Com. v. Ingram
| Citation | 440 Pa. 239,270 A.2d 190 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Lloyd INGRAM, Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 09 October 1970 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania |
Page 190
v.
Lloyd INGRAM, Appellant.
[440 Pa. 240] Harold Cramer, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., James D. Crawford, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Division, Michael M. Baylson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Richard A. Sprague, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before BELL, C.J., and JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS and POMEROY, JJ.
Page 191
OPINION OF THE COURT
BELL, Chief Justice.
On the evening of April 24, 1967, at approximately 8:30 P.M., Huriel Hildreth, the deceased, and Eugene Butler entered Margie's Bar at Second Street and Allegheny Avenue, in the City of Philadelphia. According to the testimony of Butler, an Eyewitness to the homicide, they entered the bar so Hildreth could make a longdistance telephone call. The telephone was located in the rear of the bar, adjacent to a pool table where defendant-appellant Ingram and others were playing [440 Pa. 241] pool. Hildreth was making his telephone call when appellant requested him to move because Hildreth was blocking appellant from taking his next shot. Hildreth refused. Appellant walked over to the bar, grabbed a beer bottle, broke it, came back, and with its jagged edges struck Hildreth on the side of his face, causing him to fall off the chair in which he was seated. Appellant went back to the bar and broke another beer bottle and returned and struck and slashed the other side of Hildreth's face while he was still on the floor. Appellant returned to the bar a third time and broke a third bottle, and was about to resume his attack on Hildreth, but was stopped by the bartender and other patrons.
Butler was finally able to get Hildreth to his feet and immediately took him to the hospital. Hildreth died in the hospital that morning at 5:00 A.M. At the autopsy, the Commonwealth proved that death was caused by the severing of Hildreth's jugular vein by a jagged instrument.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree. Appellant then filed post-trial motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. The lower Court denied these motions and sentenced appellant to a term of not less than five years nor more than fifteen years. From the judgment of sentence, defendant took this appeal.
Motion for a New Trial
Appellant raises two issues as grounds for a new trial: (1) whether it was error for the lower Court not to charge the jury that it could consider the degree of appellant's Voluntary intoxication on the question of whether he had the requisite state of mind to have the legal Malice which is necessary for first- or second-degree murder, and, if not, whether he could be guilty of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter; and (2) [440 Pa. 242] whether the voir dire rule or doctrine enunciated in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, is applicable when appellant was sentenced to a term of years or life imprisonment and Not to death.
Appellant and other witnesses testified that he (the appellant) was intoxicated and has been drinking for almost four hours prior to his attacks on Hildreth. Appellant's testimony disclosed a clear recollection of all his actions and activities both before and after he slashed Hildreth with the broken bottles, but he said he had no recollection of breaking any bottle or of attacking the deceased. 1
Appellant bases his requested charge (1) on the testimony of himself and several other witnesses that he was intoxicated, (2) also the testimony of Bernard Cowitz, M.D., a psychoanalyst, and (3) on a drastic change in the long-established law of Pennsylvania with respect to voluntary intoxication.
Dr. Cowitz testified that 'as a result of alcohol ingest, very probably and very likely he (appellant) had no recollection of this incident,' and that 'there was a very definite possibility that at the time of this alleged
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offense that Mr. Ingram was not aware of his actions, as the result of the ingestion of alcohol.' On the basis of the above-mentioned evidence, appellant requested a charge that would allow the jury (1) to consider whether his voluntary intoxication rendered him incapable of having the Requisite malice for either firstor second-degree murder, and (2) to consider that the degree of his intoxication could reduce the killing to voluntary manslaughter. He argues that if the degree of intoxication can reduce a killing from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree, it [440 Pa. 243] can and should be legally adequate to reduce the killing to voluntary manslaughter. 2 For the reasons hereinafter stated, we disagree.In order to consider and refute appellant's contentions, we believe it would be helpful and wise to first consider what is murder, what is voluntary manslaughter and what effect, if any, voluntary intoxication has on each of said crimes.
The law defining murder and, except in felony murders, 3 its essential element of malice, as well as (a) voluntary manslaughter and (b) the legal effect of intoxication, is well settled in this Commonwealth.
In Commonwealth v. Commander, 436 Pa. 532, pages 536--537, 260 A.2d 773, page 776, this Court said: 'Murder' * * * is * * * an unlawful killing of another (human being) with malice aforethought express or implied * * *.
"'Malice express or implied is the criterion and absolutely essential ingredient of murder. Malice in its legal sense exists not only where there is a particular ill will, but also whenever there is a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, wanton conduct, cruelty, recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of...
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