Com. v. Ingram

Decision Date22 March 2001
Docket NumberNo. 1998-SC-1090-CL.,1998-SC-1090-CL.
Citation46 S.W.3d 569
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellant, v. Wayne INGRAM, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Albert B. Chandler III, Attorney General of Kentucky, William L. Daniel, Carlton S. Shier, IV, Assistant Attorneys General, Criminal Appellate Division, Frankfort, Counsel for Appellant.

Daniel T. Goyette, Jefferson District Public Defendant, Bruce P. Hackett, Deputy Appellate Defender, Ann Bailey Smith, Assistant Public Defender, Louisville, Counsel for Appellee.

LAMBERT, Chief Justice.

Pursuant to CR 76.37(10), this Court granted the motion for certification of the law requested by the Commonwealth to consider the following questions: (1) whether video arraignment violates the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure, (2) whether video arraignment violates the local Jefferson District Court Rules, and (3) whether the video arraignment procedure as practiced in Jefferson County violates a defendant's constitutional due process rights.

In July 1996, the Jefferson District Court began using interactive audiovisual technology to arraign defendants without having to transport them from the jail to the courthouse. This `video arraignment system' permitted the accused to see and converse with the judge, who likewise could see and converse with the accused. The arraignment proceedings occurred live over a closed circuit television. The video images and the accompanying audio feed were transmitted instantaneously. All participants were able to see and hear each other simultaneously.

Another part of the video arraignment system consisted of television monitors in the court room. From the monitors, any person who was present in the courtroom could view the arraignment proceeding. Additionally, if the accused was represented by counsel, communication between the two could be achieved through the use of conference room telephones.

Appellee, Wayne Ingram, was charged with loitering and arraigned in Jefferson District Court by use of the video arraignment system. Subsequently, he filed a motion seeking to discontinue the use of video arraignment in Jefferson County. On November 17, 1998, the Jefferson District Court issued an order holding that the video arraignment system violated RCr 8.02 and RCr 8.28, and Rule 6.05 of the Jefferson District Rules of Court. The order also held that video arraignment, as currently practiced in Jefferson County, violated a defendant's due process rights. Accordingly, the district court ordered the termination of the video arraignment system. The Commonwealth sought certification of the law on the issues decided by the trial court, and this Court granted its certification request.

The first issue is whether video arraignment violates the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure. RCr 8.02 states, in relevant part,

Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall consist of reading or stating to the defendant the substance of the charge and calling upon the defendant to plead in response to it.

RCr 8.28 provides that

(1) The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every critical stage of the trial including the empaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and the imposition of the sentence.

In its ruling, the Jefferson District Court relied upon Valenzuela-Gonzalez v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Arizona,1 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit construed the applicable federal rules to require a defendant's actual physical presence at arraignment. Other courts, however, have construed the same or similar rules otherwise.2

The language of RCr 8.02 and RCr 8.28, particularly when construed in light of RCr 1.04, 3 is broad enough to accommodate the use of video proceedings at arraignment. The closed circuit video technology operates as the functional equivalent of an in-court arraignment, as both the defendant and the judge can see and hear each other. Moreover, the requirement that the arraignment be held in open court is satisfied because a television monitor allows any member of the general public present in the courtroom to observe the proceedings.

The second issue is whether video arraignment violates local Jefferson District Court Rule 6.05, which requires that at all arraignments the defendant be given in-hand notice of the next scheduled court date. To comply with this rule, under the video arraignment system the defendant's new court date was entered into a computer in the courtroom, and then that date was sent to a printer located near the defendant. The trial court held that JDR 6.05 was violated in practice because the printer often malfunctioned and because there were no court personnel at the delivery area to assure that defendants actually received the document from the printer. Although the technical problems noted by the trial court are a cause of concern to this Court, the fact that the accused is being arraigned over closed circuit television does not violate the tenets of MR 6.05. Whether an arraignment is conducted in the courtroom or by closed circuit television, it is the responsibility of the trial court to see that all aspects of the rule are observed.

The third and final issue is whether video arraignment violates constitutional due process guarantees. In its order, the trial court stated that a defendant's basic due process rights were not protected because of the poor conditions of the holding area, a frequent inability to hear and communicate with defendants over the closed circuit system, the judge's inability to see the defendant's full body on the television monitor and thus to assess the defendant's demeanor, and because of the aforementioned system of printing the next court dates. Despite these stated concerns about the technical difficulties in implementing the video arraignment effectively, the trial court's order fails to identify constitutional due process violations associated therewith. Rather, the court engrafted upon "due process of law" a host of requirements not...

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7 cases
  • Caudill v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (Kentucky)
    • June 12, 2003
    ...and equal protection. All of these arguments except the equal protection issue were addressed and rejected in Commonwealth v. Ingram, Ky., 46 S.W.3d 569, 570-72 (2001). The equal protection issue is premised upon appellants' perceptions that a non-indigent defendant could have obtained some......
  • Caudill v. Com., 2000-SC-0296-MR.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (Kentucky)
    • June 12, 2003
    ...and equal protection. All of these arguments except the equal protection issue were addressed and rejected in Commonwealth v. Ingram, Ky., 46 S.W.3d 569, 570-72 (2001). The equal protection issue is premised upon appellants' perceptions that a non-indigent defendant could have obtained some......
  • People v. Lindsey
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • June 20, 2002
    ...that our holding today is in line with the holdings of other state supreme courts which have considered the matter. See Commonwealth v. Ingram, 46 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2001) (properly functioning video arraignment is the constitutional equivalent of in-court arraignment if the video procedure is......
  • Gentry v. Deuth
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky
    • March 18, 2004
    ...petitioner's case was pending on direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, in March of 2001, rendered an opinion in Commonwealth v. Ingram, 46 S.W.3d 569 (Ky.2001), holding that the use of an interactive video system in the Jefferson District Court to conduct an arraignment did not viol......
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