Com. v. Hudson

• Decision Date: 30 May 1980
• Citation: 489 Pa. 620,414 A.2d 1381
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Bert Lee HUDSON, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 1381

414 A.2d 1381

489 Pa. 620

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Bert Lee HUDSON, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted March 12, 1980.

Decided May 30, 1980.

[489 Pa. 624] Bernard J. Rabik, Beaver, for appellant.

John Lee Brown, Asst. Dist. Atty., Beaver, for appellee.

Before EAGEN, C. J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY and KAUFFMAN, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

EAGEN, Chief Justice.

Bert Lee Hudson, appellant, was convicted by a jury in Beaver County of murder of the second degree, ¹ aggravated assault, ² simple assault, ³ and burglary. ⁴ Post-verdict motions were denied, and Hudson was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder charge and five to ten years on the non-homicide charges. The former sentence was directed to run consecutive to the latter sentence. This appeal followed.

Hudson first contends the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish his guilt of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. More precisely, Hudson complains that the evidence was not sufficient to place him at the scene of the crimes. We disagree.

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, the test is whether, viewing the entire record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing all reasonable inferences favorable to the Commonwealth, there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Smith, 484 Pa. 71, 398 A.2d 948 (1979); Commonwealth v. Boyle, 470 Pa. 343, 368 A.2d 661 (1977). Viewed in this light, the record reveals the following:

In 1975, while in prison, Hudson spoke with David Baker, the son-in-law of William Phillips, Sr. Baker told Hudson about the layout of his father-in-law's residence and that there was a safe therein.

In December 1977, after both Baker and Hudson had been released from prison, Hudson asked Baker if he wanted to join Hudson in burglarizing the Phillips' residence. Baker refused.

In August 1978, Hudson contacted one James Hassett. Hudson and Hassett drove past the Phillips' residence in New Galilee, Beaver County, and while doing so, Hudson told Hassett that he was going to burglarize the house. Hassett initially agreed to join Hudson, but subsequently refused. Hassett informed Hudson of this refusal prior to the commission of the crimes here involved.

In the early morning of September 6, 1978, a stranger entered the Phillips' residence through a first floor window. ⁵ William Phillips, Sr., his wife, and his son, William Phillips, Jr., were sleeping. The intruder entered the son's bedroom and placed a hand over the son's mouth and a gun to the young man's head. The intruder then taped the son's mouth and hands, and a struggle ensued. The intruder struck the son repeatedly in the head and shot the son in the abdomen. Thereafter, William Phillips, Sr. rushed into his son's room. He was not armed. The intruder fired at William Phillips Sr. A bullet went through his left palm, entered the right side of his face, and lodged in an area of the brain causing injury resulting in instant death.

When the police arrived at the scene of the crimes, they recovered some black electrical tape from the son's bedroom. This tape was later matched to tape belonging to Hudson which was recovered after his arrest.

The police also recovered two bullets, one from the deceased and one from his son. A state police ballistics expert testified that the bullets were fired from the same weapon, probably a .44 or .45 calibre revolver manufactured by Colt. The ballistics expert indicated that the bullets were more likely .45 calibre because of their weight.

Although neither the deceased's son nor his wife identified Hudson, Hudson made several statements in which he admitted the shootings. James Hassett conversed with Hudson shortly after the shootings. Hudson told Hassett that he had a fight with a "younger guy" in the Phillips residence; that he shot the "younger guy"; and, that he shot another "guy" who came "in the room with a gun." Hassett also testified that Hudson had a revolver in his possession and that the revolver was a large calibre, probably a .44 or .45.

Robert Eugene Johnston testified that he conversed with Hudson at Johnston's home after the shootings. Hudson told Johnston that he entered the Phillips residence, went to "young Phillips' " bedroom, put his hand over the son's mouth, and put "the gun in his face." Hudson told Johnston that he woke the son and said "(a)ll I want is food and money." Johnston then testified that Hudson recounted the ensuing struggle and the two shootings. Johnston also testified that Hudson was armed with a Colt .45 calibre gun. Hudson cleaned the weapon in Johnston's residence and showed Johnston a Colt .45 calibre cartridge.

This evidence clearly places Hudson at the scene of the crimes and is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

To further bolster his sufficiency argument, Hudson challenges the reliability of the testimony of Hassett and Johnston. Citing Commonwealth v. Farquharson, 467 Pa. 50, 354 A.2d 545 (1976), Hudson argues that the testimony of Hassett and Johnston is so unreliable that a verdict of guilty cannot be based thereon.

