Com. v. Holmes

Citation933 A.2d 57
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Christopher HOLMES, Appellant. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Rufus Whitfield, Appellee.
Decision Date16 October 2007
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Ellen T. Greenlee, Karl Baker, Jeffrey Paul Shender, Philadelphia, for Christopher Holmes.

Jason E. Fetterman, Hugh J. Burns, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Mark Patrick Cichowicz, Karl Baker, Philadelphia, for Rufus Whitfield.

CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, BALDWIN, FITZGERALD, JJ.

OPINION

Justice BAER.1

We granted review in these two cases to consider the interaction between a statute limiting the period of time during which a trial court may modify or rescind an order2 and the long-standing, inherent power of courts to correct patent errors in orders. See Commonwealth v. Cole, 437 Pa. 288, 263 A.2d 339 (1970). The two cases under review herein demonstrate a conflict in the application of authorities when trial courts attempt to exercise their inherent power to correct orders by vacating illegal sentences despite the expiration of the modification period provided by 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. Because in both of these cases the errors in question were patent, we determine that the trial courts had jurisdiction to correct the sentences. Accordingly, we reverse the Superior Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Holmes, 837 A.2d 501 (Pa.Super.2003), which reversed the trial court's order vacating its sentence and affirm the Superior Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 3194 EDA 2002 (Pa.Super.2003), affirming the trial court's order vacating its sentence.

We first consider the facts relating to appellant Christopher Homes, 22 EAP 2004, as gleaned from the record developed in the trial court at CP# 9603-1287 2/2. On May 17, 1996, Holmes pleaded guilty to criminal conspiracy and a violation of the Controlled Substances Act. He was sentenced to time served3 to twenty-three months of incarceration, with immediate parole, followed by two years of reporting probation for the controlled substance offense and no additional sentence for the conspiracy offense. On September 16, 1997, his probation, but not his parole, was revoked and he was sentenced to eleven and one-half to twenty-three months of incarceration for a probation violation.4, 5

The record reveals that at some point prior to October 1998 Holmes again was released on parole and eventually pleaded guilty and was sentenced on charges unrelated to the crimes leading to the May 17, 1996 guilty plea. As a result of these new convictions, the trial court, on May 21, 2001, revoked Holmes's parole from the September 16, 1997 sentence of incarceration imposed for the violation of the probationary sentence imposed on May 17, 1996, concluding that Holmes had violated his parole "in re sentence of 9-16-97." Rather than recommitting Holmes to serve the remainder of the sentence imposed on September 16, 1997, as would be proper for a parole violation, see, supra, at 59 n. 5, the court sentenced Holmes as if he had violated probation, imposing a new sentence of three to six years of incarceration to run concurrently with any other current sentence for unrelated crimes. Notwithstanding its impropriety, Holmes did not appeal this sentence. On April 9, 2002, the trial court sua sponte vacated the sentence imposed on May 21, 2001, presumably realizing that the parole violation sentence imposing three to six years of incarceration was improper because it set a minimum sentence and because its maximum exceeded the eleven and one-half to twenty-three month sentence Holmes received when sentenced for the original probation violation on September 16, 1997.6

On May 9, 2002, the Commonwealth appealed the court's April 9, 2002 order, claiming that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate its prior sentence.7 The Superior Court agreed in a published decision. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 837 A.2d 501, 502 (Pa.Super.2003). The court first noted that the trial court's action could not be justified as a reaction to a post-sentence motion because Holmes had not filed a post-sentence motion. The court next concluded that because the vacation of the sentence occurred more than thirty days after the imposition of the sentence on May 21, 2001, the trial court's action was impermissible under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505, see, supra, at 58 n. 2, which allows a trial court to modify or rescind an order within thirty days of entry of that order, unless an appeal has been taken removing the case from the trial court's jurisdiction.

While acknowledging that challenges to the legality of a sentence cannot be waived and that a court may raise sentence illegality sua sponte, the Superior Court cautioned that a trial court must first have jurisdiction to address the illegality, quoting our decisions in Robinson v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 525 Pa. 505, 582 A.2d 857, 860 (1990) ("Jurisdiction is the predicate upon which a consideration of the merits must rest."), and Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (1999) ("Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA's time limits or one of the exceptions thereto.").

