Com. v. Henderson

• Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky
• Writing for the Court: Lambert
• Citation: Com. v. Henderson, 85 S.W.3d 618 (Ky. 2002)
• Decision Date: 26 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. 2000-SC-0233-DG.,2000-SC-0233-DG.
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY Appellant v. William Vincent HENDERSON Appellee

85 S.W.3d 618

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY Appellant v. William Vincent HENDERSON Appellee

No. 2000-SC-0233-DG.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

September 26, 2002.

LAMBERT, Chief Justice.

Appellee, William Vincent Henderson, was convicted of one charge each of second degree robbery, tampering with physical evidence¹ and first degree persistent felony offender. The Court of Appeals reversed his convictions for tampering with physical evidence and PFO because the evidence did not support the tampering conviction. We granted discretionary review (CR 76.20) and reverse the Court of Appeals.

Lea Anna Toney was returning to her apartment early one morning when Appellee and another person pulled up behind her in their car. The driver, Darryl Baker, grabbed her purse breaking the strap and drove away. Later, the police pulled the car over because it fit the description of the car driven by the purse snatcher and Officer Combs began asking questions of the occupants of the car. Baker drove away while Officer Combs was still asking questions regarding the purse. The police took chase after the car.

At some point during the chase, the purse, emptied of its money, was thrown out the window of the car. Appellee admitted that during the chase he put the money from the purse in the insole of his shoe. The issue here is whether Appellee's act of placing the money in his shoe is sufficient to sustain the tampering with physical evidence conviction.

The Court of Appeals distinguished Burdell v. Commonwealth² and Taylor a Commonwealth³ from the present case because Appellee concealed the evidence on his person instead of some other location. The Court of Appeals held that in those cases the defendants were trying to "disrupt the investigatory process by attempting to separate themselves from incriminating evidence." To the extent the Court of Appeals regarded physical separation as a bright line requirement, we disagree. The investigatory process, which includes police chases, can be disrupted by hiding evidence on one's person in an unconventional place such as the insole of a shoe or perhaps within the inner lining of a jacket or other item of clothing or by swallowing it. The Court of Appeals reasoned that concealment in the shoe is the equivalent of placing money in a pocket. We believe there is a difference. When money is placed in a pocket there likely will be no evidence of intent to conceal. On the other hand, when stolen money is placed in a shoe, a jury may properly find the necessary intent.

We must however make a cautionary statement regarding placement of evidence in conventional versus unconventional locations. The type of evidence and the place where it is hidden is relevant. Whether the evidence is hidden during a police chase is also relevant. A conventional place may become an unconventional place if the police are chasing the suspect when the evidence is hidden. For example, some people do carry money in their shoes to avoid the type of crime that was committed in this case. However, they do not ordinarily carry it in the insole of their shoes. And the placement of money in a shoe while being pursued by the police might convert a somewhat conventional location into an unconventional one sufficient to support a tampering conviction.

Appellee further argues that there was no evidence presented at trial that he hid the money in his shoe to prevent that money from being used in an official proceeding. With this we also disagree. It should be recalled that Appellee was in a car trying to evade the police who were in pursuit. Appellee threw the purse out the window or so the evidence suggests since the purse was found on his side of the road. He then placed the money in the insole of his shoe. From this evidence there arises a reasonable inference that Appellee attempted to conceal the physical evidence to prevent it from being used in an official proceeding.

Concern has been expressed that a barrage of felony charges against those who otherwise would be charged only with misdemeanors will now be brought. Appellee argues that all misdemeanor thefts such as...