the police in apprehending appellant by showing them where appellant lived and identifying property found at the scene of the murder as being in appellant's possession at the time of their conversations.

Appellant argues that this testimony concerning a solicitation to commit drug offenses should have been excluded under the general rule that evidence of the commission of offenses not charged in the information is not admissible. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Fuller, 479 Pa. 353, 388 A.2d 693 (1978). While this is in fact the general rule, there is also:

" . . . the equally well established principle that evidence of other crimes is admissible when it tends to prove a common scheme, plan or design embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to...