Com. v. Holloway

• Decision Date: 01 October 1999
• Citation: 739 A.2d 1039,559 Pa. 258
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Arnold HOLLOWAY, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

739 A.2d 1039

559 Pa. 258

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Arnold HOLLOWAY, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted January 25, 1999.

Decided October 1, 1999.

Reargument Denied November 30, 1999.

Robert Brett Dunham, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Catherine Marshall, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Robert A. Graci, Harrisburg, for Office of Attorney General.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.

OPINION

NEWMAN, Justice.

Arnold L. Holloway (Appellant) appeals from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (PCRA Court) denying his Petition for Relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541, et seq. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant was involved in a drug sales conspiracy with Shirley "Bones" Baker (Baker), Danny Freeman (Freeman), and Richard Caldwell (Caldwell), all of whom sold heroin for Leroy "Bubbles" Johnson (Johnson). Appellant was in charge of obtaining the heroin from Johnson and supplying it to Freeman, Baker, and Caldwell for street sales. In May of 1980, Johnson informed his associates that he wanted Caldwell killed because Caldwell owed him money and owed money to a rival drug dealer with whom Johnson wanted to do business.

At about midnight on the night of May 16, 1980, Baker was selling heroin in a bar at 7 th and Allegheny streets in North Philadelphia. Baker later met Johnson, Freeman, and Appellant at her apartment, where Freeman and Appellant asked Johnson if they could use his van. Johnson said that they could, and told them that Caldwell was already in the van and Appellant should "get on his job." Appellant went to his apartment and got his shotgun, which Freeman placed down his pant leg.

Appellant and Freeman then entered Johnson's van and tied up Caldwell. They drove to Third and Sedgley Streets in Philadelphia, where Appellant and Freeman pushed Caldwell from the van. They wrapped a trench coat belt around Caldwell's neck and each pulled one end of the belt, thereby choking Caldwell. Appellant placed the shotgun to Caldwell's head and fired one shot, and Freeman did the same. They returned to Baker's apartment and informed Johnson that "it was done."

Philadelphia Police Detective James Alexander discovered Caldwell's body at approximately 2:00 a.m. Dr. Halbert Fallinger, the Assistant Medical Examiner for the City of Philadelphia, subsequently determined the cause of death to be homicide by two shotgun wounds to the head and strangulation by ligature. Approximately five years later, on May 30, 1985, the Philadelphia police arrested Appellant. When he was taken into custody, Appellant verbally confessed to murdering Caldwell, but he later refused to sign a written statement and asked to speak to his attorney.

About one year before Appellant's trial began, Freeman was tried and acquitted of Caldwell's murder. Appellant moved to suppress his statement to the police, which the trial court denied, and the Commonwealth moved to preclude any discussion in front of the jury of Freeman's acquittal, which the trial court granted. At trial, the prosecution relied primarily on the testimony of Baker, who testified to the events of the evening of May 16, 1980. On May 22, 1986, the jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder,¹ criminal conspiracy,² and possessing an instrument of crime.³

At the penalty phase, the Commonwealth sought to prove two aggravating circumstances: (1) that Appellant had contracted with another person for the killing of the victim, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(2); and (2) that the murder was committed by means of torture, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(8). The defense presented two mitigating circumstances: (1) that Appellant had no history of prior criminal convictions, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9711(e)(1); and (2) other evidence of good character and record, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8). The jury found both the two aggravating circumstances and the two mitigating circumstances, and found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, the jury sentenced Appellant to death for the first-degree murder conviction.

Appellant appealed his convictions and judgment of sentence directly to this Court, and in a unanimous opinion, we affirmed. Commonwealth v. Holloway, 524 Pa. 342, 572 A.2d 687 (1990). On May 3, 1991, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA Petition, and he was subsequently appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA Petition on June 21, 1993. On July 16, 1997, the PCRA Court issued an Order and Opinion denying the Petition.