In Commonwealth v. Farquharson, supra at 60, 354 A.2d at 550, this Court stated:

"where evidence offered to support a verdict of guilt is so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any verdict based thereon pure conjecture, a jury may not be permitted to return such a finding."

However, in Commonwealth v. Whack, 482 Pa. 137, 140, 393 A.2d 417, 419 (1978), we emphasized that the standard announced in Commonwealth v. Farquharson, supra, applies only "in such cases where the patent unreliability of the testimony is such as to render a verdict of guilt based thereupon as no more than pure conjecture." (Emphasis supplied.)

Instantly, Hudson argues that the standard in Commonwealth v. Farquharson, supra, applies to Johnston's testimony because: Johnston had been drinking beer and smoking marijuana when Hudson is said to have admitted the crimes; Johnston stated that Hudson made the admissions to Johnston in September or October of 1978 even though other prosecution evidence indicated that Hudson was taken into custody in late September of 1978; Johnston informed the police of Hudson's admissions only after Hudson was arrested despite earlier opportunities to inform the police; Johnston, at one time, denied any knowledge of Hudson in statements Johnston made to the police; Johnston was on probation for receipt of stolen goods; and, Johnston was charged with harboring a fugitive in connection with his involvement with Hudson after the crimes had been committed.

We are not persuaded that Johnston's testimony is so "patently unreliable" that a guilty verdict based thereon would be pure conjecture. Johnston's physical condition after consuming drugs is a matter of credibility to be considered by the jury. Commonwealth v. Whack, supra. Furthermore, neither inconsistencies in the Commonwealth's evidence nor attempts by Johnston to avoid involvement in a criminal episode render his testimony patently unreliable under the Farquharson standard. Commonwealth v. Whack, supra; Commonwealth v. Duncan, 473 Pa. 62, 373 A.2d 1051 (1977). The fact that Johnston initially gave inconsistent statements to the police is a matter for the jury in determining his credibility. Commonwealth v. Boyle, supra. Johnston's prior crimes are also matters going to his credibility and issues of credibility are properly resolved by the trier of fact. Commonwealth v. Whack, supra. Finally, although Johnston was charged with harboring a fugitive, this does not render his testimony "patently unreliable."

We have held that the testimony of an accomplice is testimony from a corrupt source and must be carefully scrutinized. Commonwealth v. Sisak, 436 Pa. 262, 259 A.2d 428 (1969). We have also held that guilt or innocence may be predicated on uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Commonwealth v. Tervalon, 463 Pa. 581, 345 A.2d 671 (1975).

Instantly, Johnston apparently did not participate in the perpetration of the crimes in any way. He was charged as an accessory after the fact. An accessory after the fact is not an accomplice. Commonwealth v. Richey, 249 Pa.Super. 365, 378 A.2d 338 (1977). Accordingly, if uncorroborated accomplice testimony may be the basis of a guilty verdict, the testimony of one charged as an accessory after the fact is also competent evidence for that purpose.

The testimony of Hassett is attacked by Hudson as unreliable under Commonwealth v. Farquharson, supra, because: Hassett was an admitted drug addict; Hassett was on parole for armed robbery; Hassett was the only one present when Hudson made the inculpatory admissions; Hassett initially denied any knowledge concerning Hudson; and, Hassett agreed to give Hudson money, transportation, and false identification in order to leave the area after the commission of the crimes.

That Hassett used drugs, ⁶ had a prior criminal record, and was the only witness to inculpatory statements made by Hudson are matters of credibility properly left to the jury's consideration. In addition, that Hassett, like Johnston, initially tried to avoid any involvement in the criminal episode and that Hassett was possibly criminally involved with Hudson after the commission of the crimes ⁷ do not make Hassett's testimony "patently unreliable" under the standard in Commonwealth v. Farquharson, supra.

In sum, a study of the record convinces us that the question of Hudson's guilt was properly for the jury.

Hudson urges that rulings by the trial judge were erroneous and so prejudicial that a new trial is required. In this connection, Hudson initially complains of the trial court's ruling permitting evidentiary use of two photographs of the deceased victim. Hudson contends these photographs were inflammatory because "they depict pools of blood."...