Com. v. Hill

Citation442 N.E.2d 24,387 Mass. 619
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Gerald M. HILL.
Decision Date12 November 1982
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Kathleen Donahue, Cohasset, for defendant.

Michael J. Traft, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

ABRAMS, Justice.

The defendant Gerald M. Hill appeals from his conviction of murder in the second degree on an indictment charging him with murder comprehending murder in the first or second degree. Hill alleges error concerning (1) the decision to transfer his case from juvenile proceedings to adult proceedings; (2) the denial of his motion for a directed verdict; 1 and (3) the judge's instructions. Hill also requests that we exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict to a lesser degree of guilt. 2 We conclude that there is no reversible error, and that the verdict of murder in the second degree is not "against the weight of the evidence considered in a large or nontechnical sense." Commonwealth v. Bowman, 373 Mass. 760, 765, 370 N.E.2d 435 (1977). We, therefore, affirm the conviction and decline to exercise our power under § 33E in favor of the defendant.

We summarize the facts. On October 22, 1977, Leo Murphy was fatally stabbed after having been beaten by four young men. The victim was standing on a street in Boston, smoking a pipe when three of the four men walked by him. As the fourth young man, Michael Davis, passed the victim, ashes from the victim's pipe landed on Davis, and an argument ensued. The three other men came back to aid Davis.

The four young men punched and kicked Murphy until he fell to the ground. At some point the victim threw a bottle at one of his attackers. Two of the men started to leave. The other two tried to follow them, but Murphy grabbed one of them by the ankle. The young man struggled to free himself from Murphy's grasp, and then called to his friends for assistance. Davis, the man closest to the young man being held, tried to loosen Murphy's grip but was unable to free his friend. The young man next pulled a knife from his pocket and stabbed Murphy twice--once in the heart and once in the stomach. Davis and one of the other young men saw Hill with a knife.

A witness saw the young man being held by Murphy inflict the fatal wounds. She could not identify the perpetrator. However, she described the culprit as small, thin, with sandy colored hair, and the "lightest skinned" of the four men. This description fit Hill.

Hill said that Murphy held him (Hill) by the legs, and that he called for help from his friends. When the others returned to aid him, Murphy let go of Hill's legs and all four men left. The defendant admitted he kicked the victim in an effort to free his leg from Murphy's grasp, but denied that he had a knife or that he stabbed Murphy.

1. Decision to transfer. The defendant asserts that his treatment as an adult through transfer of this case to the Superior Court was improper. 3 He claims that overwhelming evidence in the Juvenile Court demonstrated his amenability to rehabilitation, and, therefore, he should have been treated as a juvenile. 4 G.L. c. 119, § 61. We do not agree.

Hill does not argue that he did not present "a significant danger to the public." G.L. c. 119, § 61. At the time of the transfer hearing, Hill had been arrested, and had been held as an adult after a probable cause hearing on another unrelated murder. 5 Rather, Hill claims that despite his danger to the public, the overwhelming evidence shows that he is amenable to treatment as a juvenile.

Relying on three reports to the Juvenile Court, Hill challenges the judge's conclusion that he was "not amenable to rehabilitation as a juvenile." G.L. c. 119, § 61. A psychiatrist's report states that Hill is "immature" and had shown "inappropriate, impulsive acting ... out" of his feelings. "[B]y his own and [his] family's history," Hill has used "physical aggression towards others, when he felt he was justified in his own opinion." The report states that Hill should be placed in a "secure facility that would accept on admission his need for long-term (several years) treatment."

Other reports indicate that the Menninger Foundation in Topeka, Kansas, would provide Hill with a residential placement providing "psychiatric, psychological, educational and recreational services." Funding of $65,000 for Hill to spend a year at the Menninger Foundation was available from various sources.

From these reports, the judge of the Juvenile Court found that Hill's family history, psychological and social history demonstrated that Hill has "poor impulse control, and no remorse for his actions." The judge also determined that Hill "needs long term total security to protect himself and the general public." The judge concluded that "[t]here is no likelihood of any known treatment program that could even treat the defendant, let alone keep him secure--... especially given the brief period it would be available, given his age."

