Com. v. Hall

• Decision Date: 15 March 1989
• Citation: 382 Pa.Super. 6,554 A.2d 919
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Earl Joseph HALL, Jr., Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 919

554 A.2d 919

382 Pa.Super. 6

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Earl Joseph HALL, Jr., Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 9, 1988.

Filed Jan. 20, 1989.

Reargument Denied March 15, 1989.

Leonard J. Frawley, Jr., Towanda, for appellant.

Mark Smith, Asst. Dist. Atty., Towanda, for Com.

Before BECK, KELLY and HESTER, JJ.

HESTER, Judge:

On September 19, 1985, appellant, Earl Joseph Hall, Jr., was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, robbery and kidnapping. On September 4, 1987, judgment of sentence of life imprisonment was imposed on the first-degree murder convictions and a consecutive sentence of ten to twenty-five years imprisonment was imposed on the robbery and the kidnapping convictions. This appeal followed denial of appellant's post-trial motions and of his motion to modify sentence. Rejecting all fourteen of appellant's assignments of error, we affirm.

The facts may be summarized as follows. On October 29, 1984, appellant became acquainted with Joseph McCall, the victim, while drinking at the Lehigh Tavern in Sayre, Pennsylvania. Appellant's friend, Paul Arnold, was also drinking at the bar, and the three began to converse. McCall indicated that he wanted some marijuana, and appellant and Arnold left, obtained the substance and returned to the bar. Appellant invited the other men to a marijuana party, and the three smoked the marijuana together while Arnold drove toward the party. Arnold stopped the car in an isolated area in order to perform a private function. As he performed this task, appellant dragged McCall from the car and began beating him severely. Appellant then picked up a large rock, and lifting it over his head, threw it down on the victim's head, killing him. ¹ Later, Arnold helped appellant dispose of the body. Money was taken from the victim.

McCall's body was discovered the following day. He was identified by the bartender at Lehigh Tavern, Ruth Schoonover, who described both Arnold and appellant to the police. Schoonover knew appellant, an area resident, prior to the incident in question. Police immediately located Arnold, who related the events of the previous evening. Police apprehended appellant on October 31, 1984.

Arnold was later tried and acquitted of robbery and murder, but was convicted of tampering with evidence due to his admissions to aiding appellant in disposing of McCall's body.

Both Arnold and Schoonover testified against appellant at the trial, as did George Johnson, a friend of appellant's. Johnson testified that he was drinking with appellant at a bar, when appellant confessed to killing McCall.

The first five of appellant's issues relate to the validity of a search warrant that the police obtained in order to seize the clothing that appellant was wearing at the time he was arrested and taken into custody.

While appellant vigorously attacks the validity of the search warrant on five grounds, the fact remains that the warrant was entirely unnecessary. Appellant was incarcerated on charges of murder and robbery when police seized the clothing. Police may constitutionally seize a prisoner's clothing following arrest and detention without obtaining a search warrant. This issue was discussed extensively in Commonwealth v. Aljoe, 420 Pa. 198, 216 A.2d 50 (1966), where the defendant challenged the constitutionality of police actions when they seized his trousers following his arrest. A subsequent analysis revealed that they contained brain tissue. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:

Defendant's trousers were taken (without objection) and examined for the purpose of identifying him with the slaying of Conway. Such a procedure or practice is similar to seizing any articles, instruments, fruits and other evidence of crime and similar to the Commonwealth's right to fingerprint an accused or compel him to stand in a police lineup. Such procedures and practices and tests may result in freeing an innocent man accused of crime, or may be part of a chain of facts and circumstances which help identify a person accused of a crime or connect a suspect or an accused with the crime of which he has been suspected or has been accused. The law is well settled that such actions, practices and procedures do not violate any constitutional right....

....

Defendant does not allege that his arrest was other than valid and lawful. A search and seizure incident to a valid and lawful arrest is not unreasonable and violates no constitutional guarantees. In such circumstances, officers " * * * when making a lawful arrest with or without a search warrant may discover and seize any evidence, articles or fruits of crime found upon the prisoner or upon the premises under his control at the time of his lawful arrest."