II. ISSUES RAISED IN THIS APPEAL

Appellant raises the following issues for our consideration:

1. Whether the trial court improperly excluded evidence that Appellant and the investigating officers were aware of the acquittal of alleged accomplice Daniel Freeman, which was offered for the limited purpose of showing the state of mind of Appellant and the motivation of the interrogating officer at the time Appellant purportedly confessed to the crime.

2. Whether the prosecutor's guilt phase closing argument was egregiously improper and violated Appellant's rights to due process and a fair trial.

3. Whether Appellant is entitled to relief from his conviction and sentence because the Commonwealth used its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner.

4. Whether the jury instructions on accomplice liability were erroneous and relieved the Commonwealth of its constitutional obligation to prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

5. Whether Appellant's convictions and sentence must be vacated because the Commonwealth suppressed exculpatory evidence concerning a deal with its key witness and because it allowed her false testimony to go uncorrected.

6. Whether Appellant's trial counsel was ineffective at the guilt phase of his capital trial.

7. Whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could not consider Appellant's purported statement against him unless it found that he gave the statement voluntarily, and whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object or offer an appropriate instruction.

8. Whether the trial court erred when it gave the jury its opinion as to the appropriate verdict.

9. Whether Appellant was convicted of the crimes of conspiracy and possession of an instrument of crime although those charges were barred by the statute of limitations, and whether the failure of trial counsel and the court to quash the time barred conspiracy charges prejudicially affected the jury's guilt and capital sentencing deliberations.

10. Whether the PCRA Court erroneously denied Appellant's requests for discovery and for funds to obtain expert testimony, depriving Appellant of his rights to due process under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions and the effective assistance of post conviction counsel, and of his right to a full and fair evidentiary hearing on his post conviction claims.

11. Whether, at the penalty phase of Appellant's capital trial, counsel failed to investigate, develop and present evidence in mitigation of the offense and to rebut alleged aggravating circumstances, depriving Appellant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel.

12. Whether counsel's performance at the penalty phase of Appellant's capital trial was prejudicially deficient, in violation of Appellant's rights to the effective assistance of counsel under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions, in that counsel made affirmatively harmful arguments and failed to object to improper prosecutorial argument.

13. Whether Appellant is entitled to relief from his sentence of death because the jury instructions and the sentencing phase verdict slip indicated that the jury had to unanimously find any mitigating factor before it could give effect to that factor in its sentencing decision.

14. Whether Appellant is entitled to relief from his sentence of death because the trial court failed to adequately instruct the jury as to the "torture" aggravating circumstance and the prosecutor made improper argument regarding that aggravator.

15. Whether Appellant is entitled to relief from his sentence of death because the trial court failed to adequately instruct the jury concerning the "contract killing" aggravating circumstance, because the prosecutor made improper argument in support of it, and because this court construed that aggravator in a way that failed to provide adequate notice and failed to limit the sentencer's discretion.

16. Whether the instructions of the trial court prevented the jury from considering and giving effect to relevant mitigating evidence.

17. Whether all prior counsel were ineffective to the extent that they failed to object to or timely and properly raise each of the above cited errors.

18. Whether Appellant is entitled to relief from his conviction and sentence because of the cumulative effect of the above-alleged errors.

19. Whether Appellant's statement to police should have been suppressed because it was not preserved by audio and/or video recording.

20. Whether the trial court's jury instructions regarding the burden of proof were erroneous.

21. Whether the trial court's jury instructions regarding Miranda were erroneous.

This Court addressed issues 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, and 21 in Appellant's direct appeal. See Holloway, supra. Consequently, Appellant is ineligible for PCRA relief on these claims. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). Of the remaining issues, Appellant raised only issue 10 and a portion of issue 6 before the PCRA Court. Thus, all of Appellant's other claims are deemed waived. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 541 Pa. 85, 660 A.2d 1316 (1995),

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1051, 116 S.Ct. 717, 133 L.Ed.2d 671 (1996). Nevertheless, Appellant manages to preserve his claims for relief by alleging, in a most perfunctory manner, that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to raise the above-listed...