Com. v. Gustafsson

• Citation: 346 N.E.2d 706,370 Mass. 181
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Evert GUSTAFSSON.
• Decision Date: 27 April 1976
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 706

346 N.E.2d 706

370 Mass. 181

COMMONWEALTH

v. Evert GUSTAFSSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 3, 1975.

Decided April 27, 1976.

Piroska E. Soos, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Paula W. Gold, Asst. Atty. Gen., with him) for the Commonwealth.

Thomas F. Quinn, Plymouth and Donald J. Correa, Framingham, for defendant.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and QUIRICO, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

The Attorney General in the name of the Commonwealth commenced this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against Evert Gustafsson, a mobile home park owner in Plymouth, Massachusetts. In its complaint and its amended complaint, the Commonwealth sought an adjudication that certain of Gustafsson's rules and practices constituted 'unfair and deceptive trade practices' in violation of G.L. c. 140, §§ 32J--32Q, as appearing in St.1973, c. 1007, §§ 1, 2 (hereinafter referred to as the mobile home statute). Of the many rules and practices challenged below, the only ones before us on appeal are Gustafsson's rule prohibiting mobile home park tenants from displaying 'For Sale' signs in front of their mobile homes, Gustafsson's sign at the entrance to the park directing prospective mobile home purchasers to his office, ¹ and his rule which states in part that '(m)anagement recognizes a tenant's right to sell his mobile home on the lot, if current legislation is upheld in the Courts.' In response to the plaintiff's claims, Gustafsson denied that his actions were unlawful and challenged the constitutionality of certain sections of the mobile home statute.

After a two day trial in June, 1974, a Superior Court judge entered 'Findings, Rulings and Order for Judgment' on September 6, 1974. Subsequently, he revoked his initial order so as to permit reargument in light of this court's decision in COMMONWEALTH V. DECOTIS, --- MASS. ---, 316 N.E.2D 748 (1974)^A, decided September 12, 1974, and issued a second decision revising the prior order on December 19, 1974. Included in the judgment entered below were rulings that G.L. c. 140, § 32J (which restricts a park owner's right to evict tenants), and § 32M (which requires the park owner to rent to a tenant's prospective buyer if the buyer meets the current rules of the park) constitute an unconstitutional taking of property without due process; that so much of § 32P as requires disclosure of the provisions of §§ 32J and 32M is unconstitutional; and that Gustafsson's park rules and practices outlined above do not violate the mobile home statute. In addition, the trial judge reversed his prior rulings declaring unconstitutional § 32L, cls. 1 and 6, (which render unenforceable park rules which are 'unreasonable, unfair, or unconscionable' and rules or conditions of occupancy which are 'unfair and deceptive') and concluded that, in view of DeCotis, these subsections of § 32L were not unconstitutionally vague.

On February 20, 1975, the Commonwealth filed notice of appeal, and the case is now before this court after allowance of Gustafsson's application for direct appellate review.

The facts which gave rise to this controversy are as follows. Gustafsson is the owner and operator of a mobile home park known as Plymouth Mobile Estates. The park, which he has owned since 1962, consists of seventy acres, only thirty of which have been developed. At the time of trial, nearly 136 lots had been completed, and there were plans to develop seventy more lots and a recreation facility on the remaining land. Most of the tenants in Gustafsson's park are elderly, living on fixed incomes. They own their mobile homes, but rent their lots from Gustafsson for a monthly fee of $50.

In addition to running the park, Gustafsson operates a mobile home sales dealership. In this capacity, he purchases new mobile homes at wholesale and resells them to his tenants and others, usually at a profit of about $4,000. He also has purchased and resold several secondhand mobile homes.

Prior to the passage of the mobile home statute, the tenants in Gustafsson's park were tenants at will on a month-to-month basis, and, although there were no leases, written rules and regulations had been promulgated by Gustafsson, including a rule that a mobile home owner could not sell his home on the lot. Gustafsson considered this his most important rule, since it enabled him to 'keep the park up to date' and often gave him additional income. As a result of this rule, a tenant could sell his home to a buyer who had another place to put the home, sell it directly to Gustafsson, or sell it to a dealer who would in turn pay Gustafsson a commission of $100--$200 to hold the space until the dealer sold a new home for the lot.

