Com. v. Hinds

• Decision Date: 15 December 1976
• Citation: 244 Pa.Super. 182,366 A.2d 1252
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Bruce HINDS, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 1252

366 A.2d 1252

244 Pa.Super. 182

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Bruce HINDS, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted April 20, 1976.

Decided Dec. 15, 1976.

James M. Keller, Ellwood City, for appellant.

Joseph M. Stanichak, Asst. Dist. Atty., Beaver, for appellee.

Before WATKINS, President Judge, and JACOBS, HOFFMAN, CERCONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT and SPAETH, JJ.

JACOBS, Judge.

Appellant, following a jury trial in May, 1975, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, ¹ failure to stop at the scene of an accident, ² and failure to stop and render assistance. ³

We must consider three issues raised by this appeal, the first of which is whether or not there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdicts. ⁴ We find that there was and affirm the lower court's refusal to arrest judgment.

The second question raised is whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting the testimony of the arresting officer concerning the assertion, by appellant, of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. We conclude that there was reversible error and therefore order a new trial.

In order to facilitate the new trial we must consider a third argument made by appellant, that certain physical evidence should have been suppressed on the basis that appellant's automobile was illegally stopped by the arresting officer, and that the search of the automobile following impoundment, was invalid. We hold that the lower court properly refused to suppress the evidence.

I

In regards to the sufficiency of the evidence question, the following was offered as evidence at trial, on December 19, 1974, shortly after 7:00 p.m., Mrs. Joanne Evans was fatally injured when she was struck by an automobile while she was walking along 12th Avenue in White Township, Beaver County. No eyewitnesses were produced.

Two Commonwealth witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Murphy, testified that at about 7:00 p.m. on the evening of the 19th, while driving along a road leading to 12th Avenue, at a point one-half mile from where Mrs. Evans was struck, they had been passed on a blined curve by a dark blue or black Mercedes-Benz automobile of 1960 or 1961 vintage. Mr. Murphy estimated the speed of the passing vehicle to be about 45 miles per hour, which would have been 10 miles per hour above the posted limit on that section of the road. Mrs. Murphy testified that the driver of the Mercedes-Benz was a young man with shaggy hair of medium color. Appellant, a young man, owned an automobile fitting the description of the one that passed the Murphys.

After completing the pass, the Mercedes-Benz pulled away from the Murphy automobile, and went out of sight as it turned north on 12th Avenue. Mr. and Mrs. Murphy also turned north on 12th Avenue, but did not again catch sight of the Mercedes-Benz. After proceeding up 12th Avenue approximately two and one-half blocks, Mr. Murphy discovered the body of the deceased along the western, or left-hand berm of 12th Avenue between 28th and 29th Streets.

Mrs. Evans was pronounced dead on arrival at a Beaver Falls hospital to which she was rushed by ambulance. Death resulted from massive skull injuries.

Several Commonwealth witnesses testified that they saw Mrs. Evans walking in a northerly direction along the western berm of 12th Avenue shortly after 7:00 p.m. on the 19th of December. State Police Trooper Gary Kuffer, the investigating officer who arrived at the scene some thirty minutes after Mrs. Evans was struck, testified that there was an 85 foot trail of blood extending along the western berm to the point where the victim's body was found. Trooper Kuffer also discovered a parking light lens along the western edge of the road at approximately the point where the blood trail began.

The circumstances which led to appellant's arrest are discussed Infra, inasmuch as they are the basis for one of appellant's assertions of error. In any event, appellant was arrested less than two hours after Mrs. Evans was struck, after it was discovered that his automobile, a black 1961 Mercedes-Benz, was damaged in the left-front fender and headlight area. At the time of his arrest, appellant volunteered to the arresting officer that appellant's girlfriend had telephoned him to say that he might have been involved in a hit-and-run accident near Beaver Falls, and that appellant, when arrested, was on his way to a State Police Barracks to find out what had happened.