Id., 420 Pa. at 202-03, 216 A.2d at 52-53 (citations omitted); accord Commonwealth v. Bundy, 458 Pa. 240, 328 A.2d 517 (1974) (police could validly seize defendant's coat following his lawful arrest without violating any constitutional provisions); Commonwealth v. Mason, 327 Pa.Super. 520, 539, 476 A.2d 389, 398 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 507 Pa. 396, 490 A.2d 421 (1985) ("The law is clear that where a defendant is in lawful custody of police as a result of a lawful arrest, ... the police are entitled to seize articles of clothing from the defendant which might possibly be used as evidence."); see also Commonwealth v. Cope, 359 Pa.Super. 140, 518 A.2d 819 (1986).

The United States Supreme Court later analyzed the issue and came to the same conclusion reached by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Aljoe. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974). Edwards was legally arrested, incarcerated, and his clothing seized ten hours later without the use of a warrant. Evidence obtained from the clothing aided in his conviction. The United States Supreme Court upheld the search as a warrantless search incident to Edwards' valid custodial arrest, stating that "searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest, may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detention." Id. at 804, 94 S.Ct. at 1237. Noting that police have an interest in protecting evidence from destruction, the Court ruled that all of a prisoner's belongings may be seized when he is incarcerated and that they may be subjected to laboratory analysis without offending the prisoner's constitutional rights. Id. The Court also stated that it was irrelevant whether the clothing is taken upon arrival at the jail pursuant to administrative processing or whether it is taken later solely for use as evidence at trial. Id. at 808, 94 S.Ct. at 1239.

In this case, appellant's arrest was lawful, and police constitutionally seized his clothing incident to that lawful arrest. The validity of the superfluous search warrant is, accordingly, irrelevant.

Issues six and seven relate to the prosecution's closing argument. First, appellant argues that the prosecutor's comments regarding the legal definition of reasonable doubt were inaccurate and that the trial court's specific curative instruction regarding those remarks was both untimely and inadequate. The allegedly improper comments are as follows:

There was a lot of talk about reasonable doubt at this trial. I think you have all been asked that if there is a reasonable doubt, will you follow your duty to vote not guilty and I think most of you have been asked if there is no reasonable doubt, will you follow your duty, your absolute duty, to vote guilty if the Commonwealth has proven its case. Well don't take our instruction for what a reasonable doubt is. That is the Judge's job. He has the instruction. Don't take our instruction for what a reasonable doubt is and what a reasonable doubt is not. The judge will tell you what a reasonable doubt is and what a reasonable doubt is not. Listen to the Judge's instruction. The burden of proof for the Commonwealth, is it as heavy as it might have been argued? I suppose I would be about four foot three from trying to carry that burden around for a week, but isn't a reasonable doubt that the judge tells you about any different from your own sense of fair play, common decency, your own feelings of justice?

Notes of Testimony ("N.T."), 9/19/85, at 45-46 (emphasis added).

Second, appellant accuses the prosecution of improperly rendering an opinion as to his veracity with the following closing remarks:

I guess we could have cut the trial down to three witnesses because there are only three or four perhaps that you really need to consider, George Johnson has nothing to gain by testifying here. George Johnson who when he came forth with the truth is going to be faced with embarrassment and investigation. Paul Arnold the truth he told brought him into embarrassment and investigation and Earl Hall whose testimony that he bought had an interest. Earl Hall is the person that is on trial here. Earl Hall is the only one person that has something to gain, and nothing to lose by telling the truth. Nothing, has something to gain and nothing to lose by not telling the truth. Earl Hall.

Id. at 50-51.

The law in this area is settled:

A prosecutor, just as a defense attorney, must have reasonable latitude in presenting a case to the jury and "must be free to present his or her arguments with 'logical force and vigor.' " .... The prosecutor's remarks to the jury "may contain fair deductions and legitimate inferences from the evidence presented during the testimony." .... Moreover, "not every intemperate or uncalled for remark by the prosecutor requires a new trial." .... Rather, reversible error exists only if the "unavoidable effect" of the language used "would be to prejudice the jury forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant, so that they could not weigh the evidence and render a true verdict.... Finally, the effect of such remarks is largely dependent on the atmosphere at trial, ... and the proper...