The record supports the judge's conclusions. It is clear that Hill required at least several years of care in a secure facility in order to protect the public and Hill. Since Hill would reach the age of seventeen approximately eighteen months after the transfer hearing, the judge could conclude that it was not possible to rehabilitate Hill within the time constraints of G.L. c. 119.

The judge's conclusion is in accord with the overwhelming evidence at the transfer hearing, and also with the fact that funding for Hill had been provided for one year only. There was no error in the judge's decision to transfer Hill to adult proceedings. 6

2. Directed verdict. At the close of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal. 7 The test is "whether the evidence, in its light most favorable to the Commonwealth, notwithstanding the contrary evidence presented by the defendant, is sufficient ... to permit the jury to infer the existence of the essential elements of the crime charged in [the] indictment." Commonwealth v. Borans, 379 Mass. 117, 134, 393 N.E.2d 911 (1979), quoting Commonwealth v. Sandler, 368 Mass. 729, 740, 335 N.E.2d 903 (1975). The Commonwealth must prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and bring "minds of ordinary intelligence and sagacity to the persuasion of ... [guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368, 373, 162 N.E. 729 (1928).

Essentially, the defendant contends that the Commonwealth's evidence was "so inherently contradictory and had been so fully impeached that it was incredible as a matter of law.[ 8 This argument is without merit. Credibility is a question for the jury to decide. Once sufficient evidence is presented to warrant submission of the charges to the jury, it is for the jury alone to determine what weight will be accorded to the evidence." Commonwealth v. Hoffer, 375 Mass. 369, 377, 377 N.E.2d 685 (1978). The jurors "may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony presented to them." Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 376 Mass. 402, 411, 381 N.E.2d 123 (1978). Commonwealth v. Reid, --- Mass. ---, ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 1803, 1813, 424 N.E.2d 495. Since the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only on the ground of its believability, there is no error in the denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict.

3. Jury instructions on malice. The defendant, relying on Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), claims that the judge's instruction to the jury on the element of malice violated his constitutional rights. We note that at trial the main issue was the identity of the person who did the stabbing, and the issue of malice was not in dispute. See Commonwealth v. Lee, --- Mass. ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 1084, 419 N.E.2d 1378. Even assuming that we should consider the issue, we conclude that there is no error. 9

The defendant argues that the instructions that "[w]e determine [a person's] intent from what he does ... from the acts that he performs," and that "malice is implied from any deliberate or cruel act against another, however sudden," relieved the Commonwealth "of its constitutional burden of showing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant acted with the requisite intent." We do not agree.

In order to determine how a reasonable jury could have interpreted the jury instructions, Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. at 514, 99 S.Ct. at 2454, we read "the charge as a whole, and [do] not ... scrutiniz[e] bits and pieces removed from their context." Commonwealth v. Cundriff, --- Mass. ---, ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1980) 2519, 2535, 415 N.E.2d 172, cert. denied, 451 U.S. 973, 101 S.Ct. 2054, 68 L.Ed.2d 353 (1981). Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 278, 431 N.E.2d 880 (1982). Lannon v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 786, 791, 400 N.E.2d 862 (1980). The portion of the charge challenged by the defendant neither relieves the Commonwealth of its burden of proof, nor does it invade the factfinding function of the jury. Cf. Sandstrom v. Montana, supra 442 U.S. at 521-523, 99 S.Ct. at 2458-2459.

Read as a whole, the charge is adequate. The judge correctly instructed the jury both on the presumption of innocence and the Commonwealth's burden of proof. The defendant does not quarrel with these general instructions. The malice instruction did not require the jury to find against the defendant on the element of intent.

4. Jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter and self-defense. The defendant claims error in the judge's charge on voluntary manslaughter and self-defense. No objection to the charge was made at trial. On appeal, there is no claim that the law was changed on these issues after Hill's trial. 10 "[T]he defendant's failure to request the appropriate...

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