After the passage of the mobile home statute, St.1973, c. 1007, which became effective in February, 1974, Gustafsson sent to each tenant a copy of a lease and new rules and regulations for the park. The new rules, like the prior ones, included a prohibition against displaying any business or advertising signs, including 'For Sale' signs. Pursuant to this rule, eviction notices were sent to three tenants who had posted 'For Sale' signs in front of their mobile homes. At the time of trial, several of these tenants had sold their homes, but no one had been evicted. In addition, Gustafsson posted a sign at the entrance to the park, see note 1 supra, directing prospective purchasers to his office, and established a new rule (Rule 25) acknowledging a tenant's right to sell his home on the lot 'if current legislation is upheld. . . .'

On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that Gustafsson's rule prohibiting 'For Sale' signs, and Rule 25, by interfering with a tenant's right to sell his home on the lot, are 'unreasonable, unfair, or unconscionable' in contravention of G.L. c. 140, § 32L, cl. 1, and as such constitute an 'unfair and deceptive trade practice' under G.L. c. 93A, § 2(a), the enforcement mechanism provided for in c. 140, § 32L, cl. 7. Further, the Commonwealth asserts that Gustafsson's sign is an 'unfair and deceptive trade practice' in violation of the mobile home statute, since this sign inhibits a tenant's right to sell his home on the lot. Before we turn to these claims under the statute, we first must consider the trial judge's rulings as to the constitutionality of certain sections of the mobile home statute.

We believe that it was incorrect for the trial judge to rule on the constitutionality of G.L. c. 140, § 32J, ² which pertains to evictions, and § 32P, which requires disclosure of the terms and conditions of occupancy. These sections are not material to the instant case, and we need not consider their constitutionality in order to determine the rights of the parties. It is well settled that '(p)arties are not entitled to decisions upon abstract propositions of law unrelated to some live controversy.' Cole v. Chief of Police of Fall River, 312 Mass. 523, 526, 45 N.E.2d 400, 401 (1942). Courts will not decide constitutional questions until the necessity for such a ruling arises in the record before the court. Id. at 526, 45 N.E.2d 400. There is no such necessity in the present case, for the record before us does not call into question the validity of §§ 32J and 32P. ³ Accordingly, we conclude that the portion of the judgment below which passes on their constitutionality must be vacated.

On the other hand, we do not agree with the Commonwealth's claim that we are precluded from considering Gustafsson's argument that § 32L, cls. 1 and 6, are unconstitutionally vague. According to the Commonwealth, we are foreclosed from considering the constitutionality of these subsections as a result of Gustafsson's failure to appeal from the trial judge's ruling that § 32L, cls. 1 and 6, are not impermissibly vague. Although a party may not, without appealing, attack a judgment with a view to enlarging his rights hereunder, a party may support a claim or judgment allowed below by urging the validity of a theory or an argument rejected by the lower court as a basis for its decision. United States v. American Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435--436, 44 S.Ct. 560, 68 L.Ed. 1087 (1924). In the present case, Gustafsson does not attack the judgment below but only seeks to sustain it on the basis of a theory that was rejected by the trial judge, namely, that the standards set forth in § 32L, cls. 1 and 6, are unconstitutionally vague.

Although we conclude that the constitutionality of § 32L, cls. 1 and 6, is properly before us, we do not agree with Gustafsson's contention that these subsections are so indefinite and vague as to offend the due process clause. Gustafsson argues that the language in § 32L, cls. 1 and 6, set forth below, ⁴ is so subjective that a person lacks sufficient notice as to what conduct is forbidden under the law. Section 32L, cl. 7, which provides that failure to comply with § 32L constitutes 'an unfair and deceptive trade practice' under c. 93A, § 2(a), is not challenged by the defendant, for he concedes that these words are adequately clear in light of the existing body of interpretative law.

We note initially that the due process clause does not require great exactitude of statutes which regulate business activities. See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). Regulation of trade practices must be in broad terms in order to prevent circumvention of statutory purposes by 'new and ingenious ways that were unknown when the (statute was) enacted.' Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 258 F. 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1919) (rejecting the claim that the Federal Trade Commission Act is unconstitutionally vague). Therefore, the meaning and application of terms 'must be arrived at by . . . 'the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. " Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648, 51 S.Ct. 587, 590, 75 L.Ed. 1324 (1931), quoted in Federal Trade Comm'n v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304,...