Com. v. Holiday
| Decision Date | 29 April 1965 |
| Citation | 206 N.E.2d 691,349 Mass. 126 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Leonard K. HOLIDAY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Ronald J. Chisholm, Winchester, for defendant.
Donald L. Conn, Asst. Dist. Atty. (Ruth I. Abrams, Asst. Dist. Atty., with him), for the Commonwealth.
Before WILKINS, C. J., and WHITTEMORE, KIRK, SPIEGEL and REARDON, JJ.
The defendant was indicted and found guilty as an accessory after the fact under G.L. c. 274, § 4, 1 in that, knowling one Peter F. Kelly (Kelly) to be an escapee from the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Concord (the institution) and therefore under G.L. c. 268, § 16, 2 a felon, he did harbor Kelly with the intent that Kelly should avoid arrest. The defendant excepted to the judge's denial of his motion for a directed verdict. The sole question presented is whether the evidence sustains the verdict.
The defendant concedes that Kelly had in fact escaped from the institution, and had thereby committed a felony. The controversy centers on two elements of the offence charged: (1) whether the defendant, knowing that Kelly was an escapee, harbored him, and (2) whether the defendant harbored Kelly with intent that Kelly should avoid arrest. We state the evidence bearing on these issues. Both the defendant and Kelly had been inmates at the institution at the same time and knew one another. The defendant was released on parole on July 5, 1963. When he left the institution he told Kelly that he had a job at a named inn in Sudbury.
On July 25, 1963, Kelly 'left' the institution. On the evening of August 2, 1963, the manager of the inn told the defendant that someone had called him and had left a number for him to call back. It was Kelly who had called. The defendant called the number and said, 'Hello, this is Lennie,' but no one answered so he hung up. He sat on the lawn. Kelly arrived by taxi at 11 P.M. They sat down on the grass and then went to the defendant's room in the coach house on the second floor where at least five other employees of the inn lived in rooms along the same corridor. An employee knocked at the door and asked for help to push his car. The defendant and Kelly both helped to push the car and returned to the defendant's room. They had some beer. At 4 A.M. on August 3, 1963, the police entered the defendant's room and found the defendant and Kelly in bed together. The defendant jumped out of bed and was on the floor near the door when both men, unclad, were arrested. The room and the clothing of both were searched. The men were taken to the police station where the defendant told the police that he had told Kelly that he could not stay with him, 'that Kelly pulled a knife on * * * [him] and told him that he was staying there; that he was afraid of Kelly and allowed him to stay.' No knife was found by the police in the search of the defendant's room or of the men's clothing.
Both the defendant and Kelly testified in substance that, upon returning to the defendant's room after having pushed the car (approximately a half hour or forty-five minutes after Kelly's arrival), Kelly told the defendant that he had escaped from the institution and wanted to stay overnight. The defendant refused, whereupon Kelly pulled a knife, put it to the defendant's throat, and said that he was going to stay until five o'clock. Kelly ordered the defendant to take off his clothes and go to bed. Both men fell asleep and were awakened when the police came into the room. Kelly testified that he was in the defendant's bedroom for five hours after he had told the defendant that he had escaped from the institution.
On the foregoing evidence the case was submitted to the jury. No exception was taken to the judge's charge. We accordingly conclude that it was complete and correct in all essentials.
The applicable law is clear. Where, as here, knowledge on the part of the defendant that Kelly was an escapee is an essential element of the offence charged, proof of that knowledge is a prerequisite to conviction. The knaoledge of the defendant is personal to him and the statute recognizes no substitute. Commonwealth v. Horsfall, 213 Mass. 232, 236-237, 100 N.E. 362; Commonwealth v. Boris, 317 Mass. 309, 315-316, 58 N.E.2d 8, and cases cited. A person's knowledge, however, like his intent, is a matter of fact, which may not be susceptible of proof by direct evidence. In that event resort must be had, and frequently is had, to proof by inference from all the facts and circumstances developed at the trial. Commonwealth v. Devaney, 182...
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