An expert witness called by the Commonwealth testified concerning the physical evidence taken in a search of the exterior of appellant's automobile. He testified that certain fibers taken from the headlight area were identical to fibers taken from the coat the victim was wearing at the time of her death. In addition, the left-front parking light assembly was missing from appellant's vehicle, and the forensic chemist testified that the lens found at the scene was of a chemical composition identical to the lens which remained in the right-hand light assembly of appellant's vehicle. He also testified that the lens found at the scene was a good fit for the right-hand light assembly of appellant's automobile but that it did not fit well in the left-hand assembly due to the damaged condition of that side of the vehicle.

Commonwealth exhibits showed that the section of 12th Avenue in question is a straight, fairly flat, two-lane road in a residential area. One can see for several hundred feet in either direction from the point where Mrs. Evans was found.

The appellant, who lives slightly more than one mile from the scene, testified that on the evening of the 19th he had driven north on 12th Avenue at about the time Mrs. Evans was killed. Appellant also testified that to his knowledge, he did not hit anything or anybody, and that he did not stray from the right-hand side of the road as he proceeded up 12th Avenue that night. He did testify, however, that his vision had been obscured for a second or two after a passing car had splashed water and slush on his windshield, as he was proceeding in the area of 28th Street. Appellant could not explain how the left-front portion of his automobile had been damaged.

Appellant's contention that his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence must be reviewed according to a well-established standard: 'In determining whether evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction, all the evidence must be regarded in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences arising from it.' Commonwealth v. Keysock, 236 Pa.Super. 474, 483, 345 A.2d 767, 772 (1975) (citations omitted).

In so viewing the evidence produced in this case, we believe that it was sufficient to permit the jury to reasonably infer that appellant struck Mrs. Evans while operating his automobile in a 'reckless or grossly negligent manner.' ⁵

The jury heard testimony that would justify the conclusion that appellant had been driving in excess of the speed limit and had committed a dangerous pass less than one-half mile from the scene of the accident. While the manner in which a vehicle was being operated at a point slightly removed in both time and distance from the scene of an accident is generally not relevant to show Speed at the time of the accident, when recklessness is at issue, such evidence is probative of the State of mind of the driver at the time of the accident, because 'a state of mind which demonstrates 'a marked disregard for the safety of others' is not likely to change significantly in a matter of seconds. . . .' Commonwealth v. Honeycutt, 227 Pa.Super. 265, 271, 323 A.2d 775, 778, Allocatur refused, 227 Pa.Super. Xxv (1974) (citations omitted).

Although the evidence did not include an eyewitness account of the incident, the Commonwealth produced a large amount of circumstantial evidence such as the location of the body and bloodstains, the presence of the parking light assembly on the western edge of the road, testimony from several witnesses to the effect that Mrs. Evans was walking along the western berm moments before the accident occurred, and finally, the testimony of the forensic chemist linking the damage to appellant's vehicle with the accident scene. Certainly, this evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion by the jury that appellant was driving on the wrong side of the road and that the left front portion of his automobile struck Mrs. Evans.

It is well-settled that 'not every violation of law or unlawful act in the operation of a motor vehicle will render an operator Criminally liable for deaths which may result. . . .' Commonwealth v. Greer, 232 Pa.Super. 448, 450, 335 A.2d 770, 772 (1975) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, some violations of motor vehicle laws are inherently more dangerous than others, and in Commonwealth v. Smoker, 204 Pa.Super. 265, 203 A.2d 358, Allocatur refused, 204 Pa.Super. Xxxvii (1964), the court held that evidence indicating that the accused had driven his car on the wrong side of the road, absent some explanation by the accused, was sufficient to support an inference of reckless conduct.

Inasmuch as there is seldom direct evidence of the mental state of a given defendant, it is within the province of the jury to infer from the circumstances that a driver was acting recklessly or in a grossly negligent manner. Commonwealth v. Keysock, supra. In reviewing all of the evidence produced in this case, including the fact that the accident occurred in a residential area, we find that the jury could reasonably have made that inference with respect to appellant, and we must therefore conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdicts.

II

Appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting testimony of the investigating officer concerning statements made by appellant shortly after his arrest. Trooper Kuffer testified, over objection, that while appe...