Com. v. Hoss

• Decision Date: 08 October 1976
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Stanley HOSS, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 1335

364 A.2d 1335

469 Pa. 195

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Stanley HOSS, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 11, 1976.

Decided Oct. 8, 1976.

John J. Dean, John R. Cook, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Robert E. Colville, Dist. Atty., Robert L. Eberhardt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION

NIX, Justice.

The incident from which this appeal arises represents one of the most odious and pernicious killings that has occurred within this Commonwealth in recent years. The Commonwealth produced evidence at trial to establish that Stanley Hoss, then an inmate at the Western Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, in concert with several other inmates lured the victim Walter Peterson, a captain of the correctional officers at the institution, into the basement recreation area of the prison and viciously murdered him. The testimony indicated that Captain Peterson was restrained while he was being punched, struck repeatedly with chairs about the head and slashed with razors to an extent that when other guards were able to gain entrance into the area, Peterson had been completely mutilated and 'looked like a piece of raw meat.' ¹ The entire incident was witnessed by another guard who was in the observation area adjacent to the recreation area and separated by iron bars. ² Death resulted from the multiple injuries of the scalp, face and upper neck area. The appellant was tried by jury and convicted of murder of the second degree and sentenced to life imprisonment of not less than ten years nor more than twenty years. This direct appeal followed.

The obligation of society to provide an accused a fair trial is tested to its fullest where the circumstances of the crime are as heinous and atrocious as those exhibited here. Appellant's only objections raise the question whether or not he did in fact receive a fair trial. After careful consideration of the record before us, we are of the view that he did and therefore affirm the judgment of sentence.

The first complaint is that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing defense motions for a change of venue. It is argued that because of the pretrial publicity, appellant was deprived of his right to a fair trial.

Under the laws of this Commonwealth it has been clearly established that the grant or refusal of a request to change venue rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Pa. 253, 328 A.2d 507 (1974); Commonwealth v. Martinolich, 456 Pa. 136, 318 A.2d 680 (1974) (appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1065, 95 S.Ct. 651, 42 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974)); Commonwealth v. Yount, 455 Pa. 303, 314 A.2d 242 (1974); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98, 283 A.2d 58 (1971); ³ Commonwealth v. Swanson, 432 Pa. 293, 248 A.2d 12 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 949, 89 S.Ct. 1287, 22 L.Ed.2d 483 (1969); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 392 Pa. 528, 140 A.2d 828 (1958). However, the exercise of this discretion must be examined in light of Art. I, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which provides that persons accused of crime are entitled to 'a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage.' The guarantee of a right of trial by jury necessarily requires that the accused be afforded a trial before a panel of impartial and unbiased jurors.

'Although this Court has said that the Fourteenth Amendment does not demand the use of jury trials in a State's criminal procedure, (citations omitted), every State has constitutionally provided trial by jury. (Citations omitted). In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process. (Citations omitted). 'A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.' (Citation omitted). In the ultimate analysis, only the jury can strip a man of his liberty or his life. In the language of Lord Coke, a juror must be as 'indifferent as he stands unsworne.' (Citation omitted). His verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial. (Citation omitted). This is true, regardless of the heinousness of the crime charged, the apparent guilt of the offender or the station in life which he occupies.' Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721--722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961).

The mandate for a fair and impartial jury does not require that the prospective jurors be free of all knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident which forms the basis of the trial.

'It is not required, however, that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case. This is particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.' Id. at 722--23, 81 S.Ct. at 1642.

Thus, the critical question where members of the panel have been exposed to pretrial media publicity, is whether or not they are capable of casting aside any impressions or opinions they may have formed and render a verdict based solely upon the evidence presented to them during the course of the trial. In attempting to ascertain the presence of bias or prejudice, the United States Supreme Court has stated:

'Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial formula.' Irvin v. Dowd, supra at 724--725, 81 S.Ct. at 1643, quoting from United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145, 146, 57 S.Ct. 177, 81 L.Ed. 78.

The general rule requires that the accused who claims that the denial of a request for a change of venue has denied him his right of a fair trial must demonstrate the prejudice that has been created by the failure to grant that request. See, Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 451 Pa. 190, 303 A.2d 209 (1973). There have, however, been certain circumstances where courts have relieved the accused of the responsibility of establishing a nexus between the pretrial publicity and actual jury prejudice and presumed the existence of prejudice. This has occurred in two distinct situations. First, where the pretrial media coverage is so extensive, so sustained, so pervasive and includes highly inflammatory and prejudicial information (rather than a factual account of the events reported) courts have determied that prejudice may be presumed. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963); Commonwealth v. Pierce, supra. The other instance where courts have presumed the existence of prejudice has been where it was determined that in addition to inflammatory pretrial publicity, the dignity and the objectivity of the court proceedings themselves have been disrupted by the publicity. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965).

'The proceedings in these cases were entirely lacking in the solemnity and sobriety to which a defendant is entitled in a system that subscribes to any notion of fairness and rejects the verdict of a mob.' Murphy v. Florida, supra, 421 U.S. at 799, 95 S.Ct. at 2036.

It is clear, however, that this case does not fall within either category. First, the court preserved the integrity of the trial and there is no assertion that a 'carnival air prevailed'. Nor was the quantity or the quality of the media coverage in the instant case so pervasive and so prejudicial as to justify the conclusion that the community had been saturated with inflammatory information and thus was necessarily incapable of providing individuals who could render a fair and impartial verdict. Therefore, to resolve this particular claim we must turn to the totality of the circumstances and determine whether appellant has been able to establish identifiable prejudice as a result of the pretrial publicity. Murphy v. Florida, supra; Irvin v. Dowd, supra.

Immediately following the incident there was extensive coverage in newspaper, television and radio for a period of approximately ten days. The publicity characterized appellant as a convicted 'copkiller', referring to the fact that he had been convicted for the murder of a Verona policeman in 1969 and also that he was implicated in the kidnapping and the apparent murder of a Maryland woman and her child. ⁴ The stories stressed the brutality of the instant assault and also contained statements by certain public officials condemning the viciousness of the crime and urging the reinstatement of the death penalty. Additional coverage resulted because of a strike of the guards at the penitentiary who demanded new procedures for handling inmates with severe behavior problems.

The coroner's inquest was held seven days after the incident and was covered by the media. The three defendants were filmed outside the hearing room dressed in prison garb and wearing handcuffs. Thereafter, the publicity subsided and no additional media attention was given to the matter until a little over a month later when there was a brief mention made of the fact that indictments had been handed down by the...