Com. v. Griffith

• Decision Date: 02 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 1315 MDA 2008,1315 MDA 2008
• Citation: 2009 PA Super 120,985 A.2d 230
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Michelle Necole GRIFFITH, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

985 A.2d 230

2009 PA Super 120

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Michelle Necole GRIFFITH, Appellant.

No. 1315 MDA 2008

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted February 2, 2009.

Filed July 2, 2009.

Reargument Denied September 11, 2009.

Jill M. Scheidt, Wyomissing, for appellant.

Alisa R. Hobart, Asst. Dist. Atty., Reading, for the Com., appellee.

BEFORE: LALLY-GREEN, BENDER, JJ. and McEWEN, P.J.E.

OPINION BY BENDER, J.:

¶ 1 Michelle Necole Griffith appeals the judgment of sentence imposed following her conviction of Driving Under the Influence of a Controlled Substance. 75 Pa. C.S. § 3802(d)(2). Griffith contends that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress prescription medication seized from the defendant's car after police transported her to a local hospital for blood testing. Griffith also asserts that the evidence adduced at trial was not sufficient to sustain a conviction under section 3802(d)(2), as the Commonwealth did not introduce expert testimony to establish that the medications found in her bloodstream could have impaired her ability to drive safely. Upon review, we concur in Griffith's conclusion that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain her conviction under section 3802(d)(2). Accordingly, we reverse said conviction, vacate the judgment of sentence, and remand this matter for re-sentencing.

¶ 2 The trial court, sitting as finder of fact, related the salient facts of this case as follows:

On May 5, 2006, at approximately 3:00 p.m. Officer William Dillman of the North Berks Regional Police Department was dispatched to investigate an orange Mitsubishi Eclipse that was driving recklessly. Officer Dillman located the orange Mitsubishi Eclipse in the parking lot of Penn Biomedical Support, Inc. The driver of the vehicle was identified as Michelle Necole Griffith, the Defendant. Officer Dillman immediately recognized the Defendant from prior contacts and personally knew that her driver's license was suspended.

Sergeant David Reichlein arrived on scene to assist Officer Dillman with the traffic stop of the Defendant. Sergeant Reichlein also immediately recognized the Defendant from prior contacts. Officer Dillman placed the Defendant under arrest for driving under the influence based on his observations of the Defendant and her performance during field sobriety testing, as well as information he had received from a complainant pertaining to the Defendant's extremely erratic driving.

After being advised of her rights, the defendant admitted to taking one medically prescribed Soma earlier in the day. Soma is also known as Carisoprodol. Prior to being placed in the back of the police vehicle for transport to St. Joseph's Medical Center the Defendant asked the officers to take care of her dog, which had been sitting in her vehicle during the encounter. The officers agreed and the Defendant gave Sergeant Reichlein her keys so he could run the air conditioning for the dog.

The Defendant was then transported to Saint Joseph's Medical Center where, after being advised of her rights, she consented to have a legal blood sample drawn for chemical testing purposes. After the Defendant was transported from the scene Sergeant Reichlein entered the Defendant's vehicle to run the air conditioning for the Defendant's dog.

Upon entering the Defendant's vehicle, Sergeant Reichlein observed what he immediately recognized to be prescription pill bottles in the open center console. Sergeant Reichlein picked up the prescription bottles and read the prescription label that stated the pills were Carisoprodol, also known as Soma, and they were prescribed to the Defendant. Sergeant Reichlein seized all the prescription bottles and turned them over to Officer Dillman. Officer Dillman then called Saint Joseph's Medical Center six (6) times. During the fourth call Officer Dillman informed the lab that the prescription seized from the Defendant's vehicle was Carisoprodol. Due to the nature of the standard chemical testing, Carisoprodol is not regularly screened for and must be specifically tested for in order to determine its presence. Officer Dillman specifically requested Saint Joseph's test for Carisoprodol during his fourth call. The Defendant's blood contained 220 ng/ml of Nordiazepam.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/29/08, at 3-4.

¶ 3 Following her arrest, the Commonwealth charged Griffith with driving under the influence of a controlled substance, reckless driving, careless driving, driving on roadways laned for traffic, and driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked. Following a preliminary hearing, Griffith filed a motion to suppress the pill bottles seized from the console of her car as well as the results of the blood test that police requested after the seizure, which verified the presence of Diazepam and Nordiazepam in Griffith's blood. The trial court denied Griffith's motion and, on March 7, 2007, convened a non-jury trial. At trial, both counsel stipulated the presence of the foregoing medications in Griffith's blood at therapeutic levels. In addition, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Teresa Franke, the motorist who had alerted the police to Griffith's driving, and William H. Dillman, the officer who conducted the stop. Following the completion of the Commonwealth's case, Griffith elected not to testify and presented no other evidence. The court then found Griffith guilty as charged and deferred sentencing pending preparation of an updated pre-sentence report. Thereafter, the court imposed a sentence of ninety days' to five years' imprisonment for driving under the influence of a controlled substance, and a concurrent term of sixty to ninety days' imprisonment for driving under suspension—DUI related. Griffith did not file a post sentence motion. Griffith has now filed this appeal, raising the following questions for our review:

A. Whether evidence of prescription pain medication obtained by police should have been suppressed when the same was obtained by way of unlawful search and seizure?

B. Whether the results of Appellant's blood sample should have been suppressed, when said results were tainted by and [a] result of the unlawful search and seizure described above?

C. Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate all elements of the crimes for which Appellant was convicted, particularly 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3802(D)(2), given the fact that no qualified or competent testimony was offered to demonstrate that the prescription drugs possessed by Appellant, which were schedule IV prescription medications, had any effect on her ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle?

Brief for Appellant at 5 (capitalization minimized to improve readability).

¶ 4 Before proceeding with the merits of Griffith's claims, we observe that her third question, which challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her DUI conviction, is potentially dispositive of this appeal. Regardless of whether the evidence was unlawfully obtained, as Griffith argues in support of her first and second questions, a finding that that same evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction she challenges would obviate any need to review the trial court's suppression order. Accordingly, we commence our review with the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence asserted in Griffith's third question. Brief for Appellant at 17.

¶ 5 As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims requires that we evaluate the record "in the light most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (2000).

"Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt." Nevertheless, "the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty," and may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Significantly, "[we] may not substitute [our] judgment for that of the factfinder; if the record contains support for the convictions they may not be disturbed."

Commonwealth v. Brewer, 876 A.2d 1029, 1032 (Pa.Super.2005) (citations omitted). So long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant's crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, his convictions will be upheld. See Brewer, 876 A.2d at 1032. Any doubt about the defendant's guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. See Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 582 (Pa.Super.2001).

¶ 6 The conviction challenges arose from application of the specific requirements of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2), and may be affirmed only to the extent that the evidence adduced established beyond a reasonable doubt that her conduct was proscribed by its provisions. Section 3802(d) defines the circumstances under which an individual who has consumed controlled substances alone or in combination or in combination with alcohol may not operate a motor vehicle. That section provides as follows:

§ 3802. Driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance

* * * *

(d) Controlled substances.—An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle under any of the following circumstances:

(1) There is in the individual's blood any amount of a:

(i) Schedule I controlled substance, as defined in the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act;

(ii) Schedule II or Schedule III controlled substance, as defined in The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, which has not been...