The Superior Court rejected Holmes's argument that the trial court had inherent jurisdiction to correct patent and obvious errors in orders, distinguishing our decision in Commonwealth v. Jones, 520 Pa. 385, 554 A.2d 50 (1989), in which this Court approved a trial court's correction of an illegal sentence the day it was imposed.8 The Superior Court also distinguished Cole, 263 A.2d 339, in which this Court approved of the trial court's correction of an order over three months after its entry, because the order was internally inconsistent.9 The Superior Court concluded that the order sentencing Holmes was neither "facially self-contradictory or irreconcilable nor did it contain a clerical error." Holmes, 837 A.2d at 504. Accordingly, finding no jurisdiction for the trial court's order vacating the May 21, 2001 illegal sentence, the Superior Court reversed the order and reinstated that sentence.

Holmes sought this Court's review, which we granted.10 Holmes relies on this Court's statement that "[t]rial courts never relinquish their jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence." Brief for Holmes at 5 (quoting Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 560 Pa. 381, 744 A.2d 1280, 1284 (2000)).11 He notes that while a violation of probation may trigger a new sentence, a violation of parole, as in the instant case, subjects a parolee to serve the balance of the original sentence. Compare 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771 ("Upon revocation [of probation] the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing . . . .") with Fair, 497 A.2d at 645 (noting that trial courts are bound by the limits of the original sentence in sentencing for a violation of parole); Commonwealth v. Ware, 737 A.2d 251, 253 (Pa.Super.1999) ("[U]pon revocation of parole, the only sentencing option available is recommitment to serve the balance of the term initially imposed.").

Initially, Holmes demonstrates that the sentence imposed could not be for a violation of probation because the trial court, in September 1997, revoked the probation imposed in May 1996. Thus, he could not have violated something that no longer existed. Consequently, he argues that the violation found in May 2001 related to his parole from the eleven and one-half to twenty-three-month sentence of incarceration imposed in September 1997. Accordingly, any sentence for that violation must be limited by the duration of the September 1997 sentence, twenty-three months. Citing Cole and Jones, Holmes contends that the trial court acted within its power to correct the obvious and patent mistake of sentencing him in excess of the original twenty-three-month sentence of September 1997 rather than recommitting him to serve the remainder of that sentence. Holmes also suggests that all illegal sentences are obvious and patent mistakes, citing numerous Superior Court cases for broad statements regarding courts' power to address illegal sentences.

The Commonwealth responds that the Superior Court properly reversed the trial court. It contends that the trial court lost jurisdiction to correct the order when the thirty-day period set forth in Section 5505 expired in June 2001. It notes the distinction between the issue of waiver and jurisdiction, quoting our explanation of jurisdiction as "the power, right, or authority to interpret and apply the law." Brief for Commonwealth (Holmes) at 12 (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 542 Pa. 568, 669 A.2d 315, 321 (1995)). While acknowledging that a claim of sentence illegality may never be waived and may be addressed by a court sua sponte, it argues that the court must first have jurisdiction over the case to address the issue. Citing this Court's decision in Fahy, the Commonwealth contends that the only method for the trial court to have obtained jurisdiction to correct the sentence after the running of the thirty days would have been pursuant to the PCRA, which Holmes had not invoked as of April 2002, when the trial court vacated the sentence.

While tacitly acknowledging the authority of courts to correct clerical errors in orders, the Commonwealth contends that the sentencing illegality in this case is not a clerical error and that the defendant misinterprets our decisions in Cole and Jones to suggest that they provide the inherent power to correct illegal sentences at any time. Consistent with our observation in note 8, supra, the Commonwealth observes that there was no jurisdictional question in Jones, when the court acted immediately to correct the erroneous sentence, and, accordingly, that case is easily distinguished from the case at bar. The Commonwealth also argues that Cole is...

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