Com. v. Hughes
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania |
Citation | 865 A.2d 761,581 Pa. 274 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Kevin HUGHES, Appellant. |
Decision Date | 21 December 2004 |
865 A.2d 761
581 Pa. 274
v.
Kevin HUGHES, Appellant
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted May 22, 2002.
Decided December 21, 2004.
Reargument Denied February 18, 2005.
Hugh J. Burns, Esq., Amy Zapp, Esq., Philadelphia, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
BEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and BAER, JJ.
OPINION
Justice SAYLOR.
This is an appeal in a capital case from an order dismissing Appellant's petition for post-conviction relief.
On March 1, 1979, at approximately 8:15 a.m., the victim, nine-year-old Rochelle Graham, was dropped off near her school. As the victim was walking through the school playground, she encountered Appellant, who was 16 years, 11 months, and 24 days old, and whom she knew through an aunt. Appellant took the victim to a nearby vacant house at 1617 Olive Street in Philadelphia, where he forcibly removed her pants and underwear, attempted vaginal intercourse, and engaged in anal intercourse. Appellant then choked the victim to death, gathered flammable material from the room, placed it on top of her, and with a cigarette lighter, set the material on fire. At some point, Appellant also used the lighter to begin burning his nickname, "Peanut," on the ceiling of the room, writing "PEA."
At 10:30 a.m. that morning, police and fire personnel responded to a fire at the Olive Street address. Inside, police found the victim's partially burned body lying on the floor with her legs spread apart. Detectives investigating the scene observed that the victim's underwear and pants were torn, with blood running from her vaginal area, and noticed the letters burned into the ceiling of the room. A medical examination of the victim revealed bruising and tearing of her vaginal and anal areas and soft tissue bruising of her neck, but no indication of smoke inhalation. The medical examiner concluded that the victim's injuries were consistent with the attempted penetration of her vagina and the actual penetration of her rectum, and that she died from manual strangulation.
The murder went unsolved for approximately ten months. Then, on January 5, 1980, Appellant attacked a 13-year-old girl, M.O., grabbing her from behind and forcing her into a vacant house. Appellant ordered M.O. to undress and perform oral sex, after which, he choked her until she
Following his arrest, Appellant was interviewed regarding the assault of M.O. As he was a juvenile, Appellant was accompanied by two of his uncles; he was also advised of his constitutional rights. Appellant confessed to the assault of M.O. and, noting the similarities between that assault and the present matter,1 the detectives who were investigating the homicide of Ms. Graham advised Appellant that they would like to question him about her death. After being informed of his constitutional rights a second time, Appellant initially denied any involvement in Ms. Graham's death. Later in the interview, however, Appellant admitted that he had sexually assaulted and killed Ms. Graham. The following day, Appellant was again interviewed regarding the Graham homicide; on this occasion, he was accompanied by one of his uncles, was apprised of his constitutional rights, and again confessed to the crimes.
Shortly after his arrest, and in connection with whether he should be prosecuted as an adult for charges involving M.O., Appellant was evaluated by a court appointed psychologist, Clare Wilson, Ph.D. In her report, Dr. Wilson noted, inter alia, that: Appellant was functionally illiterate; his comprehension, social judgment, and reasoning were deficient; his thinking was concrete and stereotypical; his full scale intelligence quotient was in the low average range; and mild brain damage could not be conclusively ruled out.2 Ultimately, the charges involving M.O. were transferred to the criminal court. Appellant also unsuccessfully moved for decertification in the present matter, seeking to have the charges prosecuted in juvenile court.
Subsequently, Appellant was found incompetent and, on May 6, 1980, was transferred to the forensic unit of the Philadelphia State Hospital. Although the initial psychiatric evaluations of Appellant indicated that he did not suffer from a major mental illness,3 he was prescribed a conservative amount of Thorazine, an antipsychotic medication. Some months later, Appellant's condition improved, and he was found fit to stand trial following a competency hearing.
Thereafter, Appellant moved to suppress evidence and his statements. Prior to the hearing on that matter, counsel for Appellant orally requested a further competency examination, which was granted. Appellant was evaluated by Edwin Camiel, M.D., a psychiatrist employed with the Psychiatric Unit of the Probation Department of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, who testified at the ensuing competency hearing that Appellant showed no psychiatric abnormality and appeared to have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings. Dr. Camiel noted, however, that Appellant exhibited some evidence of concrete thinking, and that he
Appellant's trial commenced on February 17, 1981,4 with the Commonwealth's case centering upon Appellant's confessions and circumstantial evidence indicating his involvement, specifically, that: the letters burned into the ceiling of the crime scene were consistent with Appellant's nickname and those appearing in his bedroom; the assault involving M.O. was substantially similar to that in the present matter and tended to establish that Appellant was the perpetrator; and Appellant's route to school provided him with an opportunity to have committed the offenses.5 The defense countered by contesting the circumstances surrounding Appellant's statements, particularly, that Appellant was unable to read and write and was intellectually unable to have articulated the details of the crimes as they appeared in the statements; the defense also emphasized that Appellant was at school on the day of the crime. Appellant presented testimony from his uncle, Morris Hawthorne, who, in addition to testifying about Appellant's statements, noted that he had never seen Appellant and his mother together, and that Appellant had the intellectual capacity of a two-year old. Appellant testified in his own defense, challenging his admissions to the detectives, and maintaining that he did not sexually assault and murder the victim.
The Commonwealth presented rebuttal evidence concerning, inter alia, Appellant's confessions. In addition, the Commonwealth sought to introduce incriminating statements that Appellant made to
Appellant was found guilty and, in the penalty phase, the Commonwealth offered as aggravating circumstances that the murder was committed during the perpetration of a felony, and that Appellant had knowingly created a grave risk of danger to another person in addition...
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Commonwealth of Pa. v. Smith
...insanity acknowledges commission of the act by the defendant, while maintaining the absence of legal culpability. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 865 A.2d 761, 788 (2004); Commonwealth v. Cross, 535 Pa. 38, 634 A.2d 173, 175 (1993). Where a defendant has testified at trial and has deni......
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Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, J-16-2013
...law at the time of trial. See Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 604 Pa. 493, 560-61, 986 A.2d 759, 801 (2009); cf. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 355, 865 A.2d 761, 810 (2004) (noting counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to object to an instruction that was legally required at the......
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Com. v. Williams, No. 430 CAP.
...the position alluded to by the Romero lead was rejected previously by the Court on developed reasoning. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361-62 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813-14 n. 56 (2004) ("As here, . . . rulings in [Williams and Wiggins] were issued in the context of colla......
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Commonwealth v. Baumhammers
...law at the time of trial. See Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 604 Pa. 493, 560–61, 986 A.2d 759, 801 (2009); cf. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 355, 865 A.2d 761, 810 (2004) (noting counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to object to an instruction that was legally required at the......
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Commonwealth of Pa. v. Smith
...insanity acknowledges commission of the act by the defendant, while maintaining the absence of legal culpability. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 865 A.2d 761, 788 (2004); Commonwealth v. Cross, 535 Pa. 38, 634 A.2d 173, 175 (1993). Where a defendant has testified at trial and has deni......
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Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, J-16-2013
...law at the time of trial. See Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 604 Pa. 493, 560-61, 986 A.2d 759, 801 (2009); cf. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 355, 865 A.2d 761, 810 (2004) (noting counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to object to an instruction that was legally required at the......
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Com. v. Williams, No. 430 CAP.
...the position alluded to by the Romero lead was rejected previously by the Court on developed reasoning. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361-62 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813-14 n. 56 (2004) ("As here, . . . rulings in [Williams and Wiggins] were issued in the context of collateral......
-
Commonwealth v. Baumhammers
...law at the time of trial. See Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 604 Pa. 493, 560–61, 986 A.2d 759, 801 (2009); cf. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 355, 865 A.2d 761, 810 (2004) (noting counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to object to an instruction that was legally